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I INDEX TO BOOKS I—VI OF ŚABARA'S BHĀṢYA

(Bib Ind Edn)

By THE LATE LOL G A JACOB

[Continued from *The S B Studies, Vol II, P 28*

खदिर, 667—8,671—2

“ खनन पुरोषां [वेदिं] प्रतिष्ठाकामस्य ”

(Cf Āpast Śrauta, 2 3 5 6), 504

खलि, oil cake, 307

“ खादिरं वीर्यकामस्य यूवं etc ’, 488, 490, 493

“ खादिरे [पशु] चक्ष्णाति etc ’, 466 493 667

गर्गा शतं दग्ध्यन्ताम्, 223

गर्भदास, a slave by birth, 208

“ गर्भाष्टमेषु ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत ”, 651

“ गर्भिण्यो भवन्ति ” (T S 2 1 2 6) 446 For a new theory as to the meaning of this see Dr Barnett's notice of a book in J R A S 1909, p 473

गवामयनं, a sacrificial session, the performance of which lasts a year (Satip iv 6 2 and note to vii 1 2 1) 713, 759

“ गायत्र्या त्वा शताक्षरया संदधोत ”, 680

गार्हपत्यन्याय, 246

गुणवाक्य, “a statement meant figuratively” (MW), “indirect application (Jhṛ),—45

गुणविधि, injunction of a secondary matter, 95, 87—90, 108.

गुणानां च परार्थत्वादसम्बन्ध समत्वात्स्यात् (Sutra 3 1 22)

Cowell translates thus in Śāṅkhya Sūtra 1 19 (p 26),—
‘subsidiary portions of a sacrifice stand as such on the same level and so cannot be connected with each of her’.

“गुरुजुगन्तव्य, etc ’, 647, 650



"गृहीतान्प्रहानृत्विज आददते etc" 346 Āpast. Sr 1.16 3

"गोदोहेन पशुकामस्य प्रणयेत्",—370, 436, 491, 502.

गौण, defined, 243 6 (See too p 101)

ग्रहं वा गृहीत्वा चमसं वा उग्रीय स्तोत्रमुपाकरोति', 535

ग्रहैकान्याय (See Maxims),—224

"ग्रामकामो यजेत", 640

ग्रावस्तुत, one of the 10 priests at an Agniṣṭoma sacrifice—the extoller of the stones for pressing the soma plants (See Eggeling's notes on Śatap 18 1 21, and iv 3 3 1) —353

घटीयन्त्र, 541

घृतं शिरसि निहितं मनुष्याणां सुखकरमेव, 318

"घृतं देवानामस्तु पितॄणां, etc 317 (T S 6 1 1 4)

चक्रवाकस्तनी . नदी, 61

"चक्षुर्विमित आदध्यात्", 624 (T B 1 1 4 1 reads निमित्त'

"चक्षुषी वा एतौ यज्ञस्य यदाज्यभागौ" (T S 2 6 2 1) —487, 530

"चतुर्गृहीत वा एतदभूत्", 463

"चतुर्गृहीतं जुहोति" (T S 5 1 1 1), 345

"चतुर्गृहीतान्याज्यानि भवन्ति etc', 460, 464

"चतुर्जुहां गृह्णाति", (T B 3 3 64), 461

"चतुर्थोत्तमपो प्रतिसमानयति", 542

"चतुर्दशपर्णमास्यामाहुतय ह्वयन्ते", 442, 534

चतुर्धाकरण, dividing into 4 parts, 676

"चतुर्विंशतिमान हिरण्यं दीक्षणीयायाम्" 536

चतुर्होतृ formulas, so called from four priests (Agnīdh, Adhvaryu Hotri and Upavaktri) being mentioned in them (Śatap iv, 6 9 18 and note), 390 762

"चतुर्होत्रा पौर्णमासीमभिमृशेत् etc' (cf Āpast 2 11 5), 390, 533

"चत्वारो वै महायज्ञा etc , 526

'चमसांश्चमसाध्वर्यवे प्रयच्छति", 357, 409

चमसाध्वर्यु (Śatap iv 2 1 29 and foot note), 357, 348—9, 409,

“चमसाध्युःवृणीते”, 398.

चमसिन् (See Eggeling's note on Śatap. iv.2.1.31),—349, 356.

चपाल, a 'head-piece'-a ring on the top of the यूप, generally of wood, but occasionally of *Dongh*. (See Eggeling's note to 3.7.1.3 and 5.2.10. In the *Vedic Index* it is defined as “the monstar-shaped top-piece of the sacrificial post”),-528.

चातुर्मास्यानि, the 3 four-monthly or seasonal sacrifices (Śatap. 2.5.1) (See *Vedic Index*).—96,157.

चात्वाल, the pit from which the earth has been taken to form the high altar, and into which the कृष्णविषाण etc. are *thrown* on the conclusion of a sacrifice (See Eggeling on Śatap. 3. 5. 1. 26), 478.

“चात्वाले कृष्णविषाणं प्रास्यति” (T. S. vi. 1. 3. 8. and Śatap. 4. 4. 5. 2), 478, 638.

चारुसंरचाः (कादम्बाः), 33.

“चित्पतिस्त्वा पुनातु etc.” (T. S. 1. 2. 1. 2), 135.

“चित्रया यजेत पशुकामः,” 87, 506 (T. S. 2. 4. 6. 1).

चित्रापूर्णमास of T. S. 7. 4. 8. 2. reld. to as चैत्रीपौर्णमासी—713, 714.

“चित्रिणीरुपदधाति”, 573—5.

चोदक, a *codaka*—text enforces the performance, of a function along with its subordinate parts' (Kunte on 3. 7. 51 and 5. 1. 17), 411, 547.

चोदना ' = क्रियाया अमिधायकं वाक्यम् ', 108, 691, 701 (in these 2 sūtras Kunte renders it 'an original statement'. Should it not rather be 'originative' ?).

चोदना भूतं भवन्तं मविष्यन्तं...एवं जातोयकमर्थं उक्तोत्पद्यग-मयितुम्, 4. (Quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 135).

छत्रिन्याय, 105.

छाग may mean अश्व 'having the Jagat as its Sāma'—168, (Āpast. Śrauta xii. 14. 1).

जंजभ्यमान (जनु to yawn), 321—2. (See T.S. 2. 5. 2. 4).

जन्मान्तरानुभूतं न स्मर्यते, 65

० जरद्वय, 38, 498

"जरामर्यं वा एतत्सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रं", 194, 196

जाघनी, the tail of an animal (as used in Śatap 3 8 5 6 it is said by the purvapākṣin to stand for the whole animal—एकदेशत्वात्),—299

"जाघन्या पत्नी. संयाजयन्ति", 299 (Śatap 3 8 5 6 'they perform the Patnisamyajas with the tail (of the victim)' See too Eggeling's note in Vol I pp 75 & 256)

जातस्य पुनस्य क्रीडनकं, 564 (In १ 3 5 we have यस्य नास्ति पुत्रो न तस्य पुनस्य क्रीडनकानि क्रियन्ते)

जातेष्टिन्याय, 511

जात्यन्ध, 4, 64 65 (जात्यन्धानामिव वचनं रूपविशेषेषु), p 4 The Vedic Index omits this sense of जामि altogether See J R A S, 1914, pp 301 732

जामिता दोष, 145 The fault of repetition sameness, similarity In Śatap 1 3 2 8 Eggeling renders जामि 'a repetition and in 1 6 3 27 'sameness and 'repetition' On this latter passage Sayana says —

"एकरूपं यद्वस्तुद्वयं तद्विलक्षणेन वस्वन्तरेणाव्यवहितं तद्व्यवधानेन तद्वस्तु जामि भवति"

In Nirukta iv 20 (Vol 2, p 460, and १ 16 (Vol 4, p 67)

जामि is said to have the three meanings भगिनी, यालिश, and पुनरुक्त

See too Śabara on १ 8 63 where he explains जामि by सादृश्य See too Bhāmata pp 77 and 642

"जामि वा एतद्यज्ञस्य क्रियते यदन्वञ्चौ पुरोडाशौ, उपांगुयाजमन्तरा यजत्यजामित्वाय" (T S 2 6 6 4),—144 Sayana's bhāṣya on this mantra is as follows — 'यदन्वञ्चौ उपक्रमगता वाग्नेयाऽग्नीषोमीयपुरोडाशौ स्यातामेतेन यज्ञस्य जामि श्राल स्याय क्रियेत । अतः श्रालस्यपरिहाराय तयोः पुरोडाशयोर्मध्ये उपांगुयार्जं यजेत'

In the bhāṣya on Ait. Br. iii. 47, (Vol. 2, p 225), viz. "जामि वा एतच्छे क्रियते यत्र समानीष्यामृग्भ्यां समानेऽहन्य-
जतीति," Sāyana again explains जामि by आलस्य, but adds
"प्रयुक्तयोरेवर्चयोः पुनः प्रयोगस्य चर्चितचर्चणसदृशत्वेनाऽनु-
चितत्वात्" but Haug translates it 'laziness.'

On p. 669 of Jhā's translation of Tantravārtika (2. 2. 10) we read:—"When it so happens that between the offering of 2 cakes there is no other action to be performed, then we have the flow of jāmi [i. e. जामितादौप] and hence the mention of the removal of jāmi [i. e. अजामित्व] must be taken as enlogizing that action which would be laid down as to be performed between the 2 offerings and from this it follows that, in the case in question, what has to be enlogized is the sacrifice *Upamsu* which is distinctly laid down as to be performed in the interim [अन्तरा]."

The Nyāyasudhā on 2. 2. 10 says:—

जामि वा इत्युक्तम् । सोदर्यवाचि जामिशब्दलक्षितस्य सादृ-
श्यस्य नैगन्तर्यानुष्ठाने सत्यालस्यायापादकत्वेन दोषत्वात् etc.
जायमानस्य पुरुषस्य अग्रे शिरो जायते मध्ये मध्यं पश्चात्पादौ, 534.
'जायमानो ह वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणवा जायते etc.' (T.S. 6. 3. 10 5), 651—2.

जीर्यन्ति वा एष आहितः पशु. etc" (cf. T.S. 1. 5. 7. 3), 371.
जुह, This spoon and after sacrificial implements to be the common property of all who are performing a *sutra* (see Jhā's Prābh. Mimāṃsā, p. 210), 738—9.

जुहोति (= होम), defined as distinguished from यजति (= याग).

For the different characteristics of the 2, see Index to Jhā, S. V. होम,— 484.

जैमिनि, named in *sutra*,—210, 654.

ज्ञातसम्बन्धम्यैकदेशदर्शनादेकदेशान्तरेऽसन्निरुष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिः (cf. एकसम्बन्धिदर्शने etc. 10 Maxims iii),—10.

'ज्येष्ठो वा एष ग्रहाणां etc' (T.S. 3 5 9.1), 520.

"ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत", 598, 604, 620, 635

तत्प्रत्यन्याय, the principle that there is another scripture declaratory of it (viz of the deity, the materials etc, of a sacrifice), 89

"तत्र तत्रैवं कामा सत्रमुपेयु," 634

"तत्र तद्वाद्यत्पूर्वेस्मिन्दास्यन्स्यात्," 724

"तत्रोत्कृष्टं च अपरमितम्," 753

तदादितद-तन्याय, 550

"तद्यत्सर्वेभ्यो हविर्भ्य समवधाति," 345, 456

तद्व्यपदेशन्याय—The principle of a *Name indicating resemblance to something* So my rendering in *Maxims* III Kunte translates the Sutra 145 'तद्व्यपदेशं च' by "Again well known resemblances determine the name of a Sacrifice and explains व्यपदेश by सादृश्य In his translation, Jha renders the Sutra 'it points to the Action', but in his *Surva Mimamsa Sutra* in *Sacred Books of the Hindus*, his rendering is 'That also [should be taken as Name] which points to a similarity [between the sacrifice and the accessory that it would indicate] For Colebrooke's view see *Maxims* III 90

तनूनपात्स्वप्, 726 729

तन्त्र (See under आचाप in Index to Jhā, and Kunte on 5 2 13) —562, 568—9

तन्त्रलोप, 773

"तप्ते पयसि दध्यानयति etc, 157, 449

"तमभ्यनक्ति," Śatap 3 1 3 9 "शरेष्वेकयानीक", ditto 3 1 3 13 —413

"तं पराञ्चमुक्थेभ्यो विगृह्णाति," 555 See thus as an adjective in Tandyā xav 7 2

तरसपुरोडाश, a cake composed of meat 433

"तस्माज्जंजभ्यमानोऽनुगृयात् etc (T S 2 5 2 4),—322

"तस्मात्पितृभ्यः पूर्वेषु करोति", 496, 499 (T S 2 5 3 6 with क्रियते)

“तस्मात्पूषा प्रविष्टभोगोऽदन्तको हि सः” (T. S. 2, 6. 8. 5, and see Kunte on 3. 3. 41), 305, 308.

‘तस्माद्दीक्षितो न ददाति न पचति न जुहोति” 716.

“तस्मान्मैत्रावरुण. प्रेष्यति चानु चाह”, 407—8.

“तस्य द्वादशशतं दक्षिणा,” 391.

“तानुत्तिष्ठत ओषधयो वनस्पतयोऽनूत्तिष्ठन्ति”, (T.S.7.4.8.3),—715.

“तान्पर्यग्निकृतानुत्सृजति,” 457.

“तान्पुरोऽध्वर्युर्विभजति etc.”, 397.

“तान्स वपद्कर्त्रे हरति,” 410.

“तिस्र आहुतीर्जुहोति” (T. S. 2. 3. 9. 3), 368.

“तिस्र एव साहस्योपसदो द्वादशाहीनस्य” (T. S. 6. 2. 5. 1),—296, 324.

तिस्रो दीक्षाः,” 391, 712.

“तीर्थं वै प्रातः सघनं etc.”, 458.

तुण्डडपिस्थौ, N. of 2 men (cf. डिस्थडविस्थ in Sankara's bhāṣya on 2. 4. 20), 730.

“तुण्डमात्रे दीयताम्”, ‘let it be given to Tunda's mother’ (though she may also be the mother of डविस्थ),—730.

तुम्ब, the ‘nave’ of a wheel (So Molesworth only!).

“शोभनमस्य चक्रस्य नेमितुम्बारम्,”—99.

तुल्ययोगित्व, ‘equal applicability’, 134.

तूपर (= शृंगरहित. See Sāyaṇa on T. S. vii, 5. 1. 2),—40, 154. (See *Vedic Index*).

तूष्णीं होम, 577.

“तेजः संस्तवो ब्राह्मणस्य etc.” 731.

“तेनावभृथं यन्ति,” 480.

त्रयीविद्यः, ‘knowing 3 Vedas’, 279.

“त्रिधा तु पञ्चधा तु वेदो स्तृणाति,” 429.

“त्रिवृदग्निष्टुदग्निष्टोमः etc.”, 162.

“त्रिवृद्यहिष्पवमानं पञ्चदशान्याज्यानि”, 535.

- “त्रिरातं त्रींश्च देवान्”, the 33 gods,— (R V 3 6 9),—271
- “त्रीणि ह वे यज्ञस्योदराणि etc”, 573
- “त्रीण्येतानि हवींषि भवन्ति etc”, 522 (T S V 5 1 7)
- ‘त्रीन् ललामान्’, ~ Three with marks, 444 (cf त्रयः कृष्णललामाः of T S 5 6 20)
- “त्रेधा तण्डुलान्विभजेत्” 708—9 (T S 2 5 5 2)
- त्र्यपिष्य ‘having 3 sacred ancestors’, 629
- “दक्षिणस्य हविर्धानस्याधस्ताद्यन्वार उपरवाः etc”, 427 [Apatamba Śrauta xi 11 1]
- “दक्षिणा सोमस्य,” 391
- “दक्षिणे हविर्धाने सोममासादयति”, 394
- दण्डकालितयत् ‘like the measuring [of a piece of ground] with a stick’ (See Com on Apat Śrauta xi 12 6 and my note in J R & S for 1912, p 744), 569 [S Vol 2, p 521]
- ‘दण्डी प्रैषानन्याह्” 479
- “दण्डेन दीक्षयति,” 578
- ददाति (=दान), defined as the actual transfer to another of the thing given, 484
- “दधनि चरुं, शृते चरुम्”, 710 (T S 3 5 91)
- “दध्ना जुहोति,” 494
- “दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयात्,” 493
- “दध्निरासि etc”, 283 (T. S 1 6 1 6)
- “दर्भमयं वासो भवति” 772
- “दर्भमयी रशना भवति” (Śatap xiii 1 1 2),—378
- दर्विहोम, an oblation made with a ladle or ‘an oblation of a *darvi* spoonful of boiled rice to Indra and may be considered as part of the Gṛhamedhyāṅga, being, as it were an offering of remains, like all *Juhvā* offerings, the *darvihoma* is performed by the Adhvaryu while seated on the north side of the fire’ [Eggeling’s note on Śatap ii 5 3 17],—762,
- दशैः = उच्चारण in 1 1 18 (p 29), the utterance {of a word}’
- दर्शपूर्णमासः न्याय, 504

“दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत” 598, 604, 607, 620, 635, 682, 697.

“दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्टा सोमेन यजेत” (T. S. 2.5.6.1),—195, 526, 597: with दर्शपूर्णमासौ etc., 510, 737.

“दर्शो वा एतयोः पूर्वं, etc.” 532.

“दश चमसाध्वर्यवः etc.” 399,

दश दाडिमानि an example of अनुपपन्नार्थवचन.—13, 497 (an अनर्थकवचन). [Mahābhāṣya vol 1. p. 38].

दशमुष्टिपरिमित सोम, 152—3; 303.

“दशमुष्टीर्मिमीते,” 302.

“दशयज्ञायुधानि” (T. S. 1.0.8.3),—214. (See under यज्ञायुध).

“दशापवित्रेण ब्रह्मं संमार्ष्टि” 225, 230, 378. (See ब्रह्मकत्वन्याय in *Maxims*, iii).

दाक्षायणयज्ञ, a peculiar modification of the new and full moon sacrifices originated by the Dākṣāyāṇas—a royal family. [See Śatap. 2.4.4 and Eggeling's long note at the beginning of it.]—179, 180.

दानदोमपाकाः, 716.

दाशतय, ten-fold, relating to R. V. with its 10 maṇḍalas,—258.

दीक्षणीयेष्टि, ‘consecration offering’,— (Eggeling¹ on Śatapatha 3.1.3),—383, 535, 566.

“दीक्षाः सोमस्य,” 391.

“He cuts (a tree for) a sacrificial post at the time of initiations” (Kunte).

“दीक्षासु यूपं छिनत्ति,” 551. Cf Apast. Śrauta X. 4.14 (with कार्यात).

दीर्घसोम = सोमयागविशेष (Madhva), 301.

“दीर्घसोमे सन्तृत्याद्भृत्या” (T. S. 6.2.11.3), 301.

“दुर्घर्णोऽस्य भ्रातृव्यः,” (T. B. 2.2.4.6), 326.

दुष्टेषु हि घ्नानं मिष्ट्या, 8.

“दत्तिनयनीतिमान्यम्”, ‘butter consisting of butter [long-stored] in a lot’ [for use as a अयेन = sacrifice],—431.

दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं नाम,—2.

‘We see that its [i. e. the veda’s] object is the laying down and enjoining of a certain action. [Quoted in Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya, vol 1, p. 49]

देवदत्तः प्रातरपूयं भक्षयति etc., 548.

“देवस्य त्वा सावेतुः प्रसवे” (T. S. 1.8 7.2), 7.1 11 1, 132.

“देवा ऋययो गन्धर्वास्तेऽन्यत आसन् etc.” (Cf. T. S. 2.4.1.1),—523.

देवानां प्रिय, 684.

“देवा वै देवयजनमध्यवसाय etc.,” 39 (T. S. 6.1.5.1).

“देवा वै शम्यं चाहस्पत्यमब्रुवन् etc.,” 324 (T. S. 2.6.10 1).

“देवा वै सत्रमासत” (T. S. 1.6.1.3), 605 6.

“देवा वै स्विष्टकृतमब्रुवन् हव्यं नो वहेति,” 338, 342, 455.

“देवेभ्यो वनस्पते हवीषि etc.,” 79 (T. B. 3.6, 11.2).

“दैवतान्यवदाय etc.,” 562.

द्रव्यसंस्कार, ‘preparatory operations performed on Sacrificial Substance’s (Kunte), 427.

“द्वादशदीक्षा,” 712. See X. 2 27.

“द्वादशरात्रीर्दाक्षितो भृतिं चन्वीत,” ‘should procure food (by begging),—713, 771.

“द्वादश वै रात्रयः संवत्सरस्य प्रतिमा,” 760.

द्वादशहृत is the amount of dakṣiṇā to be given to a priest at the Jyotiṣtoma,—412, 749—59.

“द्वादशाहेन प्रजाकामेन याजयेत्,” 634.

“द्विरैन्द्रवायवस्य भक्षयति etc.,” 348.

“द्विर्हविषोऽवदानं,” 336, 559.

“द्वियचनबहुवचनान्तानामसमाप्त,” 757.

द्विषेप, ‘having a remainder twice’ (from soma being poured into a cup twice without its being washed). See Kunte’s note,—267.

“द्विष्टानि वाक्यानि,” ‘ambiguous sentences’, (Mahābhāṣya, vol. i, p. 14, and Nāges’a, vol i, p. 51),—492, 493 (singular).

द्वयद्वकाल्य, 'belonging to 2 days,—595.

द्वयवदान, 'cutting off two' (pieces of the Puroṣaṣa)—a double oblation (Kunte), 336, 674, 676—7.

"द्वयवदानं करोति," 336.

"द्वयवदानं जुहोति," 674.

"द्वयद्वं नाश्नाति etc.," 415.

"द्वयद्वं साकमेधैः," 549.

द्वयाम्नाता मन्त्राः, mantras which appear in the Veda,—419.

"धर्मप्रजासम्पन्ने दारे नान्यां कुर्वीत" (Smṛiti), 768.

धर्मं प्रति विप्रतिपन्ना बहुविदः—'There is great difference of opinion among learned men in regard to Duty',—3.

"धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च नातिचरितव्या (स्त्री)," 611—12, 767-8.

धाय्या, certain Rik verses, 570. See Kunte on 5.3.5.

धार्मिक, defined as one who offers sacrifice, 5.

धूया, a spoon for ghee (See Eggeling's note, vol i, p. 67),—342, 388, 477.

"न कलङ्गं भक्षितव्यं न लगुनं etc.," 644.

"न केसरिण्येयं ददाति न उभयतोदतः प्रतिगृह्णाति" (केसरिन् = अश्वः, 744.

नक्षत्रेष्टि (See Index to Jhā), 564.

न च कलुषे उपपद्यमाने कल्प्यः शक्यः कल्पयितुम्, 414.

न च दृष्टे कारणे सत्यदृष्टं कल्पयितुं शक्यते, 11.

न च पदार्था एव वाक्यार्थः etc., 32.

न च स्निग्धस्य स्नेहनं रुतम्, 459.

"न तानयन्ति etc" (R.V. vi.28.3), 124.

नदीयेगस्थानीय. 717.


नद्यास्तीरे फलानि, 4.

"न पिता वर्धते न माता etc.," 428.

न पुनरुक्तता महान्दोषः, 476.

"न प्रथमयने प्रयुज्यात् etc.," 304 (See Eggeling on 3.4.4.1).

"नर्तुं स प्रतीक्षेत् नक्षत्रम्," 592.



नवनीत, 431—2

“नवनीतेनाभ्यङ्गे,” (T S 6 11 5), 318

“नव प्रयाजा इज्यन्ते नवानुयाजा” (T B 1 6 3 3),—568

नष्टाश्वदग्धरथ-याय, 109 (Mahābhāṣya, vol 1, p 125)

न सप्तदशावरा. फलसमवाये भवेयु, ” 665

न सर्पायाहुलि दद्यात्, 646

न हि कपाले नष्टे तदन्वेपणार्था इष्टिर्युक्ता, 512

न हि काकिन्यां नष्टायां etc, 512

न हि निन्दा निन्द्यं निन्दितुं प्रयुज्यते etc, 203

न हि मन्दविषेण वृश्चिकेनाऽपि दष्ट etc, 185

न हि वचनशतेनाप्यनारभ्योऽर्थ. etc, 215.

न हि स्रजि चाससि वा भिक्षे etc, 658

न ह्यकृते प्रयोजने कश्चित्प्रतिपादयितुमर्हति, 356

न ह्यज्ञातेऽर्थ कश्चिद्बुद्धिमुपलभते,—9 (Quoted in Nyāyamañjarī, pp 17,162)

न ह्यनभिधाय मुख गौणमभिधदति शब्द, 245

न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभाषेऽन्यस्य वैतर्यं भवितुमर्हति, 5

न ह्यप्रतीते विषेण्ये विशिष्टं केचन प्रत्येतुमर्हन्ति, 82

न ह्यप्राप्तस्य प्रतिषेध, 629 (T S 6 3 1 5)

“नाध्वर्युरुपगायेत्” 401

नानाबीजेष्टि, a Sacrifice at which various kinds of grain are used, 562

“नानृतं वदेत्” (T S 2 5 5 6), 318,440

“नान्यस्य स्वरुं कुर्यात् etc,” 467

नामधेय, name (of a Sacrifice etc),—86,87,89—91,96,108

नामानि, defined in sutra 2 1 3 —

“Such words, on the utterance of which, the forms of the objects denoted are directly cognized, are nouns” (Jhā).

नामिक ‘relating to a name or noun

(एषां विभक्तयो नामिक्य उच्यन्ते), 111.

नाराशंसकल्प, 726—9

["Nārāśamsa, 'pertaining to Nārāśamsa (man's praise, i. e. Agni, or Soma, or the Fathers),' is the name given to certain remains of soma-libations sacred to the Fathers, which in the nine soma cups, are temporarily deposited under the axle of the southern soma-cart, till they are drunk by the priests at the end of the libation." Eggeling on 3 6.2.25].

नारिष्ट होम, 564 (also X 401). See नक्षत्रेष्टि in Index to Jhā.

नावनीत, freshly-boiled butter, 96

"नासोमयाजी संशयेत्" (T. S. 2 5.5.1), 596.

"नास्या अन्नमद्यात्" (T. S. 2.5 1.6). 325-6.

नास्ति दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नम्, 17.

निगद्, the name of certain yajus mantras which being addressed to others are recited *loudly* (See under मन्त्र in the Index to Jhā),—129, 131, 292.

निधन, the final or concluding word of a Sāman, to be sung in chorus by the Prastotar, Udgātar, and Pratibartar (See Eggelings long note on iv. 2 5.10). ह्रीप् is the *nidhana* at the end of सौभरसाम to be sung by one desiring rain, 165—6.

निनयन, pouncing out of Sacrificial water, [See Śatap 1 9.2.32. 33, and Kunte's note on 4 2 14], 477

नियोगतः, necessarily, of necessity, 643

निरालम्बन, 'without support (i. e. ideas without external objects—the निरालम्बनवाद or Idealism of the Buddhists),—8.

निर्मन्थ्य, 'fire produced by friction' to be taken in its literal sense in vedic texts,—96

निचिद्, N. of short detached formulas inserted in a liturgy etc. (See Eggeling's note on 1.4 2.1. and translation of iii.9).

"निवीतं मनुष्याणां etc.," (T. S. 2.11.1), 312.

निवृत्ति, cessation of application (in opp to प्रवृत्ति. See Kunte on 3 7.12), 392.

“निवेशनं संगमनो वसूनां etc.” (V. S. III 66. See गार्हपत्यन्याय in *Maxims*, III),—246

निषादस्थपतिन्याय, 632.

निष्कय, ‘buying off’—a ransom, an equivalent (the स्वरु being thrown into the sacrificial fire *instead* of the यूप)—529, 694.

“नीचैःसदो मिनुयात्”, 417, 505.

नीलकौशेयसंवीताः (कादम्बाः) (‘geese clothed in black silk garments’), 33

“नीलोत्पलवनेष्वद्य चरन्तश्चासुरवाः” 33, 35.

नीवारः, a substitute for व्रीहि.—381—2,657, 659, 666, 672.

नेमपिष्ट, half of flour (a certain चरु), 308—310.

“नेमे नयन्ति ऋभवो यथा,”—632 (R. V. VIII. 75, 5).

नेष्ट्रीया, verses to be recited by the Nestā priest.

(T.B. 3. 12. 9. 5),—407, 421.

नैचाशाखं नाम नगरं etc., 58. [See RV. 3. 53 14, where Griffiths renders it ‘low-born.’ Others take it as the name of a place. See *Vedic Index* It gives a *wrong* reference to R. V.]

“नेद्यन्तमादित्यमीचेत नास्तं यन्तम्”, 439, 645, 689

“पंचदश सामिधेनीरुवाह” (T. S. 2. 5 82)—369. This is referred to as पंचदश्य, T.B. 3 12. 9. 8.

‘पंच पंचाशतस्त्रिष्टुतः संवत्सरा etc, 755.

“पंचप्रयाजान्यजति” (Cf. T. S 2. 6. 1. 4), 368.

पंचशराव, ‘consisting of 5 cup fuls’, 683-5, 690, 701, 703.

पंचहोतृ (cf. चतुर्होतृ),—390.

पंचानां त्वा चातानां यन्त्राय भर्त्रोय गृह्णामि” (T. S. 1. 6. 1. 2),—419.

पंचावत्त, ‘five times cut off or taken up’. See Eggeling’s note on पंचावत्तीय in vol. 3, p. 48),—754.

“पंचावत्तं जमुदग्नीनाम्,” 754.

पत्तिनणक, an officer appointed to count the infantry (?), 102.

पत्नीसंयाजा , 299 (see Index to Jha)

“पत्नी वै परिणाय्यस्य ईष्टे etc 612 (Cf T S 6 2 1 1)

“पत्नी सन्नद्य आज्येनोदेहि,” 423

पदकर्मन्, the action connected with the 7 stakes taken by the cow to be given for purpose of soma (See Śatap 3 3 1 Kunte renders this “causing the cow to walk”), 451

पदपांशु, the dust from the seventh foot print of the सोमक्रयणी which is scraped up by the priest with his own hands and sprinkled on the axles of the soma casts (See Madhavi and Śatap 3 3 1), 451

पदचान्नार्थन्यायविद्, an epithet given to the author of a verse on विधि, 490

पदानि स्वं स्वं पदार्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि, etc 34

पदार्थानुसमन्याय, 557

“पशु वा पतत् श्मशानं यच्छूद,” 626 (‘A walking cemetery’, quoted in the Vedānta Sūtra bhāṣya 1 3 38 Compare Vasiṣṭha’s Dharmasūtra xviii 11, that of Āpastamba 1,3 9 9)

“पयसा मैत्रावरुणं शीणाति” (See मैत्रावरुणं etc)

पयस्या, a dish of curds offered to Mitra and Varuna (Eggeling on 2 4 4 14), 477

पयोधत्, ‘the living on milk alone, of the sacrificer and his wife during the performance of a Jyotistoma, 772

“पयोधत्तं ब्राह्मस्य’ (T S 6 2 5 3), 495, 623, 772

परिक्रिया (कृति), one of the many kinds of Brahmanā (as distinguished from Mantra) ‘A description of something done previously by a single person Transl Tantravartika on 2 1 33 p 572)—127, 753, 755

“पररथैर्वा एते स्वर्गं लोकां यन्ति येऽनाहिताग्नय सत्रमासते,” 737

“परा वा पतस्यायु प्राण पति याऽयं गृह्णाति’ (T S 3 3 4 2),—573

परिक्रय, hire, wages hiring engaging for wages,—339—40 396, 412

परिक्रीत, hired, engaged —397

परिचारकत्व, the position of attendant i. e. one of subordination, -742, 745.

परिधि, the name given to the 3 logs of wood placed on the north, south, and west sides of the altar [Eggeling, Vol 1, p 87, calls them 'enclosing sticks'. See Katyāyana Śrauta II. 221, p 172],—118, 509—10

परिभाषितव्य, 'to be regarded as having a technical signification',—1.

परिभोजनीयवर्हिष्, unconsecrated (i. e. अशंसकृत) grass,—429. "[पवित्रनिष्पत्तिरपि शास्त्रीयलवनादिसंस्काररहितैः परिभोजनीयनामकैर्दर्भैः संपादनीया"—Mādhyama; "अशंसकृतादेव पवित्रादि कार्यम्"—Sāradīptā].

"परिधोरीस" (T. S. 1. 3. 6. 2),—422.

"परिध्याणं कृत्वोपाकरोति पशुम्," 527.

परिसंख्या, 402, 676—7.

परिसंख्यायां स्वार्थहानं परार्थकल्पना प्राप्त्याधश्च, 402.

परीष्टि=परीक्षा in Sutra 1. 1. 3.

परोक्षं प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकं न भवति, 438.

पर्याग्निकरण, carrying fire round a sacrificial animal (Śatap. 3. 8. 1. 6),—115, 118. Also waving fire etc. round the head of a returned traveller I—117 [See Eggeling's long note on 1. 2. 2. 13]

"पर्याग्निकृतं पाक्षीवतमुत्सृजति" (T. S. 6. 6. 6. 1.),—187.

पर्यास, the third and concluding part of the Bahiṣpayamāna stotra (Kunte, 5. 3. 7), 571—2.

पर्युदास, 'exclusion' (of the Śūdra), 624.

पर्वद् (=परिपद्), 'an assembly,' 'society,' 634.

पवमानेष्टि, an oblation to Agni payamāna (Śatap. 2. 2. 1. 6. and see Eggeling's long note. Also T.B. 1. 1. 5. 10 and Kunte on 3. 6. 11), 370—2, 431, 575.

पवित्र, the purificatory ceremony at the commencement of a राजसूय,—516. (See note on Śatap. 5. 2. 3. 1). See J.R.A.S., 1914, p. 302.

पवित्र, a 'trainer (or purifier) consisting of 2 blades of Kuśa grass of equal length [See Eggeling's note on Śatap 1 1 3 1, and Kātyāyana Śrauta n 75 (p 127) Jhā (p 269 of Prab Mimāṃsā) says they are used for sprinkling water The Vedic Index—"The sieve used for purifying the Soma' and "seems clearly to have been made of sheep's wool"], 429

"पशुकाम उक्थ्यं गृहीयात् etc", 384

"पशुगन्धस्य यज्ञकृतो पट् ऋत्विज. etc" (TS 2 3 6 3 etc), 491.

"पशुमालभेत" (TB 1 5 9 7),—608—9

"पश्वङ्गं रशना चेत् etc," 528

पश्वेकव्याय, 443

पशौही (fem of पशुवह),—a cow, 516 [Wrongly given as य in Śābara In both edns of Madhava it is प्र (with पृ as variant in one) and defined thus—"यावता वयसां वर्षत्रयरूपेण पृष्ठे भारं वोढुं शक्तिर्भवति तावद्वयस्का प्रशौही" See Vedic Index]

"प्रशौही दीयति" 'he gambles with a cow (as stake)',—516-17 (cf Āpast. Śr XVIII 19 2)

पाञ्चदश्य, 369 (See "पंचदशसामिधेनी.")

पाठक्रम, textual sequence,—537, 540, 546, 586 Kātyāyana Śr 1 81

पाणिमात्रपुष्करा, (उपभृत्) 'a ladle with a bowl of the size of a hand' (See Eggeling's note on 1 3 1 1) Printed text erroneously reads प्रा, 564

पात्नीयत्वग्रह (See Index to Jhā), 187, 269

पाथिकतीय, relating to Agni (पथिकत्) 257

पारिप्लव, 122 [अश्वमेधे वाच स्तोमे च पारिप्लवं शंसन्ति Bhamatt p-252]

पार्थुरदम N of a Śaman, 491

पिकनेमसतनामरसादिशब्दा, 71 Samples of words in use among Mlecchas

पिङ्गल (and his first sutra) quoted —16

पिण्डपिनृयज्ञ (Śatap 11 4 2) —388 825—7 766—7

पुत्रनि श्रयसाय, 511—12

पुन श्रुति repetition 156 166 1 7

पुनराधेय, the re establishment of the Sacred fire (Śatap 2 2 3 and note on 4 5 1 13) —718

पुनरुक्त, repetition tautology —476 (ग्रन्थमयेन पुनरुक्त नेच्छन्ति, अर्थाग्रहणानु विभ्यत पुन पुनरभिधीयम नं बहु मन्यन्ते)

“पुरस्तात्पौर्णमास्याश्चतुरहे दीक्षेन्” (T S 7 4 8 2 wh reads चतुरहे पुरस्तात् etc) —713

“पुरस्तादुपसदां सौम्येन प्रचरन्ति etc (T B 1 8 1 2),—518, 526 Apast Śr xxiv 1 33

पुराकृत्य, one of the division of the Brahmanas— a description of something done formerly by many people (Trans of Tantravart p 572) 127 753, 755

‘पुरा वत्सानामुपाकृतोर्दिग्धर्ता अग्नीयाताम्’, 696—7

‘पुरुषदीर्घमुपदधाति,’ 727

पुरपार्थ, something wh tends to the advantage of the Sacrificer —435—6 [कृतत्रेय म कृतवर्ष पुरपाय य स पुरपार्थ]

पुरोडाश (says the purvapakin) is only applied to a cake made of consecrated flour—but this is disproved by examples from ordinary life Cf ‘पुरोडाशेन मे माता प्रह्लरुं ददाति See ग्रहेलक infra) 94

पुरोडाश आग्नेय कर्तव्य,” 336

पुरोडाशरूपालेन तुषानुपवपति 452 725 तुषा उपवपन्ति should be तुषान् (?)

“पुरोडाश पर्याग्निकरोति,” 225

‘पुरोडाशशकलमै ब्रवायवस्य पात्रे etc 469

पुरोनुवाक्या, an introductory verse 408 [In Śatap 2 5 2 21 Eggeling renders it The invitatory prayer The Vedic

Inde defines it as "The technical term for the address to a god inviting him to partake of the offering it was followed by the yājya, wh accompanied the actual oblation ']

"पुरोहितं वृणीत," 731

पुष्कर, the bowl part of a ladle—564 [See Eggeling on 1 3 1 1, and Vedic Index] *Āpast Śraut* xiv 24 12

पूतीक an authorized substitute for the soma plant [See Vedic Index] —383,659—60 669

पूर्णक, a man's name(?) (See Kunte's note on 3 2 30),—268,615
' पूर्वस्यां दिशि पता देवता etc ', 643

"पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमारयातेनाचष्टे etc ', 13

' पूर्वगुरग्निं गृह्णाति etc ", 595

"पूर्वदुरमवास्याया वेदिं करोति " 553

"पृथुवाजययौ ऋग्ने" 'those two verses The first of which begins with the word पृथुवाज are Dhīyā? (Kunte See R N 3 27 5 6 and *Āpast Śrauta* 19 18 3) 570

"पृथदाज्येनानुयायान्यजति ' (T S 6 3 11 6) 457,560,563,568
[In *Satap* 2 5 2 41 Eggeling renders पृथदाज्य by "clotted butter ' and in a note adds '(lit mottled butter) is clarified butter mixed with sown milk]

पृथ्वामत् See वराजपृथ

पृष्ठाकोट, 'twisting of the back—in turning from side to side to point out and explain diff things to a pupil Kumārila (p 416) explains it thus —

"धराणिगतानेकद्रव्यप्रत्येकनिरिक्षणे पुन पुन पृष्ठं कुटिली-
क्रियत इति तत्साम न्येन पृष्ठाकोटाभिधानम् " See Trans
p 570] —125

पोत्रीया The Rik verses to be recited by the pota priest —407,
421 (T B 3 12 9 5) Cf *Āpast Śr* xiii 24 8 9

"पौण्डरीकेऽश्वसहस्रं दक्षिणा " 329

"पौर्णमासीमेव यजेत भ्रातृव्यवान् etc 648—9 655

पौष्णपेषण, an offering to pushan,—305,306—7

"प्रउगं शंसन्ति", The *pratuga* Śastra is the name of second hymn at morning oblation (M W See Eggeling's note Vol 2 p 324), 118

प्रकरण 'context' (Jhā),—140,282,284

"प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह दूत " (Mahabhāṣya 3 1.67, vārt 2),—320

प्रचरणी, a ladle,—551

"प्रचर्षणिभ्य " (R V 1 109 6),—256 283, (in both instances Śabara has प्रच)

"प्रजाकामं चतुर्दश याजयेत् etc ', 702

"प्रजाकामो यजेत," 640

"प्रजापतिं वै प्रजा सृजमानं etc ', 756

"प्रजापतिरात्मनो वषामुदग्विदत्" (T S 2 1 1 4),—39

"प्रजापतिवैश्यायाश्वमनयत्,"—(T S 2 3 12 1),—332.

"प्रजापतिर्यो अग्निष्टोम etc ', 583

"प्रजापतिर्यो इदमेक आसीत् etc ', 278 (T S 2 1 1 4)

प्रजापतिव्रत (= ब्रह्मचारिव्रत ?)—See Manu iv 37 and Brahma Sutra bhāṣya 1 1 4 (p 76),—328,438,41,645

"प्रजामुत्पादयेत्", 651

प्रणाड्या, 'mediately,' 'indirectly' (in opp to साक्षात्),—391

प्रणीताः (आप , certain Sacrificial vessels filled with consecrated water. [See Eggeling's note on i 1 1 20 and xu 9 3 8] —477

"प्रणीताभिर्हवींषि संयौति," 477 [In his Index to Apast Śrauta, Garbe renders प्रणीता 'holy water']

"प्रणोदेवी सरस्वती" (T S 1 8 22 1), 545

"प्रतिनिष्ठान्ति ह वा एते य एता उपपन्ति." 501

प्रतिनिधि, a substitute,—नौवारा for ब्रौहि, 381,382 (The former inferior to the latter) 659 पूतीक for सोम,—393,649, 663 666

प्रतिपत्तिकर्म The final disposing of all the materials used at a Sacrifice thus, the black antelope's horn is thrown into

the चात्वाल्त whilst remnants of cake etc are eaten and drunk (See Jhā's *Prabhākar Aṭ* pp 172,199,218),—253,474—5,477,698

प्रतिपद, a Rik to be recited at the beginning of a Stotra (Mādhava)

[In Āpast Śrauta iv 92 The word प्रतिपदि is explained by “प्रथमायामृच्यारंभे वा” in the com! In the Index Garbe renders it introductory verse],—297.

प्रतिप्रधानमाचर्तन्ते गुणा, 287 See a passage on 16 (See Maxims, Part iii)

प्रतिप्रसव, a counter order, an exception, 750

“प्रतिप्रस्थात सवमीयान्निर्वपस्वेति प्रेष्यति”

प्रतिसमानी There are 2 examples of this verb (perhaps from Śrauta Sutra) on p 342 The abridged St Petersburg *alone* shows नी with the 3 upasargas, and gives Āpast Śrauta 7 14 8 (प्रतिसमानाय) as an example

प्रतिहोम, a supplementary oblation to be offered when certain ceremonies have been omitted during a Jyotiṣoma (See Mādhava and Kunte on 6 5 40) 717—8

प्रतीक (?), 155—6

प्रत्यक्ष, defined,—6

प्रत्यक्षस्तु क्लेशो याग, 642

प्रत्यगात्मन्, ‘The individual himself —395 See *J R A S* 1914, p 304

प्रत्याम्ना (‘प्रत्यान्नेत्’ in Sutra 6 4 30), ‘To take the place of,’ to be substituted for something else The noun प्रत्याम्नाय is used in explaining it, wh according to the Vachaspathyam, means ‘a substitute So, too प्रत्याम्नान Yet, in his Index to the Āpast Śrauta Sutras, Garbe renders both of them ‘Corollary’ !,—691

प्रत्याम्नाय, 692 (See above)

“प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमानि”, 223

(Paribhāṣā See Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p 57 etc)

“प्रदोषमग्निहोत्रं ह्यनव्यं व्युष्टं यां प्रातः”, 648—9

“प्रपिष्टानां कर्तव्या” (i.e. the रश्मि is to be made of crushed दर्म),—378

प्रभुत्वयोग, ‘the relation of lordship or ownership’ (with reference to the meaning of सर्वस्व in connection with विश्वजित्), 742—3

प्रमग्नो राजा (Rv iii 53 14) The king of the Kikātas See Vedic Index, 58

प्रमत्तगीत, ‘sung by (or song of) a mad man or drunkard’ (See same in Mahābhāṣya vol 1, p 3),—160 231

प्रयत्नेनान्विच्छन्तो न चेदोषमवगच्छेमहि etc 8 (Quoted in Nyayamanjri, p 173)

“प्रयाजयेवेण हवीष्यभिघारयति” 457

प्रयाजाः ‘fore offerings’—“oblations of clarified butter introductory to the chief Sacrifice” (note to Śatap 1.3 2 8) There are 5 of them corresponding with the 5 seasons (1 5 3 1),—563

“प्रयाजे प्रयाज्ञे शुष्णल जुहोति ” 367, 531 (T. S 2.3, 2.3. and Apast Śrauta xix 21 10).

प्रयोगकालाद्बहिरेतदङ्गं सद्युपकारकं भवति, 438

प्रयोगप्राशुभावात् ‘on all of rapidity of utterance (?)’,—537.

प्रवर The call to Agni or to a priest to assist at a Sacrifice (See Śatap 1.4 2 1, and 1.5 1 1—Also Kunte on Sutra 3.5 44 and Vedic Index),—128, 360—1.

प्रवर्ग्य, the offering of heated milk as introductory to a Soma Sacrifice, 304 (See Eggeling on 3 4 4 1).

प्रवीण; a sequence determined by the procedure, or order of commencement (of a series of acts, to be followed through-out),—537, 542, 550, 587.

प्रसह्यकारिन्, 101, 682

प्रस्तरप्रहरणन्याय, 252, 698—9. (See Maxims iii)

‘प्रस्तोता प्रस्तौति etc.”, 397.

“प्रहस्य परिधीन् जुहोति हारियाजनम्” (cf Apast Śrauta viii 17 1), 509

प्रहेलकं, a sweetmeat (a Purodas'a as such),—94

प्राक्रमिक 'one who undertakes much without finishing anything' (Said to occur in com on Gout Dharma Śāstra 9 73) प्राक्रमिकोऽयं कापुरुष 504.

“प्राचीनवशं करोति” (T S 6 1 1 1) 317.

“प्राचीं देवा अभजन्त” (Ditts),—316

“प्राचीमाहरति etc (cf T B 3 2 1 3) 472 (प्राची is the name of a *branch*—not of a region)

“प्राणभृत उपदधाति” [प्राणभृतः is the name of certain bricks forming one of the layers of the Sacrificial altar Śatap viii 1 17],—105

“प्राणापानवेद्यामन्थत्ते” (T S 2 5 2 4) 322

“प्रात प्रातरनुत्तं ते वदन्ति etc” 198 (Ait Br v 31, vol 3, p 192)

प्रातरनुवाक, ‘morning hymn’ [“the Prataranuvāka, or morning prayer has to be recited by the Hotṛ in the latter part of the night before any sound (of birds etc) is to be heard. It may begin immediately after midnight and conclude as soon as day light appears” Eggeling's note on Śatap 3 9 3 10 For other references See *Vedic Index*]—407, 409, 551

प्रातर्दोह, 377

“प्रायणीयेष्टि, ‘opening Sacrifice’,—345 (Śatap 3 2 3, and See Eggeling's long note on para 6 of same)

प्रायदर्शन (Sutra 2 3 16 “विशये प्रायदर्शनात् is rendered by Kunte—“In case of doubt the generality of texts (ought to determine the sense), and by Jhā—“In a doubtful case, the correct conclusion is arrived at by a *perception of similarity*”,—184

प्रयिक 'usual,—125,126,127

प्राये (in Sutra 2 2 12 'प्रायेदर्शनाच्च' is rendered thus by Jhā —
 "Also because the Sacrifice in question is mentioned in
 Vedic texts *as if it were* a primary Sacrifice Kunte's transn.
 of the Sutra is —“(It is an original statement) because
 something is *frequently* described (as principal and impor-
 tant) ,—146

प्रवर्तिकक्रमः (See प्रवृत्ति), 542

प्राशित्र The portion of the Havis eaten by the Brāhman at a
 Sacrifice [In a note on 1 7 4 10 Eggeling says —
 'According to Katy in 4 7 the *pratitra*, or Brāhmana's
 portion, is to be of the size of a barley or pippala
 berry"], 241,676

प्रासन The throwing of the black deer's horn into the pit
 (चात्वाल) as in Śat 4 4 5 2 and T. S 6 1 3,8,—478—9.

प्रीति, secular pleasure, the desire of gain, is said to be the
 motive for man's action,—435,438

प्रीतिर्हि स्वर्ग स्वर्गश्च प्रीतिं प्रार्थयते,—500

"प्रेतु होतुश्चमस etc",—349, 350,356 (Śatap 4.2 1.29 and
Apast Śr xii 23 13)

प्रेष, 'an order',—408,423,772 ["A liturgical term meaning
 'direction' or 'invitation', repeatedly found in later
Saṃhitās and *Brahmanas*' *Vedic Index*]

प्रेषार्थकारिन् The performer of the sense of a Sacrificial
 direction,—424

प्रेक्षणी (in Sutra 1 4 11), to be taken in its literal (यौगिक)
 sense,—95

"प्रेक्षणीरासादय. etc",—95,423,772 (*Apast Śrauta* 2.3.11),

फलचमस, a cup containing crushed figs of the *Juncus Indica*
 with Sour milk, as a Substitute for Soma juice (See com?
 on *Apast. Śraut* xii 24 5), 362, Said to be inferior to
 Soma, 351.

फलदर्शनात्कानि फलवन्ति, 496

फलवत्सन्निधेस्तु आधारादीन्यारादुपकारकाणि, 141

फलवत्सन्निधावफलं तदङ्गं, 525, 532 (*See Maxims 11*)

बर्हिरेवसदनं जातिवाचिता, 94 *Maṭr Saṁhitā* 1.1.2 (Bloomfield)

बर्हिरादिशब्दानां दामि" 1—243, 660

बर्हिन्यार्य, 243

'बर्हिषा यूपावटमवस्तृणति" 428

"बर्हिषा वै पौर्णमासे व्रतमुपयन्ति," 694, 696

'बर्हिषि हवींषि आसादयति" 387

बर्हिस is the ordinary equivalent of तृण and *not* restricted to consecrated grass,—94

घल्वज, a kind of coarse grass,—116

घद्विरङ्गत्य, 548

बहिर्वेदि, outside the sacrificial ground or altar, 392

बहिष्पवमान (स्तोत्र),—551 ["The first stotra at each pressing is called *pavamana* (purifying, i. e. during the chanting of which the soma becomes clarified) viz the *Bahispavamana* at the morning, the *Madhyandina pavamāna* at the mid day, and the *Arbhava* (or *tritiya*) *pavamāna* at the evening pressing. The other Stotras are called *Dhurya*, to be harnessed, belonging to or forming a team" Eggeling's note on iv 2.5.7]

बहुकृतोऽपि पठ्यं वेदितव्यं भवति, 476 (an illustration to show that repetition is sometimes necessary, and is not then a fault)

बहुषु राजप्रतिमेषु उपविष्टेषु यस्य श्वेतं वृत्रं बालग्यजनं च स राजेत्यवगम्यते, 282

बहुचग्राहण, 194 653 *Āpast Sraut* xiii 4.22

"बाणवन्तः परिधय", enclosing logs made of बाण wood (?)

[In a letter dated 12 Aug 1912, Jhā says that बाण is

some kind of wood, but that it is impossible to say what that wood is],—118. See परिधि.

वाद्रायण, mentioned in Sūtra,—7,565,608.

वादरि mentioned in Sūtra,—209,622.

वाहद्विर, N of a Sāman,—491 [named after बृहद्विरि a yati mentioned in the Pañcavimśa Brāhmaṇa *Vedic Index*]

"वाहद्विरं ब्राह्मणस्य ब्रह्मसाम कुर्यात्", 491,623,733,735.

"बृहद्रथन्तरं पृष्ठं भवति",—729.

बृहस्पति सव,—507,514 [It is performed by a Brāhmaṇa with a view to obtaining the office of Purohita (royal chaplain, or family priest). Āśvalāyana places it on a level with the Rajasaya. Eggeking's note on Śatap. v.2.1.19].

"धैर्यो यूपो ब्रह्मवर्चसकामेन कर्तव्य." (cf. T. S. 2.1.8.1),—370 (See Āpast. Dharma Sūtra 1.9.26.8, and Gaut. Dharma xxiii. 17. Also Śankara's Bhāṣya 3.4.41 and Thibaut).

"ब्रह्मचार्यवकीर्णं नैऋतं गर्दभमालभेत" (sh: sacrifice an ass to Nirriti), 769.

ब्राह्मण, as distinct from mantra, defined,—(Āpast. Śrauta xxiv. 1,31.32), 127.

"ब्राह्मणं वृणीते etc",—398.

"ब्राह्मणं परिकीर्षीयत् etc",—347 (T. B. 1.8.6.2)

भक्ति, figurative language,—433.

"भक्षेहि मांसविश दीर्घायुत्वाय etc," 262 (T. S. 3.2.5.1).

भयता शाकमप्यादत्तव्यमिति काष्ठाहरणे शाकाहरणमुपाधिः, 501.

भवन्ति वक्तारः 'they say', or 'so people say', 94,95. Here and on p. 484, it is वक्तारो भवन्ति. See *J.R.A.S.* 1914, pp: 306,734,208,484. [See Kielhorn's paper in *J.R.A.S.* for 1898, pp. 19,20, on this expression in Mahābhāṣya, vol. i, pp. 5 and 250, vol. ii, pp. 272,417, which he regards as an adaptation of the Pāli *vattāro hanti* of the Jātaka.]

"भसदा पत्नीः संयाजयन्ति etc",—612 (भसद् = pudenda).

"भस्मना दण्डाः भ्युज्यात्", 380.

भाक्त, in a secondary sense, figurative, 434

"भार्या दासश्च पुत्रश्च निर्वृताः सर्व एव ते", 611

भावशब्दाः, words expressive of भावना and producing *apūrva*,—109, 111, 113, 124

भिन्नं कपालमप्सु प्रवहन्ति", 680

"भिन्ने जुहोति स्फुञ्ज जुहोति" [See Śatap xii 4 1 6 7 as to the *breaking* of a vessel or *spilling* of milk Also Āśvalāyana Śrauta 3 11 6—11], 650, 656, 677, 680, 719 See *J R A S*, 1914, p 301

भिषज्, भिषक्ति [In the pres Indic it is found in R V, viii 79 2 viz भिषक्ति विश्वं यत्तुरम् 'all that is sick he heals (or, according to Griffith, he medicines)'] Under Jaimini's Sutra 2 2 10, Śābara employs it in the sense of 'to remedy'. He says अग्नेयाग्नीषोमीयया निरन्तरं क्रियमाणयोर्जामितादेष उक्तं, तं भिषज्जितुमुपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजति इति सिद्धितम्। That is in order to *remedy* the deficit that would be brought about by bringing those 2 offerings together, the upāmsuyāja is brought in between them. He then says—कथं तेन भिषज्जिष्यते—"how will it be remedied by that means? We thus have the verb in the Infinitive mood, active voice, and in the future Indicative, passive voice—145

भुक्तिभृतकदानादि, 717

भूतं भव्यायोपदिश्यते,—viz 2 1 4, 3 4 40, 4 1 18, 4, 2 10, 111 337, 347, 475, 600 [See *Maxims* iii]

"भूतेष्टका उपदधाति" (T S 5 6 3 1), 380, 573 575

भृगुशुनकबीसष्टाः, 736

भृति, food, nourishment ('भृतिव-वीत' चद् to procure), 713

भोजनकालो वर्तते स्थालानि संमृज्यन्ताम् (where स्थालानि represents and includes all vessels in use when dining), 230

अष्टे चावसरेऽनुष्ठापमानो यजमानस्य विशुणः स्यात् etc, 361

[The प्रवर is here the subject] Cf Pītājah 1 2 6-f (42)

भूणहन्, 608

मत्वर्धलक्षणा, 'possessive indication, [by which term is understood the denoting a thing by some thing else connected with it as a quality etc , as when the word soma is made to denote a Sacrifice in which soma is used Thibaut's transn of *Arthasang aha*] —86

मध्यक (?) Is it = मध्यमक common (as property), —634—5

"मभ्यत कारिणां etc [Apast Śrauta xii 23 4 The com — explains this term by "होतृग्रहोद्गातृयजमानसदस्यानाम्", 267,

"मभ्यन्दिनेऽपररात्रे वा व्रत व्रतयति," 773

"मभ्यमानामग्नये दात्र पुरोडासा etc (T S 2 5 5 2, which reads ये मभ्यमा. स्युस्तानग्नये etc), —705

"मभ्या पूर्वार्द्धादयेदेयम्" [i e a piece of the puroḍasa is to be cut from the middle and end as द्यवदान], 674

मनोतामन्त्र ["इवं ह्यग्ने प्रथमो मनोता" Rv vi 111 T B 3 6 10 1], —562.

मन्त्र is merely अभिधानवाची and not विधायक, —Sātra 2 1 3 but some mantras are मनविधायक, e g धसन्ताय कपिजलानालभते, —2 1 32 (p 128)

मन्द्राभिभूति etc' (T S 3 2 5 1), 264 Rv x 128 1 "Let me win glory Agni in our battles (Griffith)

"ममाग्ने वचो विद्वेष्यस्तु", —425 (T S 4 7 14 1 See विहवा)

"मलवद्वाससा [स्त्रिया] न संपदेत् etc' (T S 2 5 1 5), 325

मल्हा, having a dew lap (a cow etc), 516 (See Apast Śrauta xviii 21 13)

"मस्तु पितृणां etc [T S 6 1 1 4 मस्तु is sour cream] —318

"मस्तु शुद्रस्य", 624

महाभाष्य, quoted 13 492

महायज्ञा, there are 4 viz Agnihotra, New and Full moon, Jyotiṣṭoma, and Pindapātri, 526

महावाक्य, contrasted with अवा-न्तरवाक्य, 689

मानमुवाचहरणं क्रमोऽभिपद्य are said to be the सोमधर्मा at a Jyotistoma —381

मान्त्रचणिक, contained in the words of a Vedic hymn,—90
 Āpast 6. vii 173 reads “यत्पशुर्मायुमरुतेति संज्ञाते संज्ञातहोमं जुहोति,” but the com says that the होम was offered *only* because of the killing and not because of the मायुकरण ! See संज्ञात होम See J R 11, 1914 pp 305, 732 मायु, a cry of pain (दुःखद्वेतुकशब्द) made by an animal when being killed for a sacrifice and which necessitates the संचिन्तहोम (Sayan on T S 3 1 4 3), 772

“मासमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति etc 526, 196 [See Tandyā Br xvi 4 1 and Thibaut's note on Vedānta Sūtra 3 3 40]

माहाजानिक, 15

“माहेन्द्रस्य स्तोत्रं प्रत्यभिपिच्यते,” 566

“मिथुनं च दधि च शृतं च etc, 450

“मियोऽसंयन्धन्याय, 236 [‘the axiom of mutual non connection (kunte)]

मिथ्याज्ञान, defined, 8

मुख्य (with गौण), defined —243—6

मुख्ये हि शब्दमुपलभामहे भूमावर्थम् 13 (Quoted in Nyaya māñjari, pp 155, 241)

मुख्यक्रम, the sequence of the Principal in relation to Subsidiaries —537, 545, 587

“मुख्यगौणयोर्मध्ये कार्यसंप्रत्यय.” (Mahābhāṣya 1 1, 5 and 6 3 46 etc) 246, 288, 714

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“मुक्तरामवन्ति सेंद्रियत्राय,” 446 (T B 1 8 2 2)

“मुष्टिना पिधाय etc, 375

“मुष्टीकरोति घातं यच्छति दीक्षितमावेदयति” (cf T S 5 2 1 7 1—239

“मूलतः वास्यो शास्त्रां परिवास्योपदेशं करोति” 473

मृषिकासूक्त, 122 [used at a sacrifice called पशुकादेतिनी Kunte. See]hā]

मृगतृणावत्, 432, 489, 531. (*Mahābhāṣya* iv. 1.3.)

"मैत्रलया दीक्षयति," 578, 614. (T. S. 6.1. 5).

"मैत्रश्च यज्ञो यज्ञश्च त्यागः," 415.

मैध्यतम, (conditions under which a man is) *most fit to sacrifice*,—415.

"मैत्रावरुणं पयसा श्रोणाति," 379—80, 698 (T. S. 6.4.2),

"मैत्रावरुणाय दण्डं प्रयच्छति", 478 (T. S. 6.1.4.8.2).

मोदकशकल, 454.

म्लेच्छाः (See शिष्टः)

"यः पशुकामः स्यात्तमोऽमावास्यायामिष्टा," 701, 703.

यः प्रथमः शकलः परापतेत्स स्वरुः कार्यः," 468 (cf. *Satap.* 3.6. 4.11). See *Āpast. Śrauta* xiv. 23.1.

यः सत्राय आगुरते," 693.

यः सोमेन यक्ष्यमाणोऽग्नीनादधीत etc.," 588, 592.

यः सोमेनायक्ष्यमाणोऽग्निमादधीत etc.," 589.

"यः सोमेन यजेत सोऽग्निमादधीत," 589.

"य इष्ट्या पशुना यक्ष्यमाणः etc.," 595.

"य इष्ट्या पशुना सोमेन वा यजेत etc.," 513.

"य एतानिष्टकामुषदप्यात्स त्रीन्वरान्दद्यात्" (T. S. 5.2.8.2, wh. reads योऽविद्वानिष्टकां etc).—412.

"य एतानिष्टा अयान्येन यजेत etc.," 584.

"य एवं विद्वांसः सत्रमासते etc.," 732, 737.

"य एवं विद्वानग्निमाधत्ते,"—280, 615, 623, 626.

"य एवं विद्वानग्निं चिनुते" (T. S. 5.5.2.1.),—189, 521—2, 566, 574.

"य एव कश्चन स्तोमभागमधीयीत स एव ब्रह्मा भवेत्," 736.

य एव लौकिकाः शन्द्रास्त एव वैदिकास्त एवैषामर्थाः, 79.

य एव भुतस्योत्सर्गे दोषः स एवाभुतपरिकल्पनायाम्, 340.

"यद्यतुर्जुह्वां गृह्णाति आतुभ्यस्तद्गृह्णाति" (*Satap.* 1.3.2.8),—462.

यजति (= याग), defined,—483

"यजमानः प्रस्तरः", 'the grass-bedding is the master of the sacrifice' (Transn. of Tantravart., p. 441),—100.

"यजमानचमत्तः सोममय एकेषां etc.," 735

"यजमान पञ्चमा इडां भक्षयन्ति," 676

"यजमानस्य याज्या सोऽभिप्रेष्यति होतरेतद्यजेति etc.,"—360.

"यजमानो यूपः," 103.

यजुस् is the name give to mantras which are *not* in metrical feet (like the ऋक्), or set music (like the सामन्),—129.

"यज्जगत्या परिदध्यात् etc.," 571.

यज्ञपात्राणि, the sacrificial vessels used by an आहिताग्नि must be burnt with his body when he dies (See *Āśval. Gṛhya Sūtra* 4.2.1),—442, 739.

यज्ञकृत, a sacrificial ceremony or rite,—(See a good example in Śatap x. 4 3.4, also x. 3.3 1), 402, 583—5, 481.

"यज्ञवैशसाय वा इदं कर्म," 529.

"यज्ञार्चवर्णां वै काम्या इष्टयः etc.," 430.

"यज्ञायज्ञीयं गायति",—280 (The N. of a Sāman).

यज्ञायुधानि, the ten sacrificial utensils (as per T. S. 1.6.8.3),—214, 441.

यज्ञावचर (यज्ञप्रचारहेतु Madhava), 'having its sphere in the sacrifice' (MW), 237.

"यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजन्त देवाः" (Rv. 1.164.50, A. vii 5.1),—51, 127 (as an example of the पुराकल्प type of Brāhmaṇa).

"यज्ञो हि यज्ञस्य प्रायश्चित्तिः," 680.

यत्कालं भर्दनं तत्कालं भर्दनमुत्तं, 506 (T. S. v. 6 8.1 with मिनुयात्).

"यत्पक्षसम्पितां पिनुयात् etc.," 199, 205.

"यत्पक्षपिदितं तद्देवानां etc.," 317 (T. B. 1.6 8 6).

"यत्पशुर्मायुमकृत etc.," 772 (T. S. 3.1.4.3 where Sāyaṇa explains मायुं अकृत by "मारणवेलायां मायुं दु.पक्षेतुकशब्द-मकृत")

"यापितृभ्य पूर्वेषुः करोति etc —525 (T B 1 3 10 2)

यत्पुरुषस्य प्रयो जनं प्रीतिस्तदर्थं धनस्यार्जनम्, 438

"यत्पूर्णं तन्मनुष्याणां etc —317 (T B 1 6 8 4)

यत्प्रयाजानुयाजा इज्यन्त etc 487, 530 (T S 2 6 1 5) Āpast
Sr xii 5 5

"यत्र होतु प्रातरनुवाकमनुब्रुवत उपशृणुयात्, 407, 409

"यजान्या श्रोत्रधयो म्लायन्ते etc 70

यथाकृतं तथा साधु, 752

'यथा चमसमन्याश्चमनांश्चमसिनो भक्षयन्ति etc —353, 355

"यथा वै मन्स्योऽविदितो जनमच्युनते," 374

यददृतमभोजनं तद्, 104 (cf T S vi 6 4 1)

"यदन्तर्वेदि मिनुयात् etc, —392

"यदन्यांश्चमसानुन्नयन्ति etc, —364

"यदन्यांश्चमसाञ्जुहति etc ' —363

"यदष्टानुपभृति गृह्णाति प्रयाजानुयाजेभ्यः' (T B 3 3 5 5),—462

"यदहरवैनं श्रद्धोपमेतदहरादधीति (Śatap 2 1 3 9 with यद्,
for श्रद्धा), 592

"यदाग्नेयाऽष्टाकपाल etc, —(T S 2 6 3 3),—140, 336, 655, 674.

"यदाक्ते चक्षुरेव भ्रातृव्यस्य वृंक्ते" (T S 6 1 1 5),—487.

"यदा वद्धवि संतिष्ठेत्," 680—2 (cf Āpast xi 2 11)

"यदातिथ्यायां वर्द्धिस्तदुपसदां etc ' 485

"यदाऽनशनं तदामेधाहं", 415

"यदा वै पुरुषेन किञ्चनान्तर्भवति . अथ मेध्यतमः," 415

"यदाहवनीये जुहति" (T B 1 1 10 5), 661, with जुहोति, 690,
762, and 766

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"यदि पशुरपाकृतः पलायेत् etc —80

"यदि पुरादीक्षाणां स्यु etc ' 198, 204

"यदि बिभीयादभिमोदेप्यतीति etc, —702—3

"यदि रथन्तरस्तामा सोम स्यात् etc' (Āpastamba Śrauta
xii 14 1)

"यदि राजन्यं वैश्यं चा याजयेत् etc." 168 (*Āpast. Śr.* xii. 24-5), 350, 362, 381.

"यदि वर्षेत्तावत्येव जुहुयाद्यदि न वर्षेत् श्वोभूते जुहुयात्,"—503 (T. S. 2.4.10.1).

यदि सत्राय दीक्षिता अथ "साम्युत्तिष्ठेरन्" (*Sāṅkhāyana Śrauta* xiii. 13.1 in *singular*), 711.

"यदि सोमं न विन्देत पूतिका न भिषुणुयात्" (*cf. Āpast. Śr.* xiv. 24.12), 383, 659, 669.

"यदि सोममपहरेयुरेकां गां दक्षिणां दद्यात्" (*Satap.* iv. 5.10 1.6.),—443.

यदुत्साहं जनयत्यवै गुणाय, 418.

"यदुपभृति गृहाति अनुयाजेभ्यस्तद् गृहाति" (*Satap.* 1.3.2.9), 462.

"यदेवाहः पौर्णमासं हविः etc.", 590, 593, 596.

"यद्यग्निष्टोमो जुहोति, यद्युपस्थः परिधिमनक्ति etc."—383, 386.

"यद्यजुषा जुहुयात् etc." 577 (T. B. 1.1.6 9).

"यद्यन्यस्य वृक्षस्य स्वरं कुर्यात् etc." (*cf. Āpast. Śr.* vii. 3.5)—467.

यद्यस्य कारणभूतं दृष्टं सिद्धे etc., 159.

यद्यस्योपकरोति तत्तस्य शेषभूतम्, 387.

"यद्येकं कपालं नश्येदेको मानः संवत्सरस्य अपेतः स्यात् etc.,—511 (T. S. 2.6.3.6).

यद्येनारभ्यते तत्तदङ्गम्, 574.

"यर्हि हविर्धानं प्राचीप्रवर्तयेयुः etc." (T. S. 3.1.3.1),—451.

यवघट्टार घेतसशब्दाः, 70

यवागू, rice—gruel,—307.

"यद्यगू सन्न्यस्य," 495, 623 (T. S. 6.2.5.2).

"यश्चोभयोः पक्षयोर्दोषो न तमेकश्चो भवति" (also in viii-3.14, taken from *Mahābhāṣya* vi.1.9),—735.

"यस्य खादिरः सुवो भवति etc." (T. S. 3.5 7.1),—366, 487, 501.

"यस्य गृहान्दहाति etc." 437 (T. S. 2.2.2.5).

* 'if they should rise up without completing it'—i. e. if they should fail to carry it to completion.

यस्य च तुष्टं कारणं etc.,—8 (Quoted in *Njāyamañjarī*, p 165 यत्र च etc)

"यस्य नवतिशतं स्तोत्रियाः" *Ant B iii* 41), 582

"यस्य पर्यामयी जुहूर्भवति etc., 366, 487 (*T S* 3 5 7 1 2)

"यस्य मजाता विषायु" etc 256

'यस्य व्रत्येऽहनि etc See "व्रत्येऽहनि"

"यस्य सर्वोणि हवींषि नश्येयुर्दुष्येयुर्वा etc., 674

"यस्य हविर्निरुतं etc., —706—7 (*T S* 2 5 5 1)

"यस्य हिरण्य नश्येत् etc., 437 (*T S* 2 3 2 5)

"यस्याविने शस्यमाने सूर्यो नोदियात्", 122

"यस्यैवंरूपः स्रव etc 368 (*T S* 3 5 7 3)

"यस्याभयं हविरार्तिमाच्छेत् etc.,' (*T B* 3 7 1 8),—683, 690

"यस्योभावनुगतावग्नी अभिनिम्नोचेत् etc ' (अनुगतौ = नष्टौ), 689

"यां वै कांचन ऋत्विज आधिपमारासते यजमानस्यैव सा," 426

"या वै कांचिद्वयुंश्च यजमानश्च देवतामन्तरित etc.,' (*T S* 3 5 9 1)

"यां वै कांचिद् ब्राह्मणवतीमिष्टकामभिजानीयात्," 575

यागोऽपूर्वस्य दाता, 389

याच्ञाकयणम् 'begging and buying, 771 2

याज्या, The *yajyās* (offering prayers) are the prayers which the Hotṛ pronounces when the offerings are poured into the fire At the chief oblations the offering prayer is preceded by an *annvakya* or *puro nuvakya* (invitatory prayer) by which the gods are invited to come to the offering, and which ends with *am* ' (Eggeling's note, vol 1, p 135),—118—9, 256, 360

याज्यापनय, 360

"याज्याया अधि वषट्करोति etc.,' 360—1

यां जना प्रतिनन्दान्ते रात्री etc., 715

- या ते भग्नेऽय.शया तनूर्चर्विष्ठा etc " 134 [V S १. 8, Śatap 3 4 4.
30, "what most excellent iron clad body is thine, O Agni
etc' (Eggeling)]
- यादृशोऽस्य वेशस्तादृशो नदानाम्, 315
- "या पत्या क्रीता सती अथा.यैश्चरति", 610
- 'यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति', 194 648, 651, 653, 716
- यावज्जीविक (Sutra 2 4 1), 'lifelong,—194
- 'यावतोऽध्वान्प्रतिगृहीयात् etc, 331 (T S 2 3 2 1)
- यावद्वचनं वाचनिकं भवत्वेव 'it expresses just what is stated
(and nothing more)', 361, 572, 590, 593
- याचांश्च श्रुतस्योत्सर्गे दोषस्तावानेवाश्रुतकल्पनायाम्, 491
- युगधरत्र, the strap of a yoke,—776
- 'युवं हि स्य स्वयंती'—297 8, 636 640 (R V XI 19 2)
- युवा सुवासा." (R V III 8, 4),—422, 528
- यूपकर्मन्याय, 551
- 'यूपस्य स्वयं करोति', 466 7, 528
- 'ये ऋत्विजस्ते यजमानाः', 537
- 'येन कर्मणा ईर्ष्येत् etc ' (T S 3 4 6 2), 328
- येन च क्रिया प्रणाख्यापि सिध्यति स तस्या क्रियाया कर्ता, 333
- 'ये पुरोडाशिनस्ते उपाविशन्ति etc," 199
- 'ये मध्यमा ये स्याविष्ठा etc,' 710 (T S 2 5 5 2) See also
under 'मध्यमाना etc"
- ये मामधुक्षन्त etc (an example of a mantra consisting of a
compliment—परिदेवन),—126
- 'ये यजमानास्ते ऋत्विज', 733—4 (See ये ऋत्विज etc)
- 'यैकेणपत्नीं सन्नहति etc,' 614 (T S 6 1 3 5)
- योगीसिद्धि, 'Simultaneous accomplishment (VI W), 506—7
- योगसिद्धिन्याय, 505
- 'येऽद्भ्यं गृहीत्वा सोमाय यजते etc" (T S 3 3 4 2),—574
- 'यो दीक्षितानां प्रमीयेत etc', 665

“यो दीक्षितो यदग्नीषोमीयं पशुमाज्जभते”, 373 378, 392, 408, 428
443, 466, 528 667 773 (T S 6 1 11 6)

यो देवदत्तस्य गौ स विष्णुमित्रस्य कर्तव्य इति देवदत्तादाच्छिद्य
विष्णुमित्राय दीयते, 485

“यो वा अध्वर्यो स्व वेद स्वदानेन भवति (He who knows the
truth of the Adhvaryu priest indeed becomes wealthy —
Kunte) (T S 3 1 2 3) 408 410

‘यो विदग्ध स नैऋत etc -317 (T S 2 6 3 4)

“यो वै त्रिवृद-यं यज्ञकृतुमापद्यते etc 583—5

“यो वै मास संवत्सर etc —759

“यो वै संवत्सरमुत्पमभृत्वाग्निं चिनुते etc (T S 5 5 1 6),
see उत्पम,—521

“यो ऽश्मान्द्वेष्टि यं च वयं द्विष्म, *” 772

यो हि बहुन्यागान्कलयति क्लाय-यसावेकम्, 154

यो हि हिंसितुमिच्छेत्तस्यानुपायः, 5

“यो होता सोऽध्वर्युः, 422

यौगिक, etymological or literal (meaning), —87, 95

रथकारन्याय, 630

रथन्तरसामन् (adj) ‘having the R as its Samā, —168

‘रसायनं रायुर्दीर्घं प्राप्स्यन्ति, 756

राजन्, king (*Sama*) —711—12

राजनिजय वर्तमानं सैनिका अस्माकमिति व्यपदिशन्ति —‘Soldiers
speak of a victory achieved for the king as *our* victory,’
428

राजन्यात्रिवध्रवश्ववसिष्ठवैन्यशुनका (Cf A V n 29 3 4),—
726

राजपुरषो राजानमाश्रितो राजकर्म करोति 161

राजसूय (*Satap V 2 3*),—516

“राजसूयेन स्वाराज्यशमो यजेत, 516

रात्रिसन्न्याय, 501

रायोवाजीय, N of १ Sāmra,—491

राष्ट्रप्रतिपादनीयेष्टि, 507.

रुक्मप्रतिमोचन (T S 51 10 3), 566—7.

रुक्, 'dry'—458—9 (See सन्य)

रेवत्य, the 3 verses R V 1 30 13—15, the first of which begins with रेवतीर्न सधमाद, whence the tune as adapted to this Triplet is usually called रैवत (Eggeling, vol III, p XXI),—162

लक्षणा ह्यदष्टकल्पनाया उवायसी, 273

लावुकायन, N of an ācārya,—759

लिङ्ग, "Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out some thing) is called *linga*" (Thibaut's transn of *Artha Sangraha*, p 12) "*Linga*, sign, or 'the sense of the words' as leading to an inference" (Cowell's transn *Sandilya Sutra*, p 23, footnote),—256, 284, 285

"लोकं पृण etc" (T S 42 4 4),—575.

लोकं पृणा (इष्टका), N of a brick laid in building the altar, with the mantra लोकं पृण (as above),—575

"लोहितं निरस्यति etc",—453

"लोहितोष्णीषा लोहितवसनाऋत्विज प्रचरन्ति", 416 (*Apast Srauta* १२ 16 6)

लौकिकानि वचनान्युपपन्नार्थान्यनुपपन्नानि च दृश्यन्ते, etc (see *Mahābhāṣya*, vol I, p 38),—13 For वक्तारो भवन्ति see भवन्ति वक्तारो ।

"वाज्रणीरुपदधाति" (T S 57 3 1), 380, 573—5

"वज्रो वै यूप", 392

"वज्रो वै स्फ्य. etc" T. B 3 2 10 1), 424

"वत्सं चोपावसृजति etc",—420 (T S 1 6 9 3 4)

"वत्सजानुं पशुनामस्य वेदं कुर्यात्", 436 *Kātyāyana Srauta* 1 66—68 Compare वत्सजुं पशुनामस्य etc of *Apast Srauta* 1 65 वत्सजानु="in the form of a calf's knees")

"वत्समालमेत etc , (T S 2148),—184

"वत्सेन व्रतमुपयन्ति", 694

वध्रश्च, having castrated horse The N of an ācārya (A V.

iv 29 34, Āpast Śr xxiv 66 *Vedic Index*), 726

"वपया प्रातः सवने चरन्ति etc , 376, 428

वयो वचन (?), 777—8

वरकाः, a kind of rice, 662

"वरुणगृहीति वा एतद्यज्ञस्य यदधीजम् etc ', 480

वरुण प्रधास, 118 one of the 3 seasonal sacrifices offered

in Asādha. Some details connected with the अवभृथ

(expiatory bath) are transferred to it from Agnistoma.

[See note at head of Śatap n 51, and also n 52 Also

Śabara 7 3 12 Garbe (in Index to Apast Śrauta) calls it

"the Second Parvan of the Caturmāsya Sacrifices"]

वरुणो वा एत गृह्णाति योऽश्वं प्रतिगृह्णाति" (T S 2312 1),—

329

"वरुणो वा एतमग्ने प्रत्यगृह्णात्" 499

वचीन्याय, 425

"वचोदा अग्ने शसि वचो मे देहि", 418 (T S 1554)

"वर्षासु रथकार आदधीत", 630

वशा, 'a barren cow'—but combined with अजा (as अजावशा

in T S 3432) it apparently means a barren goat, 119, 121

"वपद्वर्तुः प्रथममक्ष", 355, 357

"वसन्तमृतूनां प्रीणामि" (T S 1623), 540

"वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानालभते," 443 (V S xxiv 20, and Śatap

xiii 5113, and note See too Śabara vi 138).

"वसन्ते ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत etc."—625

"वसन्ते ब्राह्मणोऽग्नीनादधीत etc."—(T B 1126),—175, 370,

438, 619, 622, 626 639

"वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत्", 298, 651

चाक्य, 'syntactical connection—one of the six means of as-

certaining what is subsidiary to what (Jha),—284-5

वाक्यभेद, 'Split of the Sentence,'—133 [See Note on p 177 of vol. I, of Thibaut's Transl of Vedāntabhāṣya]

"वाग्ने देवेभ्योऽपाकामद्यज्ञातिष्ठमाना" (T S 6 1 4 1),—478

"वाग्ने हविष्कृत्" (Śatap 1 1 4 11 and note), 250

वाजपेय, "N of one of the 7 forms of Soma Sacrifice (offered by kings or Brāhmanas aspiring to the highest position, and preceding the Rājasuya and Brihaspati Sava)". *MIW*. It is dealt with in Śatap 1 1 1 etc See, too, Eggeling's preface to vol III, pp XI and XXIII For this sacrifice नीवार is prescribed instead of ग्रीहि [Jai 1 2 40],—91,153,410, 416,419,456,507,772 [See *Vedic Index*]

"वाजपेयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत," 456

"वाजपेयेनेष्टा बृहस्पतिस्येन यजेत," 507,514

"वाजस्य मा प्रस्येन etc," 419 (T S 1 1 13 1)

वाजिन 'whey,' from which the curds (अमिच्छा) have been separated,—157,448,449,450 [See *Vedic Index*]

वाजिनन्याय, 449

"वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम्" ['The whey (vājina) is offered to the (divine) coursers, i e the regions or quarters' (Eggeling's note on ix 5 1 57 See too, 2 4 4 22, and *Vedic Index*),—157,449

II—STUDIES IN HINDU LAW.

BY GANGA NATH JHA

Chapter III

Judicial Procedure

In this Chapter we shall reproduce the words of Nārada, whose work among the *Smṛtis* contains the fullest and most comprehensive description of the subject, and as such may be regarded as the oldest complete account. Nārada's *Smṛti* has been translated by Jolly, but from a minor version of the text (as explained by himself in his edition of Nārada's Text, Bib. Indica). But for our present purposes, as affording a glimpse of the subject as dealt with by an old *smṛti* writer, this minor version is sufficient. We shall however, supplement it with explanations from some of the older Digests, and also with certain verses which are quoted by these as Nārada's. The most important among these verses are those dealing with the procedure to be adopted regarding the filing of the Plaint, the Answer and so forth. In the next Chapter an attempt shall be made to codify the Procedure as deduced from the various *Smṛtis*, with explanations from the more important Digests.

I. *Introductory*

1. Virtue having become extinct among men, judicial procedure has been established and the king having the privilege of inflicting punishment, has been instituted judge of law suits.

2. Written proof and witnesses are the two expedients to be resorted to for ascertaining disputed facts in a contest between two litigants.

3 Law suits are of two kinds attended by wager, or not attended by wager. attended by wager are those where it is promised in a written declaration to discharge a certain sum over and above the fine in case of defeat.

4 In a law suit attended by wager the loser has to pay the wager made by himself and a fine to the king.

5 But the declaration is pronounced to be the essence of a judicial proceeding if he gets the worst of it, the claimant loses his cause. if he gets the better of it, he wins it.

6 Family councils (*kula*) companies (of artisans), *shreni*, assemblies (of cohabitants), *gana*, an appointed judge (*adhikṛta*), and the king himself are resorts for the trial of law suits. and among these, the last in order is superior to the preceding.

Medhatithi (Manu 8.2) explains this verse, where '*shreni*' is described as 'organisation of persons belonging to the same trade, trade guilds, — '*gaṇa*', 'tribes', as 'companies of builders and other artisans. he distinguishes '*shreni*' from '*gana*' as consisting in the fact that while the former may consist of artisans working singly, the latter consists of such artisans only as work together. He quotes another explanation, whereby '*kula*' stands for '*neutral*' or '*disinterested person*'.

7 The Law, the issue of the case the conduct of the parties and an edict from the king. these are the four feet of a judicial proceeding, each following is weightier than the preceding.

This is quoted by the *Apararka* (P. 597).

8 Law is based upon truth. the issue of the case depends upon the deposition of the witnesses, the conduct of the parties becomes manifest at the trial, the king's Edict depends upon the king's pleasure.

As rendered above by Jolly, the verse does not give good sense. It is read and explained by the *Apararka* (P. 597)

10 It is said to regard four, because the perpetrator of the deed, the witnesses the judges, and the king are equally concerned by it (Ch ii 18)

11 Because it promotes justice, gain glory, renown, therefore it is said to produce four results

12 The eight constituent parts of a judicial proceeding are the king, his officer, the assessors, the law-look, the accountant, and scribe gold and fire for ordeals, and water for refreshment

13 Recovery of a Debt Deposits, Concerns among Partners, Abstraction of Gift, Breach of promised Obedience,

14 Non payment of Wages, Sale without Owner-ship, Non-delivery of a commodity sold, Rescission of Purchase,

15 Breach of Order, Contests about Boundaries, the Duties of Man and Wife, the Law of Inheritance, Violence,

16 Abuse and Assault, Gambling, and Miscellaneous Disputes, these are the eighteen heads of dispute

17. Of these again there are one hundred and eight subdivisions, therefore a judicial proceeding is said to have a hundred ramifications, owing to the diversity of men's claims

This verse is quoted in the Apararka (P 597).

18. Because it is instituted from one of these three causes love, anger, and cupidity, therefore it is said to have three causes, these are the three motives for going to law.

19. It is said to have two kinds of claims, because they rest either on suspicion or on facts, on suspicion, if the defendant has frequented bad society, on facts, if the stolen goods are produced

20. Because it concerns two parties, it is said to have two sides, of these the charge is called claim, the rejoinder answer.

21. Because both true and false statements are made in course of a judicial proceeding, it is said to have two

courses, a true statement is one agreeing with the facts, a false one is a wrong one

22 A dutiful king shall check falsehood where it has not been checked by others and strive after truth, since it is justice that happiness springs from

23 Therefore a king having seated himself on the throne of judgment, should discard interested motives, and deal even handed justice to all his subjects, as if he were Vairavasvata himself

24 He should carefully examine all claims, one after the other, according to the respective rank of the claimants, considering what would be useful or injurious, and just or unjust

25 Taking the law code for his guide, and abiding by the opinion pronounced by the chief judge

This is quoted by the Apararka (P 600) as laying down the necessity of appointing a Judge and in support of the view that if a case is being tried by the king himself, the Judge should also be there to advise him

26 Firstly, the litigants have to appear before the court, secondly the drift of their dispute has to be expounded then comes the examination and lastly the sentence, thus the trial of a law suit consists of four parts

27 The trial should be conducted discreetly and skillfully, and without neglecting either sacred or profane rules of conduct

The Apararka (P 600) quotes this in support of the view that all kinds of laws have to be considered and reconciled.

28 Where religious and secular rules are at variance the secular rules have to be put aside and the religious precepts to be followed

Cf Vyāsa Ukyā—*Atithastrāttu balavad dharmashastramisthiti*

29. The law ordains to take logic for one's guide, when the sacred law cannot be applied, for the evidence in a law-suit is more decisive than the law, and overrules the law.

30. Let the judge proceed slowly in all trials relating to debt and so on, on account of the intricacy of law-cases and the insufficiency of memory.

31. If the defendant does not speak, he must be confined and punished according to law, and if he does not refute the statement of his adversary, he has to pay the money, which he is sued for.

32. A charge relating to a cow, land, gold, a woman, theft, the two kinds of insult, and violence, has to be answered immediately. [Cf *Mitākārā*, P. 280]

33. One may wait for one day, for five, or three days, or three half-months, or seven days, if the claim relates to a debt or the like.

34. He who tries to enforce a claim, without giving notice to the king previously, shall receive a severe punishment, and his claim shall be rejected.

35. A claimant may arrest his adversary until the arrival of the summons, if the latter tries to evade the claim he is about to prefer, or does not refute his charge.

The *Aparārka* (P. 607) quotes this verse and explains 'summons' as the 'summons-bearer'.

36. Arrest is four-fold local, temporary, inhibition from travelling, and from pursuing one's occupation; and the person under arrest is not allowed to break it.

The *Aparārka* (P. 607) quotes this verse, and adds the following explanation. The arrest is 'local' when the culprit is prevented from entering certain places, it is 'temporary' when food is denied to him for a certain time,—'occupation', such as cultivating of land and so forth.

37. No culpability attaches to him who breaks an arrest put upon him while crossing a river or while passing a forest,

in an inhospitable country or, generally speaking in perilous circumstances

38 One who having been arrested at a proper time, breaks his arrest, is to be fined and one arresting improperly is liable to penalty

39 One desirous of celebrating his nuptials afflicted with an illness about to perform a sacrifice distressed sued by another party, employed in the king's service

40 Cowherds while tending their cattle husbandmen in the act of cultivation artisans engaged in their trades soldiers engaged in warfare,

41 A minor a messenger one about to give alms or fulfilling a vow, and one surrounded by difficulties must not be arrested by the adversary nor summoned by the king

These three verses are quoted in the *Upaśa* (p. 607)

42 A person arraigned not having refuted the adversary's charge cannot bring forward an alim nor is it allowed to injure one accused by another party by trying to intimidate him

43 No one must alter the charge he has brought before the judge he who rests his alim on different grounds from those first adduced by him loses his cause (Cf. *Uta*, p. 272)

44 Nor must one bring forward a false claim for it is a sin unjustly to accuse a man the punishment inflicted in such lawsuits falls upon the claimant

45 A man may delay his answer as long as the law permits it if he does not speak in the judicial assembly, or alters his former statements it shows that he is in the wrong

46 He who does not obey the summons or having appeared before the court does not answer the charge is to be fined by the king & having lost his cause

47 After the sentence has been passed, evidence is to no purpose, unless it consist in the deposition of witnesses, or in documents, referred to in a former stage of the trial

(This is quoted in the Aparārka P 630)

48 As the powers of rain are lavished upon ripe grain, so evidence is no longer useful if once the decision has been passed

49 Even false statements are examined if made in proper time, but what is left unsaid through inadvertency has no effect even though it be true

50 He who thinks a law case to have been wrongly decided and judged, may have it tried anew, if he pays the double amount of the fine inflicted

51 If an unjust sentence has been passed, the judges have to pay the fine for nobody certainly commits an offence without being liable to punishment for it

52 Whether it be through passion, ignorance, or avarice, that a judge pronounces an unfair opinion, he must be considered as no assessor of the court, and the king should severely punish that sinful man

53 But a king especially, who is careful to discharge his duty, must endeavour to distinguish right from wrong, because human minds are subtle

54 There are men who bear false testimony from avarice, and there are other wicked men who forge written documents

55 Therefore both documents and witnesses have to be carefully examined by the king, the former by inquiring into the condition of the writing, the latter by inquiring into the nature of their deposition

56. There are skilful men who imitate the hand writing of others, therefore similarity of handwriting affords no conclusive proof

57 Liars may have the bearing of veracious men, and veracious men look like liars. Men in general appear in various shapes, thus caution is required.

58 Hence it is right to examine a fact strictly, even though it occurred in the inquirer's own sight. He who ascertains facts by rigid investigation, does not deviate from justice.

Additional verses (not translated by Jolly) quoted and explained in the Apararka —

1 'No law suit shall be admitted—which is filed by one against several persons, or which is filed against women or slaves, or that between teacher and his pupil, or between father and son, or between husband and wife, or between master and servant,—and it adds the following explanations — One man cannot sue several persons simultaneously, if he has claims against several persons, he should file them separately,—if one has claims against women he shall sue their guardians but milkmaids and women selling wine may be sued by themselves—similarly for claims against slaves, their masters have to be sued—If the pupil has been chastised by the Teacher in accordance with law, it is not open to the pupil to prefer against him a charge of assault. Similarly in the case of father and son (P 610)

2 'Before the Defendant has filed his answer, the Plaintiff shall set forth in writing all that he desires to state' (P 611)

3 'That man should be permitted to make his statement first whose suffering may be greatest, or whose suit may be most important,—not necessarily one who has filed his suit first' (P 611)

4 'When the Plaintiff has stated his claim, the Defendant should state his answer traversing the claim, which

should be firm, definite, consistent, set forth in clear language',—i.e. in words which do not stand in need of amplifications or explanations

5 'This answer may be in the form of (1) Denial ('The claim is untrue—I know nothing of this claim—I was not present at the time of the transaction—I was not even born at the time)—or (2) Admission (of the truthfulness of the claim),—or (3) Confutation—admitting the claim but *confuting* it (as already paid)—or (4) Citation of a Previous Decision (Pp 612 613)

6 'In criminal cases, the person who committed the offence first should be punished more heavily, where the two parties assaulted each other simultaneously, the punishment should be equal' (P 617)

7 'A party is *non suited* in four ways (1) By making an answer which does not touch the claim, (2) by vitiating the proceedings, (3) by not answering the summons, (4) by not making an answer, and (5) by absconding after being summoned'. (P 621)

[What is meant by 'vitiating the proceedings' is explained in the following verse —]

8 'Even on the clear presentation of facts, if he does not accept it,—after having denied a fact, if he reverts to it,—after having declared that he has witnesses in support of his contention, if he fails to name them,—the party should be declared *non suited*' (PP 621-622)

9 'If the parties should come to a mutual understanding, after the suit has been filed, and the Plaint and the Answer duly presented,—they should be fined double the amount of the claim' (P 622)

10 'In a case where several claims have been filed against a man, and he has denied all of them,—if only a part of the claim is substantiated, the man should be made to make good all the claims'. (P. 625)

II

On Courts of Justice

1 One who is not appointed to be a member of the court must on no account speak at the trial of a law-suit, but by him, who has been appointed, an impartial opinion ought to be given

2 Whether appointed or not appointed, one who is conversant with the law has a right to speak, for he whose conduct is regulated by the law, delivers a speech inspired by the deity

This verse is quoted by the Aparārka (P. 604).

3 For the trial of all law suits persons familiar with many branches of science should be appointed, no prudent man would entrust this task to a single person, though a virtuous one

4 Whatever judgment ten men versed in the Veda and jurisprudence, or three men familiar with the Veda, pass upon the case in hand, is right and valid sentence

5 The king alone, being the supreme ruler, is entitled to decide knotty law cases, therefore private man should not pass a sentence alone, his opinion would leave room for doubt

6 The king should appoint, as members of the court, honest men of tried integrity, who are able to support the burden of the administration of justice like bulls bearing heavy load

7 The assessors of the king's courts of judicature should be men skilled in matters of law, sprung from good families, veracious, and impartial towards friend and foe

8. Either the court must not be entered, or law and truth must be openly declared but that man is a criminal who either says nothing, or speaks falsely

9 But judges who, after having repaired to the court, sit there in silent meditation, and do not deliver a candid opinion, as they ought are all guilty of a deliberate falsehood

10 One quarter of the iniquity committed falls upon the party in a cause, one quarter on his witnesses, one quarter upon all the assessors of the court, and one quarter on the king

11. Therefore should a judge, when he has entered the court, divest himself from both love and hatred, and deliver a fair opinion, in order that he may not go to hell

12 The king is blameless, the judges are absolved from iniquity, the sin falls upon the sinner's head alone, when those who deserve punishment receive it

13 When all the members of a judicial assembly opine, "this is right," the court is relieved from the dart of iniquity, but the dart remains in the wound, if they do not say so

14 That is not a judicial assembly where the elders are missing, nor are they elders who do not pronounce a just opinion, nor is that a just opinion which is against equity, nor is that equitable which is contaminated with fraud

III

On Evidence by writing

1 Written proof, witnesses, and possession, these are the three kinds of evidence, on which the right of property rests, and by means of which a creditor may recover his loan

2 A document remains always evidence, witnesses as long as they live, and possession becomes evidence after a lapse of time thus it is propounded in the law-books

3 What a man is not possessed of, that is not his own, even though there be written proof, and even though witnesses be living, this is especially the case with immovables

4 If a man foolishly suffers his property to be enjoyed by strangers, it will become those strangers' own through the effect of possession, although the proprietor is known to be alive

5 Whatever property a proprietor sees with his own eyes being enjoyed by strangers, without for ten years asserting his rights, may not be recovered by him

6 Because he has been indulgent and looking on without asserting his rights, therefore he will be nonsuited, if (cf C13) he prefers a claim after the expiration of the above mentioned period

7 If he is neither an idiot nor a mere child, and if the chattel is being enjoyed by a stranger while he is near, his property in it is extinct by law, and the adverse possessor shall keep it

8 Pledges, boundaries, the property of children, common deposits sealed deposits, women and goods belonging to the king or learned Brahmins are not lost to the owner through their being possessed by a stranger

9 Even pledges etc., are lost, if strangers have enjoyed them for twenty years before the owner's eyes, the property of women and of kings is excepted from this rule

10 The property of women and of kings can never be lost, even though it be enjoyed for hundreds of years by strangers who have no title to it

11 Where possession exists, but not title whatever exists, there a title, but not possession alone, can confer proprietary rights

12 A title having been substantiated, the possession becomes valid it remains invalid without a proved title

13 He who simply declares himself possessed of a commodity without having a title to it is to be considered as a thief, in consequence of his pleading such illegitimate possession

14 He who enjoys without a title for ever so many years, the king of the land should inflict on that sinner the punishment of a thief

15 What a man possesses without a title, he must not alienate, being only the possessor of it, but after the death of the possessor such possessions devolve upon his family

16 In cases falling within the memory of man, possession of land with a title makes evidence In cases extending beyond the memory of man, the hereditary succession of three ancestors is admitted as evidence, though the title be not produced

17 If a man is accused by him whom he has injured by taking possession of his property, he cannot escape defeat, only what has formerly been possessed by his fathers, and inherited by him in order, is his legitimate property

18 When possession has been held, even unlawfully, by three ancestors, including the father of the present occupant, that cannot be taken away from him, as having gone in order through three lives [This is quoted by Medhātithi on Manu 8 148],

19 Common deposits (*anvāhita*), stolen goods (*hīta*), unspecified deposits (*nyasta*), deposits for whose delivery a certain period has been fixed (?) (*balivastabdhayichitam*), and what is being possessed in secret (*‘apratyaktam jād bhuktam’*), are six things possessed without a title

[Jolly's rendering is defective Medhātithi (on Manu

8 148) has explained this verse as follows 'anvitha is that deposit which is fraudulent what is actually deposited being different from what has been previously shown —'hrtam' is what is *stolen* by breaking open a wall etc, while 'balaustabdhā' is what is robbed by open violence 'jathita is what is obtained by begging 'njasta and 'apratyakṣam' are as rendered by Jolly]

20 If a litigant dies while a law suit about possessions of his is pending the son has to prove his title, the fact of his possession being insufficient to decide the suit

21 What has been in the hands of three ancestors for a very long time though they had no title cannot be lost, having gone in order through three lives

22 After the death of a creditor, even witnesses are no longer of avail, except if a statement made by the creditor himself on his death bed has been preserved

23 For after the death of an adversary the deposition of his witnesses loses its force an attested document only being capable of influencing the sentence in this case

24 But if a man not unsound in mind has preferred a legitimate claim, a witness may give evidence even after the claimant's death, in case it be in a matter touching the six cases of deposit and the rest

25 In all business transactions the latest act shall prevail but in the case of a gift a pledge, or a purchase, the prior act has the greater force

26 A contract of delivery and receipt may be made, with a view to gains by the lender on the principal sum while remaining with the debtor it is called a loan on interest, and money lenders acquire their substance by it

27 What is given by force, what is by force enjoyed,

by force caused to be written and all other things done by force, Manu has pronounced void

28 If the creditor's claim ceases to be admissible through length of time, he may still substantiate it by means of a document if his tribe acknowledge his claim, or if he has a pledge or can prove occupancy of the land in question

29 Written proof is declared to be of two sorts, the first, in the handwriting of the party himself the second, in that of another person the former being valid without subscribing witnesses the latter requiring to be attested the validity of both depends on the usage established in the country

30 That instrument which is not adverse to peculiar local usages which declares the nature of the pledge made, and which is consistent in import and language, is termed proof

31 That instrument is not termed proof, which is executed by a person intoxicated by one under duress, by a female, by a child and that which is effected by force, by intimidation, and by fraud

32 A written contract loses its validity in that case also, if the witnesses, creditor, debtor, and writer be dead, unless its validity be insured by means of a pledge

33 If anything has been received or a public announcement been made, a contract retains its validity even after the death of the witnesses

34 Pledges are declared to be of two sorts, movable and immovable both are valid when there is actual enjoyment, and not otherwise

35 An instrument which has been produced in due season, proclaimed in public, and repeatedly called into

remembrance, remains always evidence even after the death of the witnesses

36 An instrument, whose purport nobody has heard of, which has remained unknown, or become the object of a law suit, has no validity, not even while the witnesses are living

37 In the case of an instrument being deposited in another country, or burnt, or badly written, or stolen, time must be allowed, if it be in existence, if it be so in existence, the evidence of those who have seen it must be resorted to

38 If there exist doubts about a document, whether it be genuine or not, its authenticity must be proved by the handwriting of the party himself, by evidence of the contract, which it records, by peculiar marks and by reasonable inference

39 If a document bears the name of a stranger and is designed for a different purpose, its authenticity has to be established with especial care by examining the connexion and former dealings of the two parties

40 A document written by the party himself must be authenticated by examining the writing, and an attested document be authenticated by examining the witnesses. Witnesses are overruled by documents, not documents by witnesses

41 If a document is split in two or torn, or stolen, or effaced, or destroyed, or badly written, another document must be executed. This is the rule regarding documents

IV

On Evidence by Witnesses and by Ordeal

1 In doubtful cases, when there are two conflicting parties, the facts have to be ascertained by the deposition of witnesses, as to what was seen, heard or understood by them

2 He has to be considered as a witness who has witnessed a deed with his ears or eyes, with his ears if the perpetrator of the deed has been speaking, with his eyes, if he has been committing an action

3 Eleven descriptions of witnesses are recognised in law by the learned five of which are made and the remaining six are not made

4 A witness by record, by memory, by accident, by secrecy, and by corroboration these are the five classes of made witnesses

5 But the witnesses not made have been declared by the wise to be six fold of which three are not appointed

6 The fellow villagers a judge, a kindred, one authorized to manage the affairs of the parties, one deputed by the claimant

7 In family disputes, persons of the same family shall be witnesses A smaller number of witnesses than three is objectionable and they should be blameless, decent and intelligent persons

8 They may be either Brahmans, or Vaishyas or Kṣatriyas or else unimpeachable Shudras Each of these shall be witness for persons of his own order, or for any order, if there are no witnesses of the same order

9 Among companies of artisans men who are artisans shall be witnesses and men of one tribe among those of the same, foresters among those living outside and women among women

10 And if in any association etc, any one falls out with his associates, he shall not bear testimony with regard to them for they are all his enemies

11 The incompetent witnesses too have in the law books been declared by the learned to be of five sorts, by reason of interdict, of delinquency, of contradiction, of voluntary deposition and of intervening decease

12 Learned Brabmans, etc, by interdict, thieves, etc if their delinquency has become public, by reason of contradiction, and if there is no agreement between the witnesses in a law suit

13 Voluntary deposition is when a man comes and offers his evidence without having been asked to do so Incompetent by intervening decease are all witnesses after the death of the claimant, except those instructed by him on the point of death

14 Learned Brahmins, ascetics, superannuated persons and religious devotees, are those incapacitated by interdict there is no other reason given for it

15 Thieves, public offenders, violent persons, gamblers, murderers, are incompetent from delinquency there is no truth in them

16 If the statements of witnesses, who have been summoned by the king for the decision of an action, do not agree, they are rendered incompetent by contradiction

17 He who, without having been appointed, comes and offers his evidence, is termed a spy in the law books he is not worthy to bear testimony

18 How can any person bear testimony, if the claimant is no longer in existence, whose claim should have been heard ? Such a person is an incompetent witness by reason of intervening decease

19 If both parties in a dispute have witnesses, the witnesses of that party shall be heard which has brought forward the claim

(This is quoted by the *Aparārka* P 624)

20 In such cases only, where the claimant is worsted in the trial, the witnesses of the defendant have to be examined

(This is quoted in the *Aparārka* P. 624)

21 For the defendant answers word for word to the charge brought forward by his adversary and indicating every error in the assertions of the latter, he points out the true state of the case

22 No one should secretly confer with a witness summoned by his adversary neither should he cause him to differ with another a person resorting to such practices loses his suit

23 If a witness dies or goes abroad after having received the summons those who have heard his deposition may give evidence for a second hand statement is evidence also

24 Even after a great lapse of time a written document does not lose its validity if a man can write, he should commit it to writing himself if he cannot write himself he should not cause it to be written by others

25 The deposition of witness by record remains valid up to the eighth year, that of a witness come by accident remains valid up to the fifth year

26 The deposition of a secret witness remains valid up to the third year the deposition of a witness by corroboration is declared to lose its validity after one year

27 Or no definite period is adhered to in judging the validity of a deposition for those learned in law have said that testimony depends upon memory

28 He whose intellect, memory, or hearing, has never been deranged may give valid evidence even after a very considerable lapse of time

29 But six different kinds of law cases have been indicated by the wise in which witnesses are not concerned evident signs take in these cases the place of the deposition of witnesses

30 One taken with a firebrand in his hand is manifestly an incendiary one taken with a weapon in his hand is

known to be a murderer, if a man and another man's wife are seen to play with one another's hair, the man must be an adulterer

31. One who goes about with a hatchet in his hand, is a destroyer of bridges, one who is carrying an axe, is a destroyer of trees

32 One covered with hideous marks is a public offender In all such cases witnesses are superfluous, only in the last mentioned case of violence close scrutiny is required

33 Some one might make marks upon his person on purpose to injure an enemy Therefore persons of acute perception should investigate such cases

34 One interested in the subject matter, a friend, a servant, an enemy, one perjured, a sick or infamous person, cannot be made a witness

35 The king cannot be made a witness, nor mean artificers, nor public dancers and singers nor a slave, nor a cheat, nor one exhausted nor a decrepit old man, nor a woman, nor a child, nor a potter

36 Nor can the following persons be made witnesses one intoxicated a madman, a negligent or distressed person, one extremely grieved, a gamester, a village priest, one who is gone out upon a long pilgrimage, one engaged in transmarine commerce, an ascetic, a scholar,

37 One deformed, a single person, a learned Brahman, a man of a vile class, an eunuch, a public dancer or singer, an atheist, an apostate, one who has deserted his wife or his holy fire, one who makes illicit offerings,

38 One who eats from the same dish as the defendant in a law suit a servant, a member of the highest class, kinsmen, one formerly perjured a dancer, one who lives by selling poison (?), a snake catcher,

39 A poisoner, an incendiary, a butcher, the son of a Shudra, one excluded from society, one oppressed by

fatigue, a public offender, one exhausted, one who has suffered his fire to go out,

40 One who associates with people of wicked habits, an idiot, a seller of oil or roots, one who is possessed by a demon, an enemy of the king, weather prophets, and astrologers

41 A juggler, an avaricious or cruel person, enemies of a company of merchants, or an association of kinsmen, an irreligious man, one self sold one who has a limb too little, a Bhagavritti

42 One who has bad nails or black teeth, a leper, one who betrays his friends, an idiot, a seller of spirits, a murderer, a leather manufacturer, a lame man, an outcast, a forger,

43 An impostor, one who has eaten too much, a robber, a follower of the king,

44 One who sells men, animals, meat, bones, honey, milk, water, or butter, a Brahman, and a member of a twice born class who is guilty of usury,

45 A man sprung from a good family, who neglects the duties of his class, a panegyrist, one who serves low people, one who quarrels with his father, and a mischief maker.

46 Nor a child, a woman one man alone, an evildoer, relatives, and enemies, because they would bear false testimony

47. A child would speak falsely from ignorance, a woman from levity, an evildoer from habitual depravity, relatives from affection, enemies from desire of revenge

48 By consent of both litigants even a single person may be a witness, and must be examined before the court

49 One who is oppressed by the conscience of his

separately, all of them familiar with the rules of duty and acquainted with the circumstances of the case

59 Let him cause a priest to swear by his veracity, a Ksattriya by his horse or elephant and his weapons, a Vaishya by his fine grain or gold a Shudra by all possible crimes

60 By ancient holy texts which extol the pre-eminence of truth and denounce falsehood, let him inspire them with deep awe

61 If there be contradictory evidence the plurality of witnesses decides the case if the number of witnesses on both sides in a law case is found to be equal, the defendant must be absolved

62 The deposition of the witnesses loses its validity in this case on account of the subtlety of evidence by witnesses But if a litigant is, by the act of fate abandoned by his witnesses in a law suit

63 The wise will not have him absolved even through

guilty looks as if he was ill, is constantly shifting his position, and runs after every man,

50 Who suddenly coughs without reason, and draws repeated sighs, who scratches as if writing with his feet and who shakes his arm and clothes,

51 Whose countenance changes colour, whose forehead sweats, and whose lips become dry, who looks above and about him

52 Who talks a great deal without restraint like a man in haste, and without being asked such a person is manifestly a false witness, and should receive severe punishment

53 The above mentioned persons slaves, impostors, and the like, shall nevertheless be admitted to bear testimony, with due consideration of the weight of the case in hand

54 In all cases of violence, theft, adultery, and both kinds of insult the witnesses should not be scrutinised

55 He who does not give his evidence, although he has related what he knows to others, deserves extreme punishment for he is worse than a false witness

56 If a witness speaks falsely through covetousness, he shall be fined a thousand panas, if through distraction of mind, two hundred and fifty, or the lowest amercement, if through terror, the middling amercement, if through friendship, four times the lowest,

57 If through lust, ten times the lowest amercement, if through wrath, three times the next or middlemost, if through ignorance, two hundred complete if through inattention, a hundred only

58 The judge, having summoned the witnesses, and bound them down firmly by an oath, shall examine them

separately, all of them familiar with the rules of duty and acquainted with the circumstances of the case.

59. Let him cause a priest to swear by his veracity, a Ksatriya by his horse or elephant and his weapons, a Vaishya by his kine, grain, or gold, a Shudra by all possible crimes.

60. By ancient holy texts, which extol the pre-eminence of truth and denounce falsehood, let him inspire them with deep awe

61. If there be contradictory evidence, the plurality of witnesses decides the case, if the number of witnesses on both sides in a law-case is found to be equal, the defendant must be absolved.

62. The deposition of the witnesses loses its validity in this case on account of the subtlety of evidence by witnesses. But if a litigant is, by the act of fate, abandoned by his witnesses in a law-suit,

63. The wise will not have him absolved even through an ordeal. If a witness gives unmeaning evidence, the deposition of the appointed witnesses being full of meaning, his testimony is as good as ungiven

64. If the witnesses were to disagree with one another as to place, time, age, matter, usages, tribe, or class,

65. Such depositions, too, are worthless. If the witnesses name too low or too high a sum,

66. This too must be known to make no evidence. *This is the rule of witnesses.*

67. If, owing to the negligence of the creditor, both a written contract and witnesses are missing, and the defendant denies his obligation, three kinds of measures may be had recourse to:

68. Repeated admonitions, subile ratiocination, and,

thirdly, an oath . these are the measures which a judge should successively resort to.

69. He who does not refute his adversary's statements, though he has been called upon to do so repeatedly, three or four or five times, will consequently be bound to pay the debt.

70. If the defendant has resisted such an admonition, he shall aggress him by subtle ratiocination founded upon place, time, and matter, upon the connexions of the party, circumstantial evidence, the nature of the case, and so forth.

71. If reasonable inference also leads to no result, let him cause the defendant to undergo one of the ordeals, by fire, water, proof of virtue, and so forth, according to the time of the year and to the strength of the defendant.

72. He whom the blazing fire burns not, whom the water soon forces not up, or who meets with no speedy misfortune, must be held veracious in his testimony on oath.

He is freed from the charge; otherwise he is guilty.

73. Let ordeals be administered if an offence has been committed in a solitary forest, at night, in the interior of a house, and in cases of violence, and of denial of a deposit.

74. The same rule holds good in regard to women accused of bad morals, in cases of theft and robbery, and in all cases of denial of an obligation

III—THEISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

BY GOPI NATH KAVIRAJ

Part II

The Non theistic Systems

I have given in the foregoing pages a bare outline of the different theories relating to the origin of things. I now propose to deal more particularly with the principal notions of some of the recognized schools of non theistical philosophy which bear, directly or in a remote way, on the problem of Theism. An exhaustive treatment of the subject is *prima facie* impossible within the compass of these pages, but I have nevertheless endeavoured not to exclude from my scope or dismiss unexamined any of the more important doctrines.

A The Charvaka view

First and foremost among the philosophies which deny the existence of a Personal God stands the material school of the Charvakas. Though this school of thought owing to its gross sensationalism had never succeeded in striking its roots deep into the soil of the country it still possessed an interest, almost unique in character partly theoretical—in the eyes of controversialists, and partly even practical, though only to a very limited number. Its doctrines if doctrines they could it all be called, were most mercilessly exposed by all the other systems, orthodox as well as heterodox and if they have survived to day they have done so simply as so many ill formulated theses without any pretention to speculative value.

Tradition ascribes to Bṛhaspati the foundation of the philosophy of materialism*. An adherent of this school of thought is therefore usually known as Bārhaspatya. Cf. Vivaraṇa Prameya Sangraha, pp. 210—18; Sarvadarśana Sangraha (Poona Ed.), p. 4. That Bṛhaspati was not a mythical personage is evident from the Sūtras extant in quotation under his name: Cf. (1) Bhāskara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra 3.3.53

(a) पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि ।†

(b) तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा ।

(c) तेभ्यश्चेतन्यम् ।

(d) क्लृप्तादिभ्यां मदशक्तिवद् विज्ञानम् ।

(2) Śaṅkara's commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra 3. 3. 53 :

(a) तेभ्यश्चेतन्यम् ।

(b) मदशक्तिवद् विज्ञानम् ।

(c) चैतन्यविरिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।‡

* It is hard to say anything conclusively in regard to the identity of this Bṛhaspati with the scholar of the same name who is associated with the foundation of a school of politics. Bhāsa in the *Pratimā* (5th Act) and Kauṭilya in his *Arthashastra* refer, the latter very frequently, to Bṛhaspati as the author of an *Arthashastra*; and it is interesting to observe that in the *Prasasti* section of Kauṭilya's work (Mysore Ed. p. 6) where the views of different Āchāryas are cited as to the number and names of sciences fit for study Bṛhaspati is quoted as holding that *वार्त्ता* and *दण्डनाति* are the only branches of knowledge which deserve to be specially cultivated: *वाग्मीचक्षु* and *श्रोत्र*—the sciences dealing with the supersensuous—are ignored as of subsidiary importance. May not this be a fact of some historical significance?

† Noted in the Bhamati, Nir. Ed., p. 767.

‡ These 3 Sūtras occur elsewhere also; Varadarāja in his *Kuṣu-māñjabodhanī* quotes the Sūtra marked (b) in the same form; the Sūtra defining the Self appears also in the same form in the *Gītā Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara (18 5,) and *Śiva Sūtra* and with slight verbal alterations in the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (under Sūtra 5), thus: *वत्सवादिषिष्ट शरीरमात्म* ।

(3) Nilakanṭha on the Gita -

(a) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।

(b) काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थः ।

(The last 2 Sūtras are also quoted by Madhusūdana, Nilakanṭha and Dhanapati in their commentaries on the Gita (16-11))

(4) Sadananda in the Advaita Brahmasiddhi:

(a) चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।

(b) काम एवैकः पुरुषार्थः ।

(c) मरणमेवापरमं ।

We have already dealt at some length with this view in the preceding pages where we observed that it had been one of the main dogmas of the Lokāyatika sect. We now pass on hurriedly to describe some of the other tenets of the school.

Among these we may mention first of all the doctrine of the four elements. The Cārvakas believed, very much like the Buddhist Philosophers, that Ākāśa was not an element at all, it was a Void, an absence of आवरण. Only the four elements in their atomic condition were held to be the basic (root) principles in Creation. The external world, the sense organs as well as the physical organisms were supposed to be the products of these primordial types of matter. But how this production comes to be possible is a question left unexplained. All kinds of causes, known or unknown (अदृष्ट), being rejected, and the guidance of an Eternal Intelligence being regarded as superfluous the materialist is left with the only alternative open to him, viz to say that this production results from the fortuitous concourse of the blind constitutive particles of matter. Nothing further can be said on this head. It would be illegitimate, so it is urged, to demand an explanation where no explanation can be given.

To the Materialists Life and Consciousness are practically equivalent, and are both believed to originate from Matter. Sentience and the *phenomena* of mental life are material properties and need not imply a distinct immaterial substance as the Self. It is admittedly true that Consciousness is not observed to inhere in the particles of matter either severally* or even collectively, but this is no argument against the fact that when these particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner not yet scientifically explicable they are found to show signs of life. This peculiar collocation of the atoms results in the formation of the organism (शरीर).† This is the Self (आत्मा).

That consciousness is a function of the body may be proved by a process of logical demonstration, e.g. by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference (अन्वय and व्यतिरेक). (a) Thus we find by observation, and there is no instance to the contrary that for the manifestation of consciousness body is an inalienable factor and that discarnate consciousness is not possible. This shows that between organism and consciousness there exists some necessary bond, viz. that of Causality. (b) And Universal experience as expressed in judgments like 'I feel hot, I feel tired' seems to vouch for the truth of this view. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But it would not be

* It appears that some of the older materialists did actually attribute consciousness to each of the atoms. But the view does not seem to have obtained currency.

† As to how this peculiar collocation or organisation results it is answered that the union of parents is the immediate cause and as a period of Universal Dissolution is not admitted the difficulty about the first origin of Life and Consciousness does not arise. *Brahmā-nanda's Com. on Siddhānta bindu*, p. 62.

so were not the body the substrate of consciousness (c) Apart from this there is another proof in favour of the causal relation between Matter and Consciousness This is afforded by the description in medical literature of the properties of particular preparations of food and drink (e.g. Brahmgghrita) conducive to the development of the intellectual powers *

(1) First, since the body is declared to be the agent (कर्त्ता) of all actions it should on grounds of logical consistency, be held morally responsible for their natural consequences But this is scarcely possible (a) The particles which go to the formation of the body are always in a state of flux so that the body which performs an action (कर्म) at one moment does no longer persist at the next to feel its reaction (भोग) (b) And even if this momentary fluctuation be not admitted it is nevertheless undeniable that the body suffers change the bodies in two different periods of life are different from each other, for otherwise they could not have different sizes The appearance of a different size implies that the former size is destroyed which is possible only when the subject in which it resides (i.e. पूर्वशरीर) is also destroyed

(ii) Secondly, the material theory is incompetent to account for the facts of memory and recognition (स्मृति & प्रत्यभिज्ञा) Necessity of thought demands that memory and the original experience (अनुभव) which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject but this identity of reference would not be possible if the subject were not fundamentally an unchangeable unity

To these alleged objections the Charvaka replies that they are more apparent than real For the second difficulty may be easily got over by supposing that the traces (संस्कार) left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted

(संक्रम) from the prior moment to the succeeding moment
i.e. from the material cause (उपादान) down to its direct
product (उपादेय)

As to how this may be possible one may consider, the Chārvāka says, the analogous instance of the transference of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. Here the only condition observed to be necessary is the presence of a relation between the two objects. And between a cause and its effect—the case under consideration—such a relation does undoubtedly exist. The unity of reference may also be ensured by the admission that the impressions, though transferrable, do pertain to, i.e. are preserved and revived (reproduced) in, a single line or Causal series.

As regards the first point the position of the Chārvāka prevents him from recognising its cogency as an objection. An inveterate foe of the doctrine of Adṛṣṭa he finds no justice, natural or moral, in the government of the Universe, so that the very question of the necessity of logically unifying *Karma* with its *phala* does not appear to him as a problem calling for solution. Bhoga—the experience of pleasure and pain is not determined by a previous *Karma* (पूर्व कर्म), but comes by Chance (यदृच्छा) over which there is no control. This being so, the subjective unity sought for to explain the synthesis of cause and effect needs hardly a ground for establishment.*

But even if it were needed we could find it in the unity of the organism. Recognition testifies to the identity of the body through all its changing states and this recognition can not be pronounced false as in the case of nails pared and renewed, for there is no chance here as in the example cited of the body being once destroyed and then substituted by a fresh

*This frame of mind will make intelligible the principles of conduct involved in teachings like ऋषेः सुखा दुःखेः etc.

one of a similar kind. The fact of recognition which is brought forward as subversive of the alleged momentariness of an object appearing one in consciousness is fatal also to the mutability of the organism *

Besides the above, there are three more views of the material school according as the Self is identified with (1) the sense organs (इन्द्रिय), with (2) the principle of Life (प्राण), or with (3) Mind (मन)

The advocates of the first view set forth that the senses are really the intra organic conscious agents. This view is based on the facts that consciousness and bodily movements (चेष्टा) follow from the initiation of the senses and that the judgments expressed in 'I am blind &c' showing the identity of the Self with the sense organs are universally accepted as valid. Vatsyayana thus describes the view तानिन्द्रियाणीमानि स्वस्वविषयग्रहणारुचेतनानि, इन्द्रियाणां भावाभावयोर्विषयग्रहणस्य तथा भावात् । एवं सति किमन्येन चेतनेन । (3 1 2)*

The second view consists in maintaining that is the senses depend for existence and operation on the Vital Principle this principle itself is really the source of intelligence. The fact that the presence and absence of the senses involve the origin and non origin of knowledge does not necessarily point to their agency, the fact may be equally explained on the hypothesis of their instrumentality. Moreover, if agency were to be assigned to the senses there would ensure an

*Nyayamajari, p 437, lines 16-19

† Cf also Vedanta Sara (Jiva Ed., 1915) pp 93 96, Siddhanta bindu, with Ratnavali (Adv. Math. Ed), pp 56-57, 63 64, and more particularly Vivarana Pramevasaṅgraha, p 181 lines 13 24

insurmountable difficulty in consequence of the absence of organs about the origin of action. Again, the question arises which of the senses is the agent—each of them severally or all combined. In the former case, is the agency simultaneous or successive. Now it is absurd to think that the agency belongs to all the senses indifferently for the object of one sense never becomes cognisable to another and the senses are never known to work concurrently in producing an effect. The alternative of simultaneity is of course out of the question. As to the remaining contention that each of the senses may be an agent *in its essence*, the reply is if each of these be an absolutely independent agent as asserted, it is likely that in case of conflicting movements due to varied resolutions the balance of the whole bodily organism should be upset, but this is never known to happen. But if the senses were subservient in their functions to the guidance of a Superior Entity it would be reasonable to hold this latter to be the true Self rather than the senses. This Entity is *Prāṇa*, the principle of Persistence during Sleep and Wakeful Condition alike*.

Finally, we may mention the view which claims that Consciousness is a quality of the Mind†. Brahmananda, in his commentary on the *Siddhanta bindu* (*Advaita Manjari* Ed., p. 57), explains the grounds on which this theory is founded, stating that the other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense knowledge (*निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान*), but it is mind

**Vidvanmanorajini* (J. va. Ed., 1913, pp. 96-97). Cf. *Brahmananda's Com. on Siddhantabindu*, p. 57 lines 13-14.

†See *Vedānta Sāra* p. 97, *Nyāya Sūtra* 3.1.16, *Nyāya Kandali*, p. 72, 25-26 *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 441, *Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha* pp. 181-182. This old materialistic doctrine of *मनश्चेतन्य* was recently revived with fresh vigour by the late Mr. Rakhela D. sa Nyayaratna, see his *Jāṭiyasāra* with his own commentary as well as its refutation by Pandit Hari Dāsa Śāstrī M. A.

alone that introduces into such knowledge the element of determinateness. For this reason, as well as because it controls by virtue of its power of Volition (सङ्कल्प) the outer organs and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be absent (e. g. on the plane of existence called *svapna*), the Mind is the true Self.

In these different views there is perfect agreement as to the number of *pramānas* recognised, for all of them admit that perception is the only way of gaining a right knowledge of things. Inference is not a valid proof, in as much as the Universal and Necessary relation on which it is based cannot be discovered. In other words, it is practically impossible and logically incongruous to ascend, merely by a process of multiplication of individual instances (भूयोदर्शन) from limited sense-experience to a knowledge of Universal Truths (सर्वोपसंहारिणी व्याप्ति). Bare enumeration of facts, however far it may be carried, hardly suffices to find out the element of Necessity involved in generalisations. Perception is unable to establish the truth of Induction. For though perception may tell us e. g. that *this* particular A is related to *this* particular B this knowledge would hardly justify its extension in the form of 'all A's are related to B's.' What right have we, with the limited faculties at our command, to jump into the Unknown and assert a Categorical Universal proposition? Moreover, the assertion of such a proposition would presuppose the elimination of all accidental factors (उपाधिनिधूनन). But how is the absence of these factors to be made known? Perception would not avail where these are by nature supersensuous, and the validity of inference as a proof has been already controverted. There would thus cling an abiding suspicion, not removable by any means accessible to man, as to the truth of every universal judgment.

Thus according to the Charvaka perception being the only criterion of existence whatever is not perceived is held to have no existence at all यद्योपलभ्यते तत्रास्ति This view naturally leads up to scepticism But for practical purposes probability (समावृता) alone is sufficient* Thus at the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the *probability* of fire and not of its *certainty*, and this is enough for all practical purposes For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called Inference The notion of *pramāṇa* as being the basis of certain knowledge is due to Chance Coincidence (संघाद) between the knowledge which led to the activity (प्रवेत्तक ज्ञान) and the attainment of the object in which the activity is fulfilled (प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य) i. e. harmony between thought and object

From the above sketch of the philosophical notions of the materialists it can well be seen why there is no room for God in this system The usual arguments held out by the theists have not for them the force of persuasion Admit or even the principle of physical causality being denied it is idle to argue they would say, that God is the moral Governor of the world adjusting the *karmas* of the fit is or that He is the Universal Agent—the author of the contingent phenomena And to one to whom the Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility it is equally

vain to attempt showing that from them the existence of a Omniscient Spirit could be inferred. And last but not least, Inference itself (अनुमान) is denied. The senses do not confessedly reach Him and verbal testimony falls under the category of inference. There is no means of ascertaining, therefore, that an all-knowing, all-powerful spirit exists. Nature (स्वभाव), and not God, is the watch-word of this school*.

(To be continued)

*The position of the Lokayatikas is thus summarised in the Vivarapa Prameya Sangraha, p. 311, : भूतचतुष्टयेन जन्यं प्रत्यक्षमेवेकं स्वभावः स्वभावाद् नैव पारमार्थिकः ।

Thus according to the Chārvāka perception being the only criterion of existence whatever is not perceived is held to have no existence at all यत्रोपलभ्यते तत्रास्ति This view naturally leads up to scepticism But for practical purposes probability (संभावना) alone is sufficient* Thus at the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the *probability* of fire, and not of its *certainty*, and this is enough for all practical purposes For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called Inference The notion of *pramāna* as being the basis of certain knowledge is due to Chance Coincidence (संवाद) between the knowledge which led to the activity (पर्यवर्तक ज्ञान) and the attainment of the object in which the activity is fulfilled (प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य), i. e. harmony between thought and object

From the above sketch of the philosophical notions of the materialists it can well be seen why there is no room for God in this system. The usual arguments held out by the theists have not for them the force of persuasion. Adipsta or even the principle of physical causality being denied, it is idle to argue, they would say, that God is the moral Governor of the world adjusting the *Karmas* of the jivas, or that He is the Universal Agent—the author of the contingent phenomena. And to one to whom the Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility it is equally

*So far this view is exactly what Arcesilaus is said to have asserted in reply to the Stoic's objection that scepticism makes life impossible, viz — "Probability is the only rule of practical life". This is the doctrine of Probabilism The difference, however, lies in this that while Arcesilaus doubts all knowledge, including even sense-perception the Chārvāka leaves margin for it

vain to attempt showing that from them the existence of a Omniscient Spirit could be inferred. And last but not least, Inference itself (अनुमान) is denied. The senses do not confessedly reach Him and verbal testimony falls under the category of inference. There is no means of ascertaining, therefore, that an all-knowing, all-powerful spirit exists. Nature (स्वभाव), and not God, is the watch-word of this school*.

(To be continued)

*The position of the Lokāyatikas is thus summarised in the Vivarapa Prameya Saṅgraha, p. 211, : भूतचक्षुदयैव ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमेव हि ज्ञानं, स्वभावस्यैव एव परमाधिपः ।

IV GLEANINGS FROM THE HISTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NYAYA VAIŚEŚIKA LITERATURE

BY GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

PREFATORY NOTE

The history of Nyaya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy remains still to be written, and the time does not seem to be yet ripe for undertaking at present a work of this kind in as thorough a manner as might be desired. In the meantime a good deal of spade work will have to be done: thus, it will be necessary to survey the whole field carefully and have an accurate and up-to-date knowledge of the resources available for this purpose.

Sūri, Gaddegon Keri, — to name some among many — have rendered brilliant services to the cause of Nyaya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy by their invaluable works. But as their had necessarily to rest on insufficient data, none of these works can properly claim to be a history of philosophy presenting a consistent and exhaustive account of the development of thought in all its shades.

As regards bibliography Mr Chakravarti's paper on 'Nyaya Nyaya in Bengal (in the J A S B)' is excellent but its scope is narrow and it is a bit too scrappy. Dr Vidyābhāṣa's posthumous 'History of Indian Logic' is interesting but though apparently exhaustive it suffers from the same limitations, and I believe to a much greater extent: and it seems that the book needs a careful revision especially, where it treats of the bibliography of the mediaeval and modern schools.

The following pages represent an humble, but further, contribution in the field made on the basis of the available

data in the hope of helping to prepare the ground for a systematic History of Nyaya Vaisesika Philosophy. These data consist among others in the study of (a) about 1500 Manuscripts in original on the subject belonging to the Library of the Government Sanskrit College Benares and to certain local private Collections and of (b) others as reported in the various Catalogues and Notices of Mss.

The History of Nyaya Vaisesika Philosophy is expected to follow soon. But its accomplishment and publication will naturally depend upon those of the bibliography herewith presented.

The Ancient Section of the work needs a separate and special treatment. It has been therefore omitted from these pages and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Studies.

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

THE MEDIAEVAL PERIOD

In the following pages we shall start at once with the mediaeval period and proceed slowly with the course of time, reserving for a separate study the early history of the Literature of the systems and its bibliography

It is assumed that the mediaeval age of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools of thought opened with the eighth century, when the writings of Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda had already become things of the past. There is no doubt that the Hindu Nyāya Śāstra suffered a temporary eclipse in these times under the overshadowing influence of Buddhist (and Jain) Sciences of Reasoning. It is probable that the Buddhist monasteries of Nalanda, Vikramasīla, &c. had some share in bringing about this end. That individual scholars of extraordinary powers rose in defence of Buddhist Philosophy and set themselves to the task of demolishing whatever they found inconsistent with the accepted notions of their schools is beyond a shadow of doubt. And this they did more from a vindictive zeal than from any righteous or sensible motive. The name of Dharmakīrti as one among many such polemic authors may be cited in this connection.

The curtain rises with the appearance on the scene of Bhaṣarvajña, the author of Nyayasāra, in Kaśmīr and of Trilochana, the tutor of the great Vāchaspati Miśra, on the plains.

I BHASARVAJÑA

As far as our present knowledge extends it may be said with justice that Bhāsarvajña's Nyayasāra stands unique in the history of the Mediaeval School of Nyāya philosophy in India. But the work has not been thoroughly examined yet, and I believe that a careful analysis of its contents will yield results of great historical interest. It would be foreign to

the purpose of these pages to enter into an examination of this kind, but some points may be noted in passing

A (a) In the first place I take up the question of the number of *pramāṇas*. Here Bhasarvajña is very emphatic in his assertion that (1) *Pratyakṣa* (2) *Anumāna* and (3) *Āgama* are the *only* *pramāṇas* to be recognized (pp 30⁸, 34¹⁰ 11), the other alleged *pramāṇas* including *upamāna*, already coming under the above. The rejection of *upamāna* * to which the old School held fast with such tenacity is certainly characteristic, and is probably to be accounted for as the effect of the influence of *Yoga* Philosophy (cf *Yo* Sut 17)†, which might have acted upon it directly or through the *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy

(b) While setting forth the means to be adopted for realising *Mokṣa* Bhasarvajña prescribes *त्रियायोग* consisting of

* The *Sarva Siddhānta Samgraha* in its section on *Nyāya* (VI 5, p 24³), observes *अत्रापि प्रमाणाणि त्रीणि वै तु कस्यचित्*. This *कस्यचित्* I interpret as referring to Bhasarvajña whom we know as the earliest writer among the *Naiyāyikas* admitting the threefold character of *pramāṇas*. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the statement of the famous *Karika* in *Sureśvar* ācharya's *Mānasollāsa*, II 17 18 (Mysore Ed, pp 49 50), which also occurs in the *Tarkikaraka* (p 56), viz.,

प्रत्यक्षं च चार्वाकः काणारमुपैतुं पुनः ।

अनुमानं च तथाय स ह्यत्र शब्दश्च ते अपि ॥

न्यायैकदाग्नाऽप्येवमुपमानं च कचन ।

where Mallanātha explains the word *न्यायैकदेशिन* as *भूषणाया*, i.e. followers of the doctrines of *भूषण* or *शमसुत* for *भूषण* being a work of Bhasarvajña, see *inf a*

† Though *Sāṅkhya* too admits three *pramāṇas* (*Sam* Sut 1 99—101, *Sam* *Karika* 4), its influence on Bhasarvajña's work was nothing. The possible allegation of *Vaiś* influence if well founded would be more to the point. But it does not appear that Bhasarvajña had much sympathy with this school

तप , स्वाध्याय and ईश्वरप्रणिधान This, he holds, is to serve as a helping practice for the sterilisation of *klesas*, and, through a graduated course of what are technically called *Sadhanas* viz यम, नियम and the other योगाङ्गs, for the attainment of *Samadhi*. This is exactly the view expressed in *Yō Sūtra* II 1.

(c) It also appears that the classification of *prameya** in *Nyayasāra* (p 34), viz into ह्य, तन्निवर्त्तक आत्यन्तिकहान and हानोपाय follows on the lines of the *Yōga Sūtras* II 16 17, 25 26† (cf also *Vijñānabhikṣu's* Introduction to *Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhaṣyam*) That *Bhaṣarvajña* had exactly these *Sūtras* in his mind would follow as a plain corollary from a

* I fail to see any ground in Dr *Vijñānabhikṣu's* statement (lot o to *Nyayasāra* p 2) that *Bhaṣarvajña* 'treats only one topic, viz *prameya* in his work for the whole of the latter portion of the book (pp. 3412 419) is devoted to a consideration of the *prameyas*. It is immaterial that his formulation of the *prameyas* should differ from that of the older school.

† We need not suppose that this fourfold division of *prameya* in *Nyayasāra* is based directly upon an analogy of the 4 *ārya sacca*s of the Buddhists (cf *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, V 420-2). But as to the further question whether some of the *Yōga Sūtras* themselves, as we have them to-day, originated under Buddhist influence, it would be out of place to suggest any reply here. It is enough for the purpose in hand to concede that the *Yōga Sūtras* in their present form and *Vyāsa's* Commentary upon them are earlier than *Bhaṣarvajña's* day, and this I believe will be readily allowed. We may also remember that in *Bhaṣarvajña's* time or even before it, the doctrines and practices of *Yōga* had been widely in currency in Kashmir. That peculiar form of Kashmiri Saivism which goes by the name of *Pratyabhijñā Darśana* had already been evolved as a compromise between the *Therism* of *Yōga* and the *Advaita* of *Śaṅkara*, and in this *Darśana* therefore *Yōga* occupies a prominent position. Living in such a religious atmosphere, it was not strange that *Bhaṣarvajña* should have been deeply influenced in his doctrines by *Yōga*.

comparative study of Nyayasara p 34¹⁸ (द्वेय दुःखमनागतम्)
and Yoga Sut II 16

(d) Bhasarvajna's definition of प्रत्यक्ष may be cited as a further example of how yoga deeply influenced his whole mental outlook. Perceiving that Gautama's प्रत्यक्षलक्षण (Vy Sūt 1 1 4) does not apply to the transcendental visions of the Yogins* for which the contact of an object with the sense organs is not a necessary precondition and which with him had a profound reality he was constrained to alter the प्रत्यक्षलक्षण accordingly thus योगिप्रत्यक्ष देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थप्राहकम् ।
B It may seem however that the introduction into a Nyaya work ideas and practices which we have been accustomed to associate with Yoga is of the nature of an accident. But as a matter of fact it has a historical significance which grows deeper in interest the more our acquaintance is widened with the course of ancient and mediaeval philosophy. For though Yoga in its wider form has been practically accepted by every system of Indian philosophy its relation with Nyaya is in some manner more special and perhaps fundamental. Here are for example some instances recorded in literature where the expression *Yauṅa* is employed invariably to indicate a professor of or pertaining to Nyaya.

(i) वैशेषिकनैयायिकयोः प्रायः समानतन्त्रत्वादौलूप्यमते क्षिप्ते
योगमतमपि क्षिप्तेवावसेयम् ।

Syadvāda Manjari (Yaso Vijaya Jaina Series p 628)

* It is strange that whereas Nyaya Sūtras do not recognise योगिप्रत्यक्ष at all the Vaśī Sūtras dwell upon it at great length (cf Vaśī Sūt 9 1 11 15). Neither Vatsyayana nor Uddyotakara take note of it. The latter, on the other hand, definitely asserts सन्निकर्ष to be sixfold and is silent on what is known as अशौकिक सन्निकर्ष. It would seem that before the days of Tattvachātmaṃ the difference between शौकिक and अशौकिक सन्निकर्ष was not positively declared in a Nyaya treatise. Cf Raghunātha's Padārtharatnamālā, p 711-13

(iii) नैयायिकानां योगपरमभिधानानां

Śaḍdarśana Samuccaya Vṛtti, by Gunaratna, p 49.

(iii) ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षज्ञानवादिनां योगानां च मतमपाकर्तुम्

(That this is the view of the Naiyāyikas is well known (cf their theory of anuvyavasāya) It is ascribed to them in the most unequivocal terms by Ananta Vīrya himself, at p 49 of the above gloss, thus,
ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षत्वादिति नैयायिका ।

(iv) प्रतिज्ञाद्वत्तादहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात् पञ्चावयवमिति योगाः ।

Ibid, p 44

(v) नापि सामान्यविशेषो परस्परानपेक्षो इति योगमतमपि, &c

Ibid, p 44

(vi) Cf Raja Śekhara's Śaḍdarśana Samuccaya (Yaśo-Vijaya Jaina Series), pp 8 & 12 (verse 23)*

These evidences though coming from sources not recognised as orthodox, need not be summarily dismissed as calling for no attention [But cf Nyāya Vārttika, Ben Ed, p 105, under Sūtra 1 1 29 where the word 'Yuga' is employed in the sense of Naiyāyika] Their cumulative weight is considerable Besides, the Sarva Siddhanta Sangraha of Śaṅkara (pp 24¹¹, 28³, 10¹²) affords distinct proof in support of a relation existing between Nyāya and Yoga, for it is maintained there that according to Nyāya Mokṣa follows directly from Yoga, a doctrine which it shares in common with the Pātanjala system (as distinguished from the Sāṅkhya where

* Cf also नैयायिकसाख्ययो कथाया भोक्तृकानीदृशार्थेति योगानामभौतिकानोति सांख्यानमिति वार्तिक योगानां नैयायिकानां ।

(Nyāya Siddhantamālā of Jayarāma, Ms of Bābu Dikṣita Jaḍe fol 16a b)

jñāna is held to be the immediate cause of Mukti*) The Nyaya Darśana, in its present form, contains some Sūtras (4 2 38 49) where the practices of Yoga are strongly recommended

C From the above it seems to be pretty clearly made out that the relation between Nyaya and Yog was an intimate one, and Bhasarvajña in laying stress upon certain Yoga practices in his treatise on Nyaya was not guilty of irrelevancy His exposition was only a reflection—dim but faithful—of the then existing medietan condition of this philosophy But how, under what ascertainable influences, this fusion came about is a question to which no thoroughly convincing answer can be returned at present Probably the right explanation will be found, *inter alia*, in the discovery of a bond of historical unity between these schools, and in my opinion this is supplied by the original Śivagama or its philosophical counterpart, the so called Īśvaravāda, out of which not only the present form of Yoga and Nyaya, but the later Sāṃkhya philosophies also may have well arisen and gradually crystallised themselves into independent systems

At any rate in Nyayasāra Sāṃkhya influences are clearly discernible in many places On p 59 Bhasarvajña observes that two things are requisites as immediate antecedents for a direct vision of the Supreme Self (called here Śiva) and Final Release निर्गम्यं श्रेयः) to follow, viz परधैर्याय (known as अनामगति) and परा भक्ति towards Viśveśvara This śloka is quoted

यदा चर्मघटाकाशं ऐरिष्यन्ति मानवा ।

तदा शिवमविशाय दु खस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥

(श्वेताश्वतर उपनिषद् VI 20)

* See *Ibid*, pp 36 40 & 41 Cf Sa Sūtra 3 20—ज्ञाना मुक्ति । The Yoga view, as represented in Sarvasiddhanta Saṅgraha, is briefly this :

पुरुषदिशोऽप्यतो नष्टाविवाधि पुरुषः । इहलोकदेशास्तु योगतव विनाशय ॥

It is, as we know, a stock verse among the Śaivas (cf Śaiva Darśana Saṅgraha, Śaiva Darśana). The inculcation, 23) of course, but it may be due in both cases to Śaiva influence. And similarly when we find in Nyāya Sāra, p. 35, the concept of Īśvara expressed in language like 'ऐश्वर्यादिविशिष्ट संसारधर्मरीपदप्यसंख्ये परो भगवान् महेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सत्त्वजगद्विधाता' it is hard to decide between Yoga and Śaivism as its probable source. The definition here given is taken almost *verbatim* from Yoga Sūtras 1.24-54, but then it is likely that these Sūtras themselves were originally of Śaiva formulation. It may be remembered that the word ईश्वर or महेश्वर as found in Nyāya & Yoga) was originally a name of Śiva, as the corresponding word पुरुष (of Sāṅkhya), or rather its derivative पुरुषोत्तम, came to mean Narayana.* [We are not concerned here with the metaphysical contents of the terms ईश्वर and पुरुष or पुरुषोत्तम but only with their sectarian meanings.] In this way then the philosophy of ईश्वरवाद is brought into close contiguity with the Śaiva theology, and we can understand why Śaṅkara (Ved. Śat. 2.2.37) should have arrayed in a line (under Īśvaraśāstrin†) such opponents as the

* This would be a confirmation of what Guṇaratna actually says in his commentary on Haribhadra's *Saṅkṣipta Saṁuccaya*. Rajasekhara (पदार्थसंग्रह, pp. 34, 42-43) too mentions the fact that the Sāṅkhyas were worshippers of Narayana (नारायणपूजः) and the Yogins of Īśvara or Śiva (ईश्वरपूजः). In this connection the conception of Śiva as the Yogin *par excellence* may also be remembered as implying that Yoga was theologically a Śaiva system.

† This is not the right place to enter into a discussion of ईश्वरवाद and its relation to the other *śāstras* which arose in ancient India, in attempting to solve the problem of Efficiency (निमित्तत्व) and the Origin of Motion. In a general sense Nyāya too, while dealing with this question must come under the category of ईश्वरवाद. The fact that Nyāya Sūtras 4.1.20-21 are directed against ईश्वरवाद does not indicate, however, that this view is repudiated as altogether

vocates of Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and other Sāiva doctrines [It is to be remembered that the अधिकरण of ईश्वरवाद is explained in Ratnaprabhā, Bhāmati and Ānandagiri as bearing on माहेश्वरमत]*

It is historically interesting to note how the element of Bhakti has come to find a place in Bhāsarvajña's work. The notion that Bhakti is the invariable antecedent of Jñāna is admittedly very old in India. Certainly the conception was familiar as an integral part of the theology of Nyāya (Vaiś) when the Sarvasiddhānta Saṅgraha was written, for its importance is recognised there: the doctrine of भक्ति (= Faith?, perhaps the word is here an equivalent of ध्या and has not yet assumed the highly emotional colouring of the later age) and the parallel doctrine of Grace (प्रसाद) are accepted as essential in this twin system, so that Mokṣa or Realisation of the Self's Identity is held in both the Schools to ensue through Faith (भक्ति) and Divine Grace (प्रसाद), the mutual difference of the Schools being that while Nyāya adhered to Yoga as the direct antecedent of Mokṣa, Vaiśeṣika kept away from it. The beginnings of this doctrine may be traced back to a remote past (perhaps even to the pre upaniṣadic period), but its connection with Nyāya remains for investigation. I suppose that here, too, as elsewhere,

unwarrantable, it means simply that the extreme form of this doctrine as illustrated in the so called वागुपनि दंशन in Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha (e.g. निषेधकत्वे of Isvara, meaning that the Agency of Isvara is free and spontaneous, and *not determined* by the Karmas of the Jivas) is incompatible with its general background. Cf. Tat Tika, p. 418, lines 13-14.

* Rāja Śekhara & Cuyaratna take

शेव=नैवायिक (called कर्मावी in रघाट्वादमञ्जरी)

& वागुपनि=वैशेषिक ।

These are two out of the 4 Mahesvara sects. Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri differ from this view.

the influence of Saivism is palpable. [Bhāsarvajña notes the भक्ति element alone, but we may be sure that he had nothing to say against the corresponding element of Grace too, which occurs in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a high authority with Bhāsarvajña, as with all Saiva philosophers.]

D. Another point to which attention may be briefly drawn in a study of Nyāyasāra is the recognition of a distinction between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in their earlier (but post-Vātsyāyana) forms in the conception of Mokṣa. The former held that Mokṣa consists in the attainment of the essentially blissful character of the Self, involving of course cessation of all Pain (which embraces, among other things, the sensible pleasure too), but the latter, unable to conceive of any higher pleasure than what passes for it in the world, were reluctant to admit that in Mokṣa happiness persists. Their view of Mokṣa was thus negative, as consisting in the absence of all the *viśeṣagunas* of the Self, including with other qualities दुःख as well as सुख & ज्ञान. Bhāsarvajña notes this distinction (pp 39-41)* and taking side with the Naiyāyika (p 417-8), thus concludes “अनेन (i.e. नित्येन) सुखेन विशिष्टा आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्षः” (cf. Gunaratna's report of this view, pp. 93-94).† That such a distinction did really exist between the two systems during a certain period would be evidenced by the two definitions of मुक्ति in Sarvasiddhānta Saṅgraha :

(1) Under “Vaiśeṣika pakṣa” we have (V. 35-36)—

तत् (परमेश्वर) प्रसादेन मोक्षः स्यात् करणोपरमात्मकः ।

* The Commentators Bhaṭṭa Raghava (Ben Sk Coll Ms 162, fol 98a4) and Jaya Simha Sūri (pp 282, 284) plainly ascribe the two views as expounded in Nyāyasāra to Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya.

† This view, which latterly came to be associated with Nyāya, had been recognised as a *पूर्वपक्ष* in Vatsyāyana's Commentary on Ny. Sūtr. 1.1.22.

करणोपरमे त्वात्मा पापाण्यदवस्वितः ।

दुःखसाध्यसुखोच्छेदो दुःखोच्छेदवदेव न ।

(ii) Under 'Naiyāyika pakṣa' (VI 41-43)—

नित्यानन्दानुभूतिः स्यान्मोक्षे तु विषयाद्वैते ।

चरं वृन्दाचने रम्ये सुगलत्वं वृणोम्यहम् ।

वैशेषिकोक्तमोक्षान्तु सुखलेशविवर्जितात् ॥*

Whether this Ananda element found admission into Nyāya directly through Vedānta or through its Kashmirian representative—the Pratyabhijñā 'school of thought—cannot be ascertained. But the authorities quoted (cf Vidyabhūṣaṇa's Ed., p. 40¹⁰⁻¹³) by Bhāsarvajña are worthy of note.

I think the above will suffice to bring out the historical importance of this neglected treatise, and serve as a plea for its wider appreciation.

* * * * *

It was not known whether Bhāsarvajña had written any other work, besides the one under notice. Neither Vidyabhūṣaṇa nor Sūri seems to have anything to say in this regard. But Bhaṭṭa Raghava, whose ṭīkā on Nyāya-sūtra may be pronounced to be the oldest extant Commentary on the book, supplies positive proof to show that Bhāsarvajña had written a gloss called भूषण on his own work. I do not entertain any doubt as to the identity of this Bhūṣaṇa with the Nyāya bhūṣaṇa mentioned by Guṇaratna (p. 94⁶) and Rajasekhara.

* The sloka occurs in a slightly variant form in the following Sloka. —

वद वृन्दावन रम्ये सुगलत्वं वृणोम्यहम् ।

न च वैशेषिकी मुक्तिः प्रायेवास्मि कदाचन ॥'

The expression 'न च वैशेषिकी मुक्तिः' is significant. Over against the above stands, however, the statement in the Naisadha (17-75)—मुक्तये च गिरिस्थाय यादृमृच &c which may be explained as either due to confusion (common in the later period) or as referring to the original system instead of its mediæval modification.

p. 10⁷) as the oldest of the 18 commentaries on Nyayasāra and it is this to which Jaya Sīṃha Suri in his Commentary on Nyayasāra so often refers * Here is what Bhaṭṭa Raghava says (I quote from Ms 162 of the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares) यत्तु स्मरणज्ञानति पाठास्तरं (cf Vidyabhūṣaṇa's Ed of Nyayasāra Text p 2⁹-1⁰) तिष्ठति तत् सिद्धितस्मन्यपाठकदोषादित्युपेक्ष्यम् । भूषणे च भासर्वज्ञैरज्ञानस्य गमादिति व्याकुर्वद्दिरीदृश एव पाठ कथतोऽपि प्रतिष्ठितः ।

Fol 116⁴-5

In Nyayasāra the reading generally met with is this —स्मरण-ज्ञानव्यवच्छेदार्थमनुभवग्रहणम्, i.e. the word अनुभव in the definition of pramāṇa (viz. सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्) is employed to guard against the possible inclusion of स्मरण and ज्ञान. Bhaṭṭa Raghava criticises the above as pedantic, and on his own part approves the reading स्मरण and अज्ञान. The ground of his preference, he adds is that Bhāsarvajña himself has established that reading (अज्ञान) with the stamp of his sanction in commenting on the word in भूषण.

In continuation of the evidence of Bhaṭṭa Raghava we may point out that in Nyaya Līlavatī Vallabbhacharya also refers to Bhāsarvajña as the author of Bhūṣaṇa. Thus—

तदिदं चिरन्तनचैशेषिकमतदूषणं भूषणकारस्यातित्रयाकरम् ।
तदियमनासन्नतता भासर्वज्ञस्य यदयमाचार्यमन्यवमन्यते ।

(Nyaya Līlavatī Nir Ed p 30)

The question here relates itself to the existence of सत्त्वा as an independent guṇa. The author of Bhūṣaṇa denies it as unnecessary, and thus breaks loose from the traditional ideas of the school (cf Vaiś. Sūtra 1.1.6 and Praśastapada, p 111). Hence the above remark †

* Cf Vidyabhūṣaṇa Ed वाक्यव्यवच्छेदोक्तिः pp 56 64 65 67 80 87

† In commenting on Nyayasāra (Vidyabhūṣaṇa Ed, p 3²-3) Bhaṭṭa Raghava makes the following observations, showing that according to Bhāsarvajña मत्तः & पृथक्त्वं as separate guṇas have

Again, Chitsukha quotes in his *Tattvapradīpikā* (N. Sāg. Ed., 1915, p. 224), under the name of Bhāsarvajña (भूपण-कारमापितं) the definition of Viparyaya as मिथ्यास्यचसायो विपर्ययः ।

A glance at Nyāyasāra (Vidyābhāṣa's Ed., p. 2*) would show that this is Bhāsarvajña's own definition. [Observe that here also Bhāsarvajña leans towards Yoga. Cf. Yo. Sūtr 1.8]

Pratyakṣavarūpa, in his commentary on Chitsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā*, quotes the definitions of *Samśaya* and *Pratyakṣa* as given by the author of Nyāyabhāṣa in these terms ; (1) तथाच 'अनवधारणद्वान्न संशयः' इति वदतो न्यायभूपणकारस्य वदनसरोरुद्धं व्याहृतिर्हिमादृतम् (p. 222) & (2) 'सम्यगपरोक्ष-लुभयसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम्' (p. 230). These definitions occur in the Nyāyasāra. In the same manner Malliṣeṇa also quotes (in the *Siddhāntamūlārī*, p. 65, Yasovijaya Jain Series) Bhāsarvajña's definition of *Pratyakṣa* as that of the author of Nyāyabhāṣa Sūtra. These are further arguments in favour of the proposed identity of the authors of Nyāyasāra and Bhāṣana.

The full title of Bhāsarvajña's Commentary was as already stated Nyāyabhāṣa, which for convenience of reference came to be shortened into mere Bhāṣa. While expatiating on the famous passage in Kiraṇāvalī—तस्माद् धरं भूपणः कर्मापि गुणस्तद्वत्त्वयोगात् (Vindhyeśvarī Prasad's Ed., p. 160)—Vādiṇdra mentions the fuller name of the book. Thus,

no existence, but that in the manner of प्रमेयत्व they reside in all the padārthas alike :

अथ संस्थाप्रत्यय परमते- इष्टम् । स्वमते तु संस्थापृथक्स्वयोः सकलपदार्थनिष्ठत्वेन सामान्यवत्त्वाभावात् । यथा हि प्रमेयत्वमवधारणसकलपदार्थेषु प्रमेयत्वं तथा संस्थापृथक्-तु तयोः समानादायेषु पृथक् पृथक् इत्यापवाभिप्रायः बुद्धिरवाकिकायां भूयाः भवेत् ।

Fol. 14a³⁻⁵

(Cf. Nyāya Līlāvati. The author of Upaskāra (7.2 1) thus puts the view of Bhāṣa on संस्था—स्वरूपमिदं पदार्थं, स्वरूपभेदस्तु दिक्तादिकम् । Cf. also Guṇa Kiraṇāvalī, p. 192).

in his *Rasasara* we read- कर्म गुण सामान्यवत्त्वे स्पर्शानाधारत्वे च सति द्रव्याश्रितत्वात् । सामान्यवत्त्वे सति कार्यानाधारत्वा-
दित्यनुमानाच्च कर्म गुण इति न्यायभूषणकार* । *

Mm Haraprasada Śāstri, in his Preface to "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts", p 11, distinguishes the न्यायभूषण known as the Commentary on Nyāyasāra from the Bhuṣaṇa referred to in the pages of the Tārkikarākṣā (pp 341, 351 & 353) The latter, he observes, is "a Vṛtti on the Nyāya Sūtras" [Cf also f note 1 in Kiraṇāvali (guṇa), pp 160, 192] Sualī, in a note at p 59 of his work, seems also inclined to accept this view But nowhere are the grounds clearly stated. Possibly it is supposed that as all the three references to Bhuṣaṇakāra in the Tārkikarākṣā, bear on निग्रहस्थान—a subject to which the Nyāya Sūtras have devoted a lengthy discussion, the Bhuṣaṇa must be a gloss on these Sūtras But I fear this supposition is vitiated by what I might call the fault of 'undue extension (गौरव)' It is more likely that passages quoted in Tārkikarākṣā have been taken from the section dealing with the varieties of निग्रहस्थान in Bhāsarvajña's Commentary on Nyāyasāra (cf also Tārkikarākṣā, p 351¹⁰⁻¹¹ & Nyāyasāra p 26^{16 17}) As to whether the statements attributed to Nyāyabhuṣaṇa by Ratnakīrti (Six Bud Ny Tracts, pp 11, 58) are really those of Bhāsarvajña himself in Bhuṣaṇa or of a distinct author of that name, I cannot presume to judge

* *Rasasara*, p 4, edited by Gopinath Kaviraj (Benares Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts No 5) But on p 7, in defending the orthodox view as to the independent character of कर्म as a category, the author of *Rasasara* himself refers to the shortened form of the name एतेन कर्माणि गुण इति भूषणोऽपि प्रायुक्तः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सति द्रव्याश्रितत्वाच्च कर्मणि साधारणानुमानसहस्रव्यापि साधारणानुमानवत्त्वात् ।

II TĀTPARYĀCHĀRYA

The name of this author seems to have well nigh disappeared from the subsequent history of the literature. But it would appear from references by earlier writers that he had been a man of considerable influence. Udayana quotes his view on Pramaṇyavāda in his *Ātmatattva Viveka** (Jayanara yaga *Tarkapañchanana* s Ed p 65²⁰) and though it is set aside there as being irreconcilable with the system of traditional Nyaya (न्यायसम्प्रदाय) to which he himself belonged, the mere fact of its being quoted by an eminent scholar like himself† would constitute a claim for its propounder to a wider recognition.

Mm Vindhyesvar Prasad Dube (Intros to *Prasastapada Bhāṣya* with *Kiraṇavali* p 28) and the late Mm Chandra Kanta Tarkalankara (Intro to his own Commentary on *Kusumanjali Haricas*, p ii) identified this Tatparyāchārya with Vachaspati Miśra, the author of *Tatparyāṭika* but this will have to be given up now in view of the decisive statement of Vallabhāchārya in the *Nyāyalavati*.

तदियमनास्तातता भासर्वज्ञस्य यद्यमाचार्यमप्यवमन्यते ।
तथा च तदनुयायिनस्तात्पर्याचार्यस्य सिद्धनाद 'सर्वदेव हि
भगवती'त्यादि ।

(*Nir Sāgara* Ed p 33 10 12)

From this passage it is evident that Tatparyāchārya was a follower (possibly a direct successor or even Commentator) of Bhasarvajña and that his attitude towards the orthodox school like that of his own Guru was often not quite a

* एककोटिनिपतो ह्यनुभवो निश्चयः । ज्ञानतद्वत्प्रमादिणि च ज्ञाने न द्वैतमिति न्यवस्थितिरेव तस्यायं प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः परत एवेति न्यायसम्प्रदायः । अत एवति विषयात् तादृशस्य स्वत एवति तस्यान्वयाः ।

† For another reference to Tatparyāchārya see Vachaspati II, *Khaṇḍanoddhara*, p 81

pliant one. The dictum ascribed to him in Nyayalilāvati is quoted in full by Śāṅkara Miśra in Upaśhara (7 2 26), by Jayarāma in Nyāya Siddhantamālā (fol. 120 a¹)* and by Vāchaspati II in Khandanoddhāra (Ben. Ed., p. 103), where it stands thus

‘ संचिदेव हि भगवती वस्तुषगमे नः शरणम् । †

It is an appeal to Intuition or Immediate Perception as against the formal testimony of Authority for the ascertainment of the real character of an object (वस्तुषगम) ‡ This would

* Ms. of Babu Dikshita Jade of Benares

† It is quoted in Paumala, a com. on महाप्रज्ञा (V. 32) by Mahesvarananda, thus संचिदेव भगवती विषयस्त्वोपगम एवम्, etc. (p. 80, Trivand. Ed.)

‡ In Nyayalilāvati, for example, the question arises as to whether तत्त्व as an independent guṇa is to be admitted. The Sutrakara and Prasastapada both vouch for its separate existence, but Bhāsarvajña and with him Tatpariyacharya, emphatically deny it, setting at naught the weight of all tradition, apparently on the simple but ultimate ground of सचिद्वगमेव. It is interesting to note that Śāṅkara, or as it is somewhere in a more restricted sense denominated ‘pratīti’, as the final arbiter for all decisions, is practically admitted by all [Cf. Śāṅkara Miśra’s remarks in Upaśhara on the Samavāya Sūtra (cf. also Jayanta, p. 312)]. Precisely the same attitude of mind is evinced by the opponent in Nyayamañjarī when he defies the authority of Prasastapada on the strength of what he calls ‘प्रतीति’ (Nyayamañjarī, pp. 136²⁴, 137²). Thus, referring to the statement of Prasastapada (Viz. Ed., p. 24), viz. यथावा प्रत्यक्षत्वरूपवत्त्वद्वयत्वं, the opponent, anxious to establish the pratyakṣatva of Kala declaims “नेदं द्वैतं वचनं यद्वैतं तद्वैतं न च वचनं प्रत्यक्षत्वमप्रत्यक्षत्वं च यथाप्यतः । प्रत्यक्षत्वं हि चेन्द्रियकप्रतिविधिषयत्वमुच्यते । तदेवेति कालस्य नास्त्यस्यापि प्रत्यक्षता केन वार्यते ।

Viz. Ed., pp. 136²⁷-137³.

Viewed from our present standpoint the drift of the opponent’s

seem to correspond, in one of its aspects, to the Pratibhā of the Yoga system (Yo. Sut. 3. 54) described as immediate and all embracing, as distinguished from अनुमान and आगम which are remote [cf “सर्ववस्तूने संविदेककरणानि &c” in Pramāṇa Pārīkṣā by Śālikanātha, Upamāna Chap. (Pandit, Old Series, Vol. I, p. 153). संवित्, comprising अनुभूति (= प्रमा, there being no false presentation according to Prābhākaras) and स्मृति (संस्कारमात्रज्ञा संवित्) is a favourite word with the Prābhākaras.] The epithet भगवती as applied to संवित् is strangely reminiscent of Kashmir Śaivism or Pratyabhijñā Darśana, where the expression भगवती संवित् or its equivalents are of frequent occurrence* (Javasinha Suri speaks of प्रत्यभिज्ञा as भगवती in his Commentary on Nitya Sāra, Vidy. Ed, p 266).

argument would appear to be this. That *आज्ञाज्ञा* is acceptable in so far as it does not clash with our experience, but as soon as it happens to differ its validity is impugned (cf the view *दृष्टार्थे वेदान्त प्रामाण्य नास्ति*). Of course in a sphere beyond human experience its validity stands undisputed. A curious doctrine this and is open to grave objections. But such seems to have been the position of the opponent here concerned.

• Cf Kemarsja—

A. In *Pratyabhijñā hṛdaya* (Kashmir Series, Vol. III).

(a) सर्वोत्तमत्वेन वर्तमानत्वात् तन्मिति श्रुत्या भवता च बह्व्योषधि
स्वरूपानुपपत्तेः सविदेव भगवता 'ब्रह्मम्' ।

P. 3713-15

(b) यदा तु उत्पत्तिर्भवेत् सर्वे-उत्पत्तये मध्यमता सविभवाया विकसति etc

p. 39 12

(c) ग्राह्यरूपः। चिन्तितेन भगवती स्वहन्ता etc

P. 2 6-7

(Note the use of the term चैतन्यक in Yoga)

(d) विदेव भगवन् स्वच्छावर्तनरूपः।

and B In Commentary on the Śiva Sūtras, called Vimalakīrti

(Kashmir Series, Vol 1)

(अ) परा *द्वारेका सारिद इच्छायात्केतममुख एयुषमेवपर्यन्त विश्व वमन्तो

It is probable therefore that Tātparyācharya was a native of Kashmir

III—TRILOCHANA

Ratna Kīrti (950 ?)* in his *Apohasiddhi* ('*Six Bud Nj Tracts*, p. 13) and *Kāśanabhaṅgasiddhi* (*Ibid.*, pp. 58,70) quotes to refute the views of one Trilochana. No definite data are available to determine the identity of this author, except what appears from a study of the meaning of the

It may be mentioned by the way that the Sloka

सविद भगवतो देवा इत्यनुभववेदिता ।

अनुवृत्ति इत्येतस्या इष्टि सत्कारमात्रज्ञः ॥

ascribed by Gaṇikānta to the text of Tarkabhāṣā in some recensions has a like significance. The characterisation of सविद by the epithets भगवतो and देवो is notable. Moreover, its description as the Supreme Witness (for such would be the meaning of इत्यनुभववेदिता, lit. the witness of अनुभव and इष्टि or of the whole mental life) rather than as a mere state of consciousness while bringing it close to the Vedāntic conception of सत्, is a sure mark of its relation to the Trika philosophy of Kashmir.

*Dr. Vidyabhāṣa (*Med Ind Logic*, p. 140, footnote 2) makes the older Ratnakīrti, a contemporary of Raja Vimala Chandra (650 A.D.)—the author of *Apohasiddhi* and *Kāśanabhaṅgasiddhi*. But the internal evidence of the works does not justify this view. How, for example, could a man of the 7th Century have quoted from an author (e.g. Vāchaspati) who lived undoubtedly so late as 841 A.D., at the earliest? To avoid falling into this absurdity I prefer to take the author of *Apohasiddhi* &c. to be the younger Ratna Kīrti whom Dr. Satis Chandra himself describes as the guru of Ratnakara Śānti (*Ibid.*, p. 140) in the University of Vikramaśila, Ratnakara's time being 983 A.D. I have placed Ratnakīrti in the middle of the 10th Century. [NB This is an indirect corroboration of the plea for an earlier date (than 976 A.D.) for Vāchaspati Mūṛa]

extracts given by Ratna Kīrti, viz that he had been an established Nyāya writer before the 10th Century Mm H P Śāstri (Preface to Six Bud Ny Tracts, p 11) identifies him with the teacher (विद्यागुरु) of the great Vāchaspati Miśra* and it is likely that he is right

IV—VĀCHASPATI MIŚRA

The greatest name in the history of Philosophy of this country is perhaps that of Trilochana's pupil Vāchaspati Miśra His wide and deep erudition in all the branches of Indian Thought earned for him the rare distinction of being called सर्वतन्त्रस्यतन्त्र (Master of all Sciences)—a distinction seldom grudged by his successors It is difficult to glean anything from his numerous works in which traces of his personal predilections in any direction might be detected His all round scholarship and sympathy with diverse ways of thinking makes such an attempt almost impossible

While the Vedantists claim him as their own saying that he had been in his previous existence the great Vārttika kāra Suresvara himself one of the direct disciples of Śaṅkarācharya Udayana pays homage to him rather as a great authority in Nyāya and comments on his work So with Mīmāṃsa, Sāṅkhya and Yoga—everywhere the stamp of his genius is unmistakable

Similarly it might appear that Vāchaspati was a Śaiva in faith His obeisance to Bhava (Intro to Bhāmat, Verse 3 and to Nyāya Kanika Verse 2) to Pinakī (Tat Tika Intro Verse 1) and to Vṛsaketu (Intro to Tattvavaiśaradi, Verse 1 Cf Tatparya Tika p 513¹² 13), might be cited as an illustration of his belief But his devotion to

*Both Udayana and Vardhamana speak of Trilochana as Vāchaspati's Guru And Vāchaspati himself says in the Tatparyatika

विज्ञेयदगुरुस्तत्परादनुगमना मुद्रे ।

अद्यामान यथावस्तु व्याख्यातमिदमाह्वयम् ॥

Vishṇu* and to Gaṇeśa is equally patent (See Intro. Verse 1 in Nyāya Kanikā and Verse 4 in the beginning of Bhāmati).

It appears from a reference to Udayanāchārya's Tātparyaparīśuddhi that Vāchaspati's tutor was Trilochana†. But in the Introduction of Nyāya Kanikā, Verse 3, Vāchaspati thus says.

अज्ञानतिमिरश्मनीं परदमनीं न्यायमञ्जरीं रुचिराम् ।
प्रसवित्रे प्रभवित्रे विद्यातरवे नमो गुरवे ॥

Are we to understand this passage as containing an implied allusion to his Guru's work, Nyāya Mañjarī?

Hall's remark (Bibliography, pp 5, 9, 21, cf Auf's Cat. Cat I, p 560, Ind Off. Cat, p 719) that मार्त्तण्डतिलकस्वामी was the name of Vāchaspati's tutor was obviously due to a misinterpretation of the 4th Verse of the Introduction of the Bhāmati, viz

मार्त्तण्डतिलकस्वामिमहागणपतीन् वयम् ।
विश्वधन्यान् नमस्याम सर्वसिद्धिविधायिन ॥

Here Martanda, Tilakasvami and Mahāganapati are the names of three distinct gods. The belief that their worship ensures success is a very old one and is recorded in Smṛti literature (Cf Yājñīa Sm 1 293, see also Bala Śāstri's Ed, Bhāmati, p 1, f note 3). Martanda is doubtless the Sun and Mahāganapati the once famous god of that name (Ānandagiri in his Śaṅkaravijaya testifies to the existence in the days of Śaṅkarāchārya of a sect of Gāṇapatyas worshipping महागणपति as the Supreme Self. See Chap XV, Bibl Ind.

*It is striking that though the descriptions of the Deity in the first benedictory verse of Nyāyakanikā approaches to the definition of Īśvara in Yoga Sūtra it is as Viṣṇu and not as Īśvara or Śiva that the Deity is conceived.

†See also Mm. II P Śāstri, Preface to "Six Bud Ny. Tracts" p. 11.

Ed, pp 106-110 For a description of Mahaganapati see Gopinath Rao's "Hindu Iconography", Vol I, Part I, pp 55-6)

From the two concluding verses (5 & 6) of the Bhāmati* it would appear that Vāchaspati undertook to compose this his greatest work during the reign, and perhaps at the request, of one Raja Nrga. And it is just probable, considering the praises lavished upon this king, that he had been Vachaspati's own patron. But who was he? That he was not a mythical figure may be almost taken for granted. According to Vachaspati he was a king of a generous nature, accomplished in the Śāstras and highly famed for his wonderful deeds. And it is further said that the deeds which he had performed with such remarkable ease (क्षीलामाश्रयिर्निर्मित) were, not merely beyond the actual power of other kings who would seek to imitate him, but even above their comprehension (मनसापि दुष्कराणि). I have found a passage in the Bhāmati which would seem to set in a clearer light the meaning of the above. The kirtis already

nibandha he himself assigns 898 (षस्वङ्कवसु) as the date of its composition, and though the era to which the number refers is left unmentioned it is likely that we have to take it standing for Vikrama Samvat, and not for Śakābda. The year would then correspond to 841 A D.*

Regarding the native place of Vāchaspati tradition and opinion of scholars are equally divided. From the evidence of a śloka found in the Introduction of Nyāya Sūtroddhāra† Mm H.P. Śāstri infers that he was an inhabitant of Mithilā. But this can hardly be accepted as a correct view. The author of Nyāya Sūtroddhāra was Vāchaspati II and was not identical with the author of Bhāmati and other works.

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There cannot be much uncertainty as to the age in which Vachaspati Misra flourished. For in his Nyāyasūchi-

- * नृपावस्था मनसाप्यगम्या अक्षेपमानेष्वचकार कीर्तिम् ।
कात्स्न्यसाधारणसुखीत्यर्थस्यैव यावद्विचक्षणश्च ॥
नरेश्वरा यन्त्रविद्यानुकारमिच्छन्ति कर्तुं न च पारयन्ति ।
वसिमन् महाप्रेमदानीयकीर्ती श्रीमन्मृगेश्वर इति मया निरव्य ॥

† Cf. Amalānanda in Vedānta Kalpataru (Viz. Ed., p. 246). आचार्य या महापतिर्महाचकार (Appaya dikṣita in the Kalptaruparimāla prefers the reading महाचकार । See Panmala, Viz. Ed., p. 406) तस्य नाम नृग इति ।

nibandha he himself assigns 898 (घस्वङ्कवसु) as the date of its composition, and though the era to which the number refers is left unmentioned it is likely that we have to take it standing for Vikrama Samvat, and not for Śakābda. The year would then correspond to 841 A.D.*

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Vāchaspati was a voluminous writer, mostly of commentaries. In Nyāya‡ two works have come down to us, of which

* Cf (i) Suali, *Introduzione allo studio Filosofia Indiana*, p 58, (ii) Woods, *Yoga system of Patanjali* (H. O. Series, Vol 17), Introduction, pp XXI-XXIII, (iii) Seal, *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* p 51; (iv) Chakravarti, *J A S B*, 1915, pp 262, 400. As opposed to the above I may set the view of Mm. H. P. Śāstri (Preface to Śāstri's Notices, Vol II, p. XII & "An Examination of the Nyāya Sūtras" in *J A S B*, 1905, p 246) who is disposed to maintain the śaka theory. With all respect for the Śāstri's erudition in this field I beg to differ from him on this point, for the simple reason that Vāchaspati ought to be placed at a sufficiently long interval from Udayana (984 A.D.) to enable the latter to conceive of the idea of writing a Commentary upon his work.

† Śāstri's Notices, Vol II, No 118, p 98 (cf Preface XII).

‡ Vāchaspati has left his speculations almost on every orthodox school. I say almost, because no work has yet been found dealing exclusively with the Vaiśeṣika system in its alienated form. But though not discovered, such a work may be still existing. In Sāṅkhya his *Tattva Kaumudī* has become a standard ~~treasure~~ ^{treasure} and

one is a mere booklet attempting to fix the number of Gotama's Sūtras and their readings. It is known as *Nyāya*

Nyāya Kanika, a Commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Vidhiviveka*, is as good a tract in Mīmāṃsā as the *Bhāmātī* is incontestably in Vedānta. It is not a work on *Nyāya*, but on Mīmāṃsā, and it is a pity that a scholar like the late Mr. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in his posthumous work on 'The History of Indian Logic' (p. 314) makes the curiously blundering statement 'Vachaspati Miśra's *Nyāya Kanika*, a work on logic is not now available'. The work was published in Benares as early as the year 1907 A.D. and is even now available in print. The word *Nyāya* seems to have led Dr. Vidyabhusana to the belief that it was 'a work on logic', though it is well known that many celebrated Mīmāṃsā works have a similar designation. Cf. Madhavacharya's *Nyāyavivartanī*, Parthasarathi Miśra's *Nyāyavivartanī*, *Nyāyavivartanī*, etc. *Tattvabindu* is a small original paper devoted to discussion of Sound. *Tattva Samikṣā* (*Bhāmātī*, Nir. Sūgar Ed., p. 996, *Tat. Tika*, p. 57) or *Brahmatattva Samikṣā* (*Bhāmātī*, Nir. Sūgar pp. 15, 466 & *Tatparya Tika*, p. 394) and *Brahma Siddhī* (*Nyāya Kanika* p. 80) are two other Vedantic works, now lost, by Vachaspati, to which he himself makes passing references [Hall, p. 87, and Ananda (in *Vedānta Kalpataru*, Viz. Ed., p. 538) make *Tattva Samikṣā* a Commentary on the *Brahmasiddhī*]. Of all his works *Brahmasiddhī*, *Brahmatattva Samikṣā* & *Nyāya Kanika* (mentioned in *Bhāmātī*, pp. 15, 466, 996, in *Tatparya Tika*, pp. 394, 395, 467, in *Tattva Vaiśaradī* under Sūtra 4.14) seem to be the earliest, and *Tattvabindu* mentioned in *Bhāmātī*, p. 996, *Tattva Vaiśaradī* and *Bhāmātī* the latest. *Tatparya Tika* is earlier than *Tattvakaumudī* (cf. *Kaumudī* under *Kanika* 5), but later than the earliest group. From the expression 'द्वयसंज्ञा निश्चये' in the *Bhāmātī* (concluding verse 2) it appears that

Sūchinibandha. The other is a commentary on Uddyotakara's Nyāya Vārtika known as Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Tīkā. He is said (Bühler's Catalogue of Sk. Mss. in the Private Libraries of Gujrat etc. 4, p. 24) to have also written a Commentary on Nyāyaratna, apparently an older treatise which is now lost.*

The Nyayatattvāloka, noticed in the India Office Catalogue, pp. 610-611, was the work of the younger Vāchaspati Miśra, and not of the author of the Tātparya Tīkā.

V.—JAYANTA

The determination of the time of Jayanta, the author of Nyayamañjarī does not seem to be beset with much difficulty.

Gangeśa's reference to him as जरन्नेयायिक shows that in the latter's time he had been an established authority.

There does not seem to exist any positive evidence in confirmation of the alleged quotation by Jayanta from Vāchaspati Miśra's works.

(a) Mr. Chakravarti's statement (J.A.S.B., Sept. 1915, p.262, f.Note I) that "Bhāmatti is quoted as an authority in Nyāya Mañjarī" is apparently founded on the foot note by Mm. Pandit Gangādihara Śāstri (Ny. Mañj., p.120) where the śloka—

* May it not be the same Nyāyaratna which Bhāsarvajña in Nyāyasara attributes to the authorship of his own Guru ?

Presumably the work had been of great merit and enjoyed a wide celebrity before the time of Vāchaspati Miśra, or he would not have undertaken to write out a Commentary upon it. And this would be perfectly in keeping with the encomiums bestowed upon it by Bhāsarvajña.

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थं कुशलैरनुमादुभि ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्वैरन्यथैवोपपद्यते ॥

is erroneously ascribed to Bhāmati under Sutra 2 1 11. The sloka as a matter of fact does not belong to Bhāmati, where it is introduced is तदुक्तम्. It occurs originally in Bhartṛhari's Vakyapadīya, I 34

(b) Gangādihara (Preface to Ny Māñj, p 1) says that in the sentence तदपि परिहृतमाचार्यैर्जातं च संबद्धं च इत्येक काल इति वदद्भिः. (Ny Māñj, p 312 ¹³) the word आचार्यैः is to be understood as a reference to Vāchaspati Miśra whose Tatparya Tīkā on Sutra 2 1 32 contains the following statement. अथासम्बद्धस्य विद्यमानत्वं तत् सत्यपि पृथगातिमत्त्वे नावयविनोऽस्ति जातः सम्बद्धश्चेत्येकः कालः (p 267). Now, though the dictum जात &c found in Ny Māñj. does really occur in Tatparyatīkā it may not have been the original pronouncement of Vachaspati. For in view of the practically insignificant interval between their periods of life* it is hard to believe that Jayanta should have spoken of Vachaspati in such term as आचार्या at all. It is more probable that the dictum had been even then, as later (cf Upaskara on 1 2 3), a familiar one, and that the आचार्य referred to by Jayanta, may have been an ancient authority

As for the personal history of Jayanta nothing more is known than what his son Abhinanda has recorded in the Introduction of his Kādambarī Kathasara. It is said there that Jayanta's 5th ancestor, named Śakti, had emigrated from Gauḍa and settled in Darvābhīśara, a country which Dr Buhler located on the frontiers of Kashmir (Ind Ant, Vol

* Vachaspati lived in 841 A D and Jayanta, being the great grandsoo of Śakti Svāmī the minister of king Muktapīḍa Lalitaditya of Kashmir could not have been far removed from him in age. Possibly both were contemporaries, one older and the other younger

II. p. 102)*. The village of Gauramūlaka, which Jayanta's grandfather Kalyāṇa Svāmi is said to have acquired in consequence of having performed a **समग्रहणी** sacrifice†, is mentioned as Ghoramūlaka in the *Rājataranginī*, VIII, 1861. According to Dr. Stein it was situated in the territory of Rājapuri within the boundaries of Dārṣābhisāra (Kalhana's *Chronicles of the Kings of Kashmir*, by Stein, Vol. II, pp. 144-5, foot note to verse 1861†.

* Dr. Stein makes it comprise "the whole tract of the lower and middle hills lying between the Vitastā and Chāndrabhāgā" (See Stein's *Trans.*, Vol. I, p. 32, foot note to verse 180).

† असमग्रहणी एव ग्रामकामः समग्रहणी इत्यनेन स इदिसमाप्तिसमनन्तमेव गौरमूलके ग्राममवाप्त । *Nyāya Mañjarī*, p. 274. Dr. Stein has fallen into a twofold mistake here (i) in taking Abhmaoda to be the author of *Nyāyamañjarī* and (ii) in calling Jayanta's father by the name of Kānta. The second mistake, based on Bühler's false rendering (*Ind Ant II*, p. 104) evidently arose from a misunderstanding of the following verse of Kādambari Kathāsāra:

अगाधदुन्दुभारमात्र परमेष्ठिभवनम् । अत्रायत सुतः कान्तश्चन्द्रो दुम्बोदधोरिव

Here the meaning is plain enough. The word Chandra has to be taken in a double sense signifying the name of the son as well as the Moon. The epithet कान्त would be applicable to both the cases. That this interpretation is the right one would appear from the fact that Jayanta himself mentions Chandra as his father in the end of *Nyāya Mañjarī* (p. 659¹⁶).

‡ A geneology of Jayanta's family, constructed from the statements of his son, is appended below:

ŚAKTI (Gauja Brāhmaṇa of the Bharadvāja Gotra)

MITRA

ŚAKTISVĀMIN, minister (मन्त्री) of King Muktapala (Lalitaditya) of the Karkota family. (See *Raj. Tar.* LV. 42).

KALYĀṆA SVĀMIN, a great Sacrificer and Yogin.

CHANDRA, a great Controversialist

JAYANTA.

king Śaṅkaravarmān whom Jayanta describes as धर्मतरुक्ष and to whom he attributes (p. 271) the credit of having suppressed the नीलाम्बरयज्ञ apparently a very obscene rite, cannot be identified with certainty. From Jayanta's words it would seem, as Col. Jacob has rightly guessed (J. R. A. S. 1911 p. 511) that the king was a Jain*.

Jayanta was known to his contemporaries as a वृत्तिकार (Ny. Mūj. p. 659¹⁷ cf. Kadambari Katha Sarā, Introduction) or the author of a gloss on the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama†. Probably Nyāya Māñjarī is the gloss here referred to. Gunaratna in his Commentary on Śaṅkarsana Samuchchaya ascribes to Jayanta a Commentary on Nyāya Sāra, named Nyāya Kalikā. It is not known whether this Commentary is now extant. Bühler notices a work of the same name by Jayanta in his Kashmir Report (Nos. 385-7, p. CXLV)‡, but until its contents are examined it would be impossible to say anything as to its identity.

The style of Nyāya Māñjarī deserves special mention. It is unique of its kind, rich, humorous, brilliant, with a poignancy that is almost biting in its pointedness§. It is

* There was a king of this name in Kashmir, but the anachronism of his time (883-902 A. D.) and the fact of his being described by Kalhana as a worthless prince (V. Taraṅga) precludes the possibility of this identification.

† Cf. Rajavakya as Śaṅkarsana Samuchchaya, p. 10³.

‡ Cf. also Stein Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss., Jammu p. 148, No. 1353. The opening benedictory sloka of this Commentary is the same as in Nyāya Māñjarī (p. 1, verse 1) but the concluding verse runs thus:

अवातरुनिष्पन्दमनिष्कसौरनम् । न्याय कलिकामात्र जयन्ते पर्यदीदृशम् ॥

It is likely, considering the meanings of the words *कलिका and *न्याय, that the former was a smaller work on the same subject (i. e. a gloss on the Nyāya Sūtras). However, this is only a conjecture.

§ Abhinanda thus describes the style of his father:

सरसा सदक्कुरा प्रसादमधुरा गिर । काव्यास्तावज्यन्तस्य ह्यग्निं जगतां सुरा ॥

wonderfully eloquent, sweeping everything before its tremendous rush the arguments of the Laukayatikas as mercilessly as those of the Mīmāṃsakas. All through the work there runs a deep vein of religious earnestness & sense of personal conviction which renders its remarks on the views of the opponents so caustic and bitter. Thus for instance, we read on p. 204—

ये त्वीश्वरं निरपवाददृष्टप्रमाण
सिद्धस्वरूपमपि नाभ्युपयन्ति मूढा ।
पापाय तैः सह केषापि चिन्त्यमाना
जायते नूनमिति युक्तमतो विरन्तुम् ॥

Cf also on p. 236—

मीमांसका यश्च पिवन्तु पयोऽत्रा पिवन्तु बुद्धिजाड्याश्च य-
नाय ब्राह्मीकृतं वा पिवन्तु च दस्तु पुष्टप्रणीत एव नात्र भ्रान्तिः ।

The general Śaiva Culture of Kashmir exercised a marked influence on Jayanta's personal creed. He was a Śaiva through and through. In his discussion on theism he shows a decided bias towards the Kashmirian form of this faith. Like Bhaṣarvajña and other Śaivite philosophers he too conceives of the Divinity as Śiva (p. 200^{11 20}) and predicates of Him 5, rather than 3, of the 9 Viśiṣṭagunās pertaining to the Ātman. It is interesting to note that among these qualities, all eternal, we find both धर्म and सुख (besides the usual two, viz. ज्ञान, इच्छा and रुचि). He says—धर्मस्तु भूतानुग्रहवतो वस्तुस्वाभावाद्भवन् न चार्थते तस्य फलं परमार्थनिष्पत्तिरेव । सुखं तस्य नियमेन नित्यानन्दत्वेनागमात् प्रतीते (p. 201¹²⁻¹⁴). Now in the mouth of a Naiyāyika this would appear to be a remarkable confession. For though strictly speaking धर्म is not denied to Īśvara in the orthodox system (cf \) Vartika, Benares Ed.—या धर्म इश्वर तासौ तत्रैश्वर्यं करोति किन्तु प्रत्यात्मवृत्तीन् धर्मधर्ममन्त्रिचयानु-गृह्णाति (p. 404⁵⁻⁶) it is admitted only as a matter of concession. Thus Uddhotakara expresses his own views—न चेश्वरे

धर्मोऽस्ति (Ny Va, p 464⁶) and एतच्च न बुध्यामहे यथा बुद्धि-
मत्तायामीश्वरस्य प्रमाणसद्भावो न चैवं धर्मोऽद्वैतित्यत्वे प्रमाणम-
स्ति &c (Ny Vā, p 464¹³⁻¹⁵) Vāchaspati, too, says almost
the same thing (See Tāt Tika, p 420²¹⁻³) Similarly as
regards the existence of नित्यसुख and its presence in Isvara
(and with some, in the *multa atmans* as well), the usual evidence
of the Nyaya Vaisēṣika is decidedly against it. The following
words of Udayana may serve as the pith of their arguments

नित्यं तु सुखं न सत्यं योग्यानुपलम्भवाधितत्वात् ।

श्रुतिस्तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेत्, न । योग्यानुपलम्भवाधितं तदनवकाशात्,
अवकाशे वा प्राचक्ष्वनयुतेरपि तद्यभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

[Ātmatattva viveka (Tarkapanchānana's Ed, p 95¹⁴⁻¹⁵)]*

VI — VYOMASIVACHARYA.

Vyoma Sivacharya, as the name indicates, seems to me
to have been a Śaiva Saint of the South. Though a high
authority on Vaiśeṣika philosophy his name has practically been
forgotten. Rajasekhara, in his commentary on the Nyaya-Kandali
(Nyaya Kandali-pañchikā), credits him with the author-
ship of a commentary named Vyomavati on Prasastapada's
Padārtha dharma Sangraha. This commentary was long
believed to have been lost, but it has recently been recovered
and a transcribed copy of it exists in the Government Sanskrit
Library Benares, from which it appears that the work more
than ordinarily deserved the renown which it once universally
enjoyed. It is likely that the Acharya of whom Udayana
speaks in the Kiranavali is no other than Vyomasiva, and that
Śridhara also presumably made use of his predecessor's work
in writing the Kandali.

Vyomasiva was the leader, at any rate a learned represen-

* Comparing the statements of Jayanta and Udayana it
appears that their attitudes towards Āgama were quite distinct. In
this regard in spite of slight differences Jayanta and Bhasarvajña side
together.

tative of a distinct section of Vaiśeṣika school and commanded a great influence on contemporary and subsequent thought. He accepted Śabda as a separate pramāṇa and had no sympathy with the people who suggested that the Vaiśeṣika did not admit the independence of verbal testimony as a valid source of knowledge. In regard to this view of his Maṇibhadra gives the following report in commenting on Haribhadra's Śaḍdarśana Samuchchaya (Chowkh Ed, p 63) यद्यपि श्रौतुक्त्यशासने व्योमशिवाचार्याकृतिर्नास्ति प्रमाणानि, तथापि श्रीधरमतापेक्षया अत्र उभे एव निगदिते । It is clear from this that there was already a split in the school which was due perhaps to the interpretation of the true import of the Sūtra (Vais) 9 3 3, and was not of comparatively recent occurrence. Among the advocates of dual pramāṇa we find the names of scholars like Śrīdhara, Śivāditya, Vallabhacharya Udayana (), Rājasekhara (see his Śaḍdarśana Samuchchaya, Yalovijaya Ed, verse 114, p 11) &c*. And Sureśvaracharya, in his Manasollasa, II 17 (Mys Ed, p 49), also subscribes to this view†. On the contrary, the interpretation of Vyomasiva is confirmed by the statements of Śaṅkarācharya in the Sarvasiddhiantasāṅgraha (V 33, p 22) and of Jinadatta in the Viveka Vilasa (Bhand Rep 1883-'84, p 462)‡.

The only other references to Vyoma Śiva which I have hitherto found in Sanskrit philosophical literature occur in

* Gauḷapadacharya, while commenting on Sāṅkhya Karika 4, plainly refers to the Vaiśeṣika opinion as being in favour of the duality of pramāṇa यद्यपि वैशेषिके यद्वे नान्युपपदे तथापि ते न प्रमादर (Ben Ed, p 5)

† Cf. Jayanarayana's Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha in the vernacular, p. 45

‡ वैशेषिक मते तावत् प्रमाणान्वयः भवति । अथवा अनुमानं च तार्किकमयागमः (Vivekavilasa). In the introduction to Vaisavaśyakabhaṣya (Ben. Ed p 660) the Vaiśeṣikas are credited with the theory of three pramāṇas इ. त्रैविध्यं प्रमाणानुमानागमत्रयं प्रमाणान्वयव्यवस्थम् ।

Vidindra's Rasasara*, and Vallabha's Nyayalīkṣitī (Bomb Ed., p 98)

VII—UDAYANACHARYA

The last great representative of the older schools of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika was beyond question Udayanacharya

Jayanta and Vachaspati Misra wrote on Nyaya, while Śrīdhara wrote on Vaiśeṣika, but the credit of combining for the first time the two allied systems into a joint format is, according to tradition, due to Udayana. And it was he who made the most pronounced effort to combat the anti-theistical tendencies of his age by bringing philosophy to the service of theology. His *Ātmatattvavivēka* & *Nyaya Kusumanjali*

* एतेन सप्तमदतविषयविशेष्ये नति स्वाश्रयकजातीवद्वन्द्वका विवेकगुण इति ज्योतिषाचार्योक्तमपि कथं प्रत्युक्तम् । स्वाश्रयकजातीवद्वन्द्वकानामनवयवमयत्वविवेकितत्वात् (Rasasara, p 11)

† For instance, in *Nyaya Kusumanjali* which being an independent treatise afforded ample opportunities to the author for sufficient freedom of expression we find in several places the characteristic doctrines of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika fused up with one another. To take one example. The Vaiśeṣika does not admit *Upamāna* and *śabda* to be separate *pramanas* but Udayana, in agreement with the orthodox Naiyāyika's standpoint (Ibid III 12 Benares Ed pp 5-57 & pp 57 etc), makes it a definite point to prove that their separate character cannot be gainsaid. But on the other hand while dealing with the question of *Svapna* or dream-consciousness he subscribes to the usual Vaiśeṣika view of the point with some modification. Thus though the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika are both at one on the falsity of dream-consciousness, the former considers it as a kind of *स्मृति*, whereas the latter makes it fall under the category of *अनुभव* and so distinct from *स्मृति*. Udayana agrees with the Vaiśeṣika in so far as he maintains the presentative character of dream-consciousness (अनास्तुभव एवास्ति हरीकृतम्, Ny Kusa, V Ben Ed p 147) but differs from him in holding that even dreams may come occasionally true (आस्तु न सप्तानुभवस्यापि कदाचित् सत्यत्वं, उदाहरत, Ibid)

are the best polemical treatises ever written with the avowed object of disposing of the Buddhist contentions against the doctrines of Ātman and Īśvara and of placing their truth on a firm and secure footing.

There is no doubt no *vas* as to the age of Udayanacharya. He lived in the fourth quarter of the 10th century as evidenced by the following *śloka* at the end of his *Lakṣaṇavali* :

तर्काम्बराङ्गप्रमितेऽप्रतीतिषु रक्तान्ततः ।
वर्षवृद्धयनश्चक्रे सुबोधालक्षणावलीम् ॥

This gives 106 Śikābdī or 951 A.D. for the composition of *Lakṣaṇavali* and as this was not probably his very last piece his period of life may be carried some more years forward.

Udayana was a contemporary of Śrīdhara but it is not possible with the resources now available to determine which of them was the older. His *Lakṣaṇavali* was 7 years earlier than the *bandali* but there seems to be reason to believe that his *kirāṇavali* was a later work. Besides the case already cited by Pindit Vinḍhyeśvarī Prasad Dube (Preface to *Nyāya bandali* p 21, f. note 5) where the view of Śrīdhara appears to be cited and refuted in the *kirāṇavali*, there is one positive instance of a similar kind. Thus the view on *तम* as the imposed blue colour which is associated with Śrīdhara's name (cf. *Śrīdhara's* *Su-graha* & *Dinakarī*) is rejected in the *kirāṇavali* (pp 19-20) and though the name of Śrīdhara is nowhere mentioned by Udayana it is nevertheless sure that his views were familiar to him. But Udayana did not live to complete the work thus initiated which broke off abruptly in its course with *सुद्धिग्रन्थ*. I think that on the death of Udayana Śrīdhara still living, began to revise his book in the light of the criticisms made not fully, however in his turn to cast a ring at Udayana whenever occasion permitted. This is my own suggestion.

and may be accepted as a tentative explanation of the other wise quite unintelligible fact of both Udayana and Śrīdhara quoting and refuting each other's views*

Udayana was a Śāṇa and though professedly a Naiyāyika he had the highest regard for Vedānta in its most rigorous and unfalsified form. His notion of Nyāya, too, was unique. His conception of the mutual relations of the various systems of Indian philosophy, orthodox and heterodox is extremely interesting. I am reminded here of the remarkable passage in the *Ātmatattvavivēka* where he attempts to show that in its gradual ascent along the path of mokṣa the soul is confronted with views which broaden out more and more. The different schools of philosophy representing the varied views thus obtained in passing are conceived to form a graduated series, arranged according to an ascending scale of spiritual realisation, and in such a scheme the lower is always supposed to be a stepping stone to the higher and is to be *superceded* by it †. Udayana's works may be thus tabulated

A Commentaries on

(a) Gotama's Sūtras (न्यायपरिशिष्ट)

(b) Prasastapada's Padārthadharmasamgraha (किरणवली) It was the last work of Udayana, and contains references to *Ātmatattvavivēka* and *Nyāyakusumanjalī* (p 147)

(c) Vachaspati Miśra's Nyāya Vārtikā tatparyapīka (न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यपरिशुद्धि or न्यायनिबन्ध)

* For Śrīdhara referring to Udayana's views, see Preface to *Nyāya Kāṇḍalī* p. 21 f. note 3.

† This attempt at Synthesis, though incidental, may be taken to be one of the earliest of its kind on record and though brief is matchless in its grandeur. Sarvajñaatma Muni's earlier attempt (in *Sanjīkṣepa Sāmraka*) and Madhusūdana's (in *Prasthānabbedha*) and Vijnānabhikṣu's (in his Introduction to *Saṅkhyā pravachana Bhāṣya*) later ones pale before it in comparison.

B (a) **आत्मतत्त्वविवेक** (known also as **बौद्धाधिकार** or **बौद्धाधिकार**). This was probably one of his earliest works. It is a splendid production, and represents probably the most vigorous defence of the Theory of Self on behalf of Nyaya against the merciless assaults of the Buddhist philosophers.

(b) **न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि**, consisting of 5 chapters, partly in prose and partly in verse. It contains a reference to **Ātmatattvaviveka**.

(c) **लक्षणावली***. This is a very useful booklet, containing a series of definitions of terms pertaining to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It was composed in 906 Śaka or 984 A. D. and was therefore earlier than the **Kīranāvalī** which succeeded the **Nyāya Kāṇḍikā** written in 991 A. D. So I do not find any warrant for Mr. Chakravarti's opinion (J. A. S. B., Sept., 1915, p. 263) that the **Kīranāvalī** preceded **Lakṣanāvalī**. The fact that the last sloka of **Lakṣanāvalī** is the same as the opening verse of the **Kīranāvalī** really proves nothing. For we might as well argue from this fact that the former was earlier than the latter.

(d) **प्रबोधसिद्धि**, an original treatise in Nyāya, probably compiled from **Vātsyāyana**, **Uddyotakara** and **Vāchaspati** (cf. T. Rakṣ., p. 308⁹⁻¹¹). **Varadarāja** refers to it four times in the **Tārīkarakāśī** (pp. 189, 190, 308, 343 & 357), and though he does not attribute it to **Udayana** by name

* **Mallinatha** in his **Commentary on Tārīkarakāśī** makes **Udayana** the author of **Lakṣanāmālā** (pp. 179⁹, 225¹⁸), but this seems to be a case of erroneous ascription. **Lakṣanāmālā** was the work of **Śivaditya** and not of **Udayana**. Probably the mistake arose from a confusion of **Lakṣanāmālā** with **Udayana's Lakṣanāvalī**. That **Varadarāja** does not refer to **Udayana's** work follows from the facts that once (p. 179) he explicitly mentions **Lakṣanāmālā** by name as the source of his quotation and that in both the cases the statements cited do not occur in the **Lakṣanāvalī**.

there can be no doubt about Udayana's authorship of it* from the fact that Varadaraja once speaks of the author as Achārya (p. 308¹⁰⁻¹¹), a term generally reserved by the later Naiyāyikas for Udayana (and sometimes for Vāchaapati also)†

VIII—ŚRIDHARA

As the author of *Nyāya Kandali*, a Commentary on Prāsaśtapada's *Padārthadharmī Samgraha*, Śrīdhara's reputation has come down to posterity. He was a great scholar, the last of that glorious band whose depth of learning was commensurate with their range of studies. In *Nyāya* his fame is known to be well established. Later writers have always acknowledged his authority, and though some of his personal opinions, such as the view on तमः‡, are rejected in the subsequent history of this philosophy, the eminence of his position in the world of Indian thinkers remains still unaffected by it.

* Cf. Intro to *Tarkikaraksā*, p. 7, Aufrecht, Cat. Cat. I, 65 (here the name appears as वैश्वसिद्धि).

† For example, see *Tarkikaraksā*, p. 139¹³⁻¹⁴, where Varadaraja quotes Udayana's definition of *Vīśa* under the name of वाचाय (Mallinatha makes वाचाय = किंवावलेकार). Cf. *Tarkikaraksā*, p. 107⁵⁻⁶ (तदेव सर्वं वाचकमुपायको अपक्षिमाचार्य), p. 65³ (विज्ञानमर्थोऽनुमानमिवाचार्य) pp. 85⁶ 86¹⁻², &c. and also p. 77¹ (see Mallinatha's note).

‡ His view might appear to be outlandish to one accustomed to the usual way of thinking. To him तम (darkness) is not mere अभाव as with the orthodox Naiyāyika nor a kind of द्रव्य made up of atomic particles as with the Mīmāṃsaka, but it is the blue colour and is therefore a quality (cf. for a summary of the different views on darkness, Athalve, *Tarkasangraha* Notes, pp. 78-79). Śrīdhara thus sums up his own conclusion on the question: तस्माद्द्रु स्यादव्येवाऽ-यस्य तद्वैजाडमाय सति सर्वतः समारोपिततम इति प्रतयत ।

Śrīdhara is fortunately one of those few writers in the history of India who have left some account of themselves. He says in the *Nyāya Kandali*, pp 330-331, that he was born in the village of Bhūrisrī in Southern Rājha (= दक्षिणराष्ट्रायं भूरिस्थितिः) His parents' names are given as Baladeva and *Acchoka* (or *Ahhoka*), and it appears that the Kāyastha gentleman named Pīṇḍudāsa, at whose request he undertook to write this Commentary, was his patron

Besides (a) *न्यायकुन्दरी** which was composed in 913 Śaka (अधिक दशोत्तर नवशतशकाब्द) or 991 A D Śrīdhara had also written—

(b) *अद्वयसिद्धि*, an original work in Vedānta (*Kandali*, p 5)

(c) *तत्त्वप्रबोध*, an original work in *Mīmāṃsā* (*Kand*, pp 82, 146), and

(d) *तत्त्वसंवादिनी* (*Kand*, p 82)

Mr Chakravarti notes (*loc cit*) that Śrīdhara's *Nyāya Kandali* was "little used in Bengal or Mithila. But this does not seem to me to have been exactly the case, at least so far as Mithila is concerned. For though undoubtedly it was not so widely read as Udayana's *Kīranavahit* and was confined to the specialists alone, its studies continued for some centuries uninterrupted, and it was during these years of its flourishing condition that Commentaries used to be written upon it. Padmanabha wrote a Commentary upon it (*Nyāyakandahsara*) as he had done upon Udayana's parallel work, and looking at the

* *सुप्रहरीका* (*Kand* p 159), was not a Commentary on some treatise named *Samgraha* (= *Kanada Samgraha*?), as is usually supposed, but it was the name of the *Kandali* itself. If we remember that the *Kandali* was the Commentary on the *Padārtha dharmā Samgraha*, we can make out the meaning of the term

† But in Kashmir, it would appear from Buhle's Report, it enjoyed a greater popularity

opening verse of this commentary it would seem that Vardhamāna and other earlier writers had also commented upon it.* With the evidence for these Commentaries, all by Maithilas, before us it would be hard to accept Mr. Chakravarti's statement regarding *Mithilā* as true. But as to the fact of the general disuse of the book in Bengal there exists no ground for raising any question. It is really a mystery how a work written in Bengal, by a Bengali author and with real claims to appreciation should have gone out of fashion in the country of its birth. It seems to me equally inexplicable how this work, just like Bhāsarvajña's Nyāya Sāra, could find such vogue among the Jain logicians. Raja Śekhara wrote a Commentary upon it (Nyaya Kandarpañjikā. See Peterson's Report 3.272) and refers to it in his Śaṅḍarśanasamuchchaya. Guparatna, in his gloss on Haribhadra's Śaṅḍarśana samuchchaya and Malliṣena in Śyādvāda mañjarī (Yaśovijaya Ed., p 56) also refer to it, & so do many other Jaina writers.

IX.—ŚIVADITYA MIŚRA

The earliest reference of Nyāyāchārya † Śivaditya Miśra is found in Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍana Khāṇḍa Khāḍya where the former's definition of *prama* is strongly denounced. Śrīharṣa's time being the 12th Century (M. Chakravarti, in J.A.S B., 1915, p. 264), Śivaditya may be placed a century or more earlier.

* Thus in the sloka

उपदिष्टा गुरुचरैष्वरुष्टा वर्षम नाथं.

कन्दल्याः साराणस्तन्वन्ने पप्रताभेन ॥

Intro. to Nyāya Kandali, p. 4.

[the expression चरैष्वरुष्टा वर्षम नाथः plainly implies the existence of Commentaries upon the work by Vardhamāna and other authors gone before.

† Sankara Miśra employs this epithet for Śivaditya's name in his Commentary on Khaṇḍana Khāḍya (Ben. Ed., p. 144)

He seems to have been the author of two original works, both in Vaiśeṣika viz (a) सप्तपदायी and (b) लक्षणमाला (See Pratyakṣavarupa's Commentary on Chitsukhī, Nir Sāgara Ed, p 180, and Śāṅkara Miśra's Commentary on Khaṇḍaḥa, p 144)

Pandit Vindhyeśvarī Prasad Dube (Intro to Prasastapada Bhāṣya and Vyāsa Kāṇḍikī, Viz Series p 19, footnote 2) assumes the identity of this Śivāditya with Vyomaśivacharya, the author of a Commentary on Prasastapada Bhāṣya. This assumption is not tenable. Probably this misidentification proceeded from a confusion due to similarity of names and to an erroneous reading in one of the Mss of Saptapadārthī (cf Tailāṅga Rama Śāstri's Ed of Saptapadārthī, Preface, p 1, and the Text p 80, footnote)

Mr Chakravartī (J A S B 1915, p 262) attributes to Śivāditya the credit of having added the Category of abhava to the sixfold group of the older writers. But this view cannot be accepted without some reservation. For if it is meant by what he says that Śivāditya was the earliest known philosopher who gave to abhava a place of importance in the discussion of Categories and that he was *not* its introducer the view may be pronounced probable. But if it implies, as it seems to do, that he *added* it as a fresh Category not hitherto recognised in the system, the error is apparent. The distinctive position of the Vaiśeṣika in the order of Indian Systems would suffer a deadly shock with the disappearance of Abhava. It forms with Samavāya and Viśeṣa, the keystone of the whole system. It is true that in the older works (e g Vaiś. Sūtr 1 1 4 Pras Bhā. p 6, cf Sāṅ. Sūtr 1 25 Kāṇḍikī, p 331⁴) six categories are explicitly enounced, but it does not mean that abhava is not recognised as real. The reason why it is excluded from the usual formulation of the Categories, all positive, is thus stated by Śridhara.

अभावस्य पृथगनुपदेशः भावपारतन्त्र्यात् त्वभावात् (Kandali, p. 7")¹. With the Vaiśeṣika, (unlike the Sāṃkhya), for whom प्रतीति (added to, but in a greater measure than, its counterpart व्यवहार) as an ultimate fact of consciousness given in the form of 'belief', is the determinant of objective reality, abhāva is necessarily real. It was under a metaphysical, rather than a logical, necessity that abhāva had to be postulated in this system. And the necessity thus felt was twofold, arising (a) from the fundamental assumption of the school that Mokṣa is really negative*, (b) and from its doctrine of असत्कार्यवाद which allows of a real negative judgment. To illustrate this point we may revert to the position of सत्कार्यवाद such as that of सांख्य or योग to see that a really negative predicate can have no place in its theory of predication. It being assumed here that everything exists everywhere, or one thing is identical with another ("जात्य-मुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वोत्तमं" Vyāsa's Com. on Yoga Sutra III.14.) all negation would be merely verbal (वैकल्पिक). Let us take an example

(A) The judgment घटो नास्ति or more explicitly मृत्तिकायां घटो नास्ति would be a real judgment according to the Vaiśeṣika and lend itself to a double interpretation—(i) it may mean that the jar, being not yet produced, does not exist in the Matter (मृत्तिका); this would be प्रागभाव; or (ii) it may mean that the jar, being destroyed, does not exist in the Matter (मृत्तिका); this would be खेस. But both these kinds of abhāva are according to the Sāṃkhya Yoga really two forms of bhāva (there being no room for असत् in this system), the one known as the अनागतधर्म and the other as the

* According to the Vaiśeṣika Mokṣa being conceived as an absence of qualities, a separate category other than positive was rendered necessary. This was named अभाव.

(अतीतधर्म of the Matter मृत्तिका) Both are equally positive in content. The judgment घटो नास्ति, therefore as in (i) and (ii), or more strictly मृत्तिका घटाभाववती, would be a pseudo judgment the true (of course relatively) judgment taking the form of मृत्तिका घटवती, even when the घट is not produced or is already destroyed. In other words while in Sāṅkhya Yoga अभाव is not allowed to be a real predicate or धर्म, in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika it is. It may be observed that the Vaiśeṣika allows only what is called in Sāṅkhya Yoga वर्तमानधर्म, i. e. उदितधर्म to be a positive predicate. That is, घट may be a positive predicate of मृत्तिका or मृत्तिका may be said to be the आधार of घट, only after its production and before its destruction, in other words when it is वर्तमान. And for explaining this presence or वर्तमानता of the product in the Matter, the relation of समवाय has to be assumed. But before the production and after the destruction घट is negatively predicable. This is a fundamental difference between the two systems, resulting necessarily from the two assumptions of सत्कार्य or असत्कार्य. Naturally therefore the अतीत & अनागत वस्तु though admitted to be प्रमेय or object (विषय) of right knowledge are held in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika as असत् or non existing (but not तुच्छ or अवस्तु as the Bauddha might say), i. e. ध्वंस and प्रागभाव are respectively predicable of them.

(B) Similarly the judgment पटो घटो न where the identity of the objects पट and घट is denied would be a false judgment according to Sāṅkhya Yoga. Really पट being identical with घट (तदात्मक) there is no ground for such negation. But since the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika does not hold प्रकृतिकारणवाद or the doctrine of the Immanence and Unity of Matter of which the manifold (वैचित्र्य) given in experience is more or less (i. e. gradual) a manifestation, and

consequently is an advocate of absolute difference (अत्यन्तभेद) between one thing and another, it cannot do without what is technically called अन्योन्याभाव

(C) And so with अत्यन्ताभाव too. Everything being every where and so there being no possibility of any relation (संसर्ग) like संयोग or समवाय which implies the existence of two really distinct objects अत्यन्ताभाव is no more than a verbal fiction

Briefly speaking then the प्रकृतिवाद of the Sāṅkhya, of which सत्कार्यवाद is an aspect leaves it no room for real अभाव (or सम्बन्ध). All predication is reduced to identification धर्मी or logical subject : e कारण (उपादान) is identical with धर्म or predicate : e कार्य. Matter (प्रकृति) is the subject in the last resort, and all else, viz the products (विकृतिसः), are its predicates. These predicates, all positive, are each threefold in character—अतीत अनागत & वर्तमान, this division being founded on the bare fact of succession given in the limited consciousness (वृत्त्यात्मक ज्ञान) and not on the reality (स्वरूपतः) in which all the predicates co-exist and are identical with the subject. That is to say, time itself being a product predicates appear within it as successive, but beyond it in Eternity—or in मूला प्रकृति, the predicates are already given as existing together and somehow inexplicably identical with it. This is तादात्म्य. [From this it will be plain why Sāṅkhya Yoga does not feel the necessity of admitting सामान्य and विशेष, both predicates, as distinct categories. And real difference being denied, it is easy to understand how the necessity of समवाय also is dispensed with.]

The Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, with his assumption of real difference corresponding to and necessitated by the difference in प्रत्यय and व्यवहार was thrown upon the असत्कार्यवाद

(which is, looked at from a slightly different standpoint the same thing as आरम्भवाद & परमाणुवाद) which led him in logical course to maintain the reality of succession and with this of what are technically termed प्रागभाव & ध्वंस. Their अन्वयेन्याभाव also follows naturally from the view of the reality of difference given in consciousness, viz घट is other than not घट c g पट. This is in logical terms nothing but a combined statement of the principles of Identity and Contradiction, thus symbolically $A=A$, & $A=\text{not-not } A$. It seems to have been the outcome of a reaction against the extreme views of the Sākhya on one hand with whom $A=B$ and of the Bauddha on the other with whom $A=\text{not } A$. A real ससर्ग (संयोग and समवाय) being admitted, its absence led to the postulation of अत्यन्ताभाव ।

Without entering into further detail in this place it may be just said that the concept of abhava is so intimately bound up with this system as a whole that its denial would mean the overthrow of its distinctive character.

Then again in the actual texts of the older writers abhava is found recognised. Cf Ny Sat 228 et seq, Nyaya Vartika, pp 278-280, 281-284. Tat T kā, pp 306-307 & Nyaya Manjari. Even Kanada himself, though not mentioning it in his enumeration of the Categories (1.1.4), devotes some sūtras to a discussion of it in the 9th chapter. Thus the absence of Kanāda's mention of it by name in the उद्देशसूत्र is no proof against its recognition by him. Vallabhacharya says—
अभावस्य च समानतन्त्रसिद्धस्याप्रतिषिद्धस्य न्यायदर्शने मानसेन्द्रियतासिद्धिर्वापि अविरोधादभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तसिद्धत्वात् ।
Nyaya Lilavati, Nir, Sagara Ed.

To this Sanjara Mīśra adds the following explanatory notes in his Nyaya Lilavati Kanth bhārana (Ms belonging to the Benares Sanskrit Library) तेषु लक्षितलक्षणत्वात् (Corr. reading लक्षितेष्वलक्षितलक्षणत्वात्) इत्यादि सूत्रे

न्यायदर्शने ऋमाने तद्वैश्वानरस्य व्युत्पादिनात्वाच्च च तदप्रति-
पेद्यात् परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतिमिति न्यायेन सूत्रकृतस्य ब्राह्म्युप-
गमनो-नयनात् । यथा गोतमेन मनस इन्द्रियत्वं नोक्तमप्रतिपे-
धादभ्युपगतञ्च ।

 $\Gamma_0 \in \mathcal{A}^{p-1}$

I think it has now been demonstrated that there is no warrant for asserting, as Mr Chakravarti has done (loc cit), that Śiv ditya “*śodā*” abh va “to the six categories of the older writers” * He simply explicated, giving to it the name of the 7th category, what had already been recognised in the system as a real Category.

X-VARADARĀJA

The exact time of Varadaraja's life is very hard of determination. Dr Venis places him in the interval between 1050 & 1300 A D or more definitely about the first half of the 12th century (Prefatory notice to Tarkikaraksā, p. iii). Though a greater precision is not attainable on this matter in the present state of our knowledge, a word or two may be suggested here. Jñāpātrīa, whose time cannot be later than the 13th century and possibly was much earlier, alludes in the beginning of his commentary called Laghubhāṣya to Varadaraja as having lived long ago (पुरा). This would appear to furnish a plea for pushing back this date by some decades at any rate. And the constant references to Udayana in the Tarkikaraksā seem to me to indicate, not merely

* Mr Chakravarti is equally wrong in his assertion (loc cit, 262) made apparently on the authority of Kandali, p 331, that Sridhara 'acknowledged only six categories'. As indicated in the line quoted from the Kand II on p 118 above this assertion is unfounded. Sridhara did acknowledge abhaya (note the phrase न त्वाभयः) as a *real* category of existence. Compare also Kandali p 230, lines 3-23.

that Varadaraja was his admirer but that he was his close successor as well. As a provisional step, therefore, I would prefer to claim for him as his approximate date the middle of the 11th Century*.

Varadaraja is known to have written only three works

A Commentaries on

(a) Udayana's

i न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि (= बोधनी) Mallinatha refers to it in his Commentary on the Tarkikaraksā (p 46) एतच्च ग्रन्थकृतैव स्पष्टीकृतं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिटीकायामित्यात्मतां तावत् । Burnell (Tanjore Catalogue, p 123) notices a copy of this Commentary existing in the Palace Library of Tanjore, where the name of the author's father is given as Mahamahopādhyaya Ramadeva Misra †

ii किरणावली (See Aufrecht, Cat. Cat., I pp 107, 550)

B तार्किकसूत्रा, sometimes called तर्ककारिका, a treatise on Nyāya consisting of 160 Karikas distributed in three chapters (97 + 34 + 29) and of a Commentary named सारसंग्रह. The book is referred to in the Sarvadarśana Sangraha

* Mr Chakravarti's assertion (loc cit p. 26) that 'Vardhamana is the oldest Commentator known on Udayana's works' is thus found to be no longer tenable

† A Ms of this work, as far as Chap III was obtained by the present writer in 1916. It had been transcribed in Śaka 1436 (1514 A D) and belonged to the private collection of Sarva Vidyanidhana Kavindracharya Sarasvatī whose name appears in bold hand on the first and last leaves. It has since been edited by the writer with a historical Introduction for the Sarasvatī Bhavan Texts No 4 (Benares)

XI—VALLABHACHARYA

Vallabhacharya was one of the greatest authorities on Vaiśeṣika philosophy next only to Udayanāchārya, in the mediaeval period of its history. There are certain peculiar views associated with his name in subsequent literature, but as we have dealt with them at length in our forthcoming work on the history of Nyaya Vaiśeṣika philosophy, there is no use reverting to them here.

He was the author of *Nyayalavati*, an independent * work on Vaiśeṣika. This work has had the rare good fortune, viz much like Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva Chintāmaṇi*, of finding a host of commentators.

Vallabha's nationality is not known. But his date may be assigned with tolerable certainty to the end of the 12th Century A.D.†

XII—ŚAŚADHARA

It is believed that Śaśadhara was one of the great Nāyayikas of the pre Gaṅgeśa School and that in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva Chintāmaṇi* there is a reference to his definition of Vyapti‡. As there is no mention of Gaṅgeśa or his successors in Śaśadhara's work available to us there is no inherent improbability in the correctness of this belief.

* *Nyayalavati* is apparently an independent work, based on and planned after, *Prasastapada's Bhāṣya*. It is said that on this Vaiśeṣika *Bhāṣya* there was a commentary by Śrī Vatsa called *Nyayalavati*. If Śrī Vatsa is held identical with Vallabha *Nyayalavati* will have to be considered as a commentary on the *Bhāṣya*, just as the *Bhāṣya* itself is on the *Sūtras*.

† Vallabha is referred to in (a) *Vidindras Rasasara* (about 1225 A.D.) and in (b) a Kannarese poem written by a poet under King Singhan of the Yadava dynasty of Devagiri (about 1226 A.D.).

‡ Tradition identifies "*Simha* (Lion) and '*Vyaghra* (Tiger) whose definitions of Vyapti have been quoted by Gaṅgeśa under

Saśadhara may therefore be placed between Udayana to whom he refers and Gaugesā, i.e. in the middle of the twelfth century.

He was the author of *Nyāyavāddhantadīpa*, an excellent treatise on Nyāya *.

VIII—VADINDRA

Mahādeva Sarvajña Vāḍindra was one of the greatest polemic writers in the field of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika in mediaeval India and deserves to be ranked, so far as dialectical abilities are concerned, with Śrī Harṇa and similar other writers.

He is said to have been the pupil of one Yogisvara. His name Vāḍindra is apparently due to his reputation among his contemporaries as a great controversialist, and we know that Chitsukha and other subsequent writers referred to him under this very name. His pupil Bhaṭṭa Raghava speaks very often, in his Commentary on Nyāyasāra, of his large following. Vāḍindra was a votary of Śiva (cf. the benedictory verses of his works), and it is not unlikely that the words Śaṅkara Kinkarī as used in Madhava's *Sarva darśana Saṅgraha* (Ānandāśrama Ed., p. 95) and Hara Kinkarī is in the Colophon of the *Mithā-*

the name *शिव-आर्तिरुप-ग्रन्थ*, with Saśadhara (or Śaśadhara) and Maṇi-dhara. It is not known whether this tradition has a historical basis, and if so, who these two persons really were. Dr. Satish Chandra is inclined to believe that the names 'Lion' and 'Tiger' represent the Jain Logicians, Viṇanda Suri and Amarachandra Suri. See his *Ind. Logic*, p. 356.

* Aulrecht (*Crit. Cat.* I, p. 638) ascribes the following works to Saśadhara: (a) *Nyāyanaya*, (b) *Nyāyamimamsāprakarapa*, (c) *Nyāyaratnaprakaraṇa*, and (d) *Saśadharamūla*. That the last is a separate work is evident. According to the *Ind. Off. Cat.*, p. 645, (c) is another name of *Nyāyavāddhantadīpa* itself, while in Burnell (p. 119), (i.e. *Nyāyanaya*) is the name of a Com. on *Nyāya Siddhantadīpa* by Dharmarāja Bhaṭṭa. *Nyāyanaya* and *Nyāyamimamsā* too are probably not different works.

vidya viṣambana are to be understood as meaning a 'devotee of Śiva' rather than a 'pupil of the Ācharya named Śankara or Hara'. He describes himself in his work on the Mahāvidyā as the Dharmadhyakṣa of King Śrī Siṃha, whom Mr M R Telang identifies with Rāja Siṃha of the Yādava dynasty of Devagīr.

The manuscript of Bhaṭṭa Raghava's Nyāyasaravichara, which exists in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares, is dated in Śakabda 1174 (=1252 A D) * But Rāghava was the direct pupil of Vāṇindra as he says expressly in his colophons as well as in the beginning of his commentary. Vāṇindra may therefore be placed in the early part of the 13th Century. This date synchronises well with the time of his patron, Raja Siṃha or Śrī Siṃha.

Vāṇindra was the author of the following works

(1) Mahāvidyāviṣambana

It has been published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No XII. It was perhaps the *magnum opus* of this gifted author and created quite a sensation in his time. His great controversialistic genius appears at its best in this work, where he attempts to prove the futility and defects of the so called Mahāvidyā syllogisms, which played an important part in the history of mediaeval Indian Logic.

(2) Rasasara

This is a Commentary on the Guna Kīranāvalī of Udayana. It has been published in the Sarasvatī Bhavana Sanskrit Texts of Benares (No 5).

(3) Kavadasutra nibandha†

(4) A Commentary on Udayana's Lakṣanāvalī

See Śārṅgadharī, in his Commentary, Nyāyamuktāvalī,

* For a discussion of this date see under Bhaṭṭa Raghava.

† See M R Telang's Introduction to the Mahāvidyā viṣambana, p XVI.

मभ्युपगम्य निर्विकल्पकजनकशरीरसंयोगधिकरणत्वे सति याग-
जघमीज-यजन्यसंज्ञातकाराविषयत्वे सति शरीरवानधिकरण-
मिन्द्रियमिति यथाश्रुतमेवैतद् व्याचक्षते (Ben. Ed., p 29). This
passage would seem to show that Vādīśa whom I take to be
identical with Vādindra wrote a Commentary on Lakṣaṇāvalī.
The name Vādindra also occurs in the same Commentary (cf
p. 23), and the term Vādindra being only an honorific title
there is no inherent difficulty in understanding the two names
as representing one person. It is much like शङ्करिकङ्कर
being substituted by हरिकङ्कर as already noted.

(5) A metrical philosophical treatise :

The name of this tract does not appear. But the
quotations under Vādindra's name as given in the Sarva-
darsana Saṅgraha and Nyāyasāra-vichāra being in verse it
seems likely that he was the author of a metrical tract.

XIV—BHATTA RAGHAVA.

Bhaṭṭa Raghava's Commentary on Bhāsarvajña's Nyāya
Sāra (न्यायसारविचार) is the only work from his pen known
to philosophical bibliography, and though it does not seem to
have ever been widely used in later times its importance is
none the less very great. Apart from the fact that this book
furnishes a clear exposition of Bhāsarvajña's doctrines which
it professes to defend from the attacks of opponents, it
contains a number of lengthy discussions relating to certain
topics raised in the text which are historically of great value
to a student of contemporary philosophy.

There exists a manuscript of this Commentary in the
Government Sanskrit Library, Benares (fols. 2—106), where
in the Colophon the date of its composition is given as 1174
Śaka or 1252 A. D.*

* The verse in which the date appears runs thus,
यके चतुःषष्टितिसहस्रक गनेः यतावन्मयं यके च त्रिंशद्वयः ।
दिवाविहस्यन्तं भूय वत्सर्गं विचारः परिभाषि—॥ ॥

his Guru was Mihadeva Sarvajña Vaidindra (See the Colophons at the end of each chapter fols 191⁷ b¹ 72a⁷ &

[The meaning of the last phrase is not clear but the reading is exactly as given above. There is no room for reading वसिष्ठसिद्धव, as the late Vm. Satya Chandra (Introduction to Nyāya p. 7) has done. After ३ of वसि the ० is visible and a stroke, the consonant following having disappeared and the last letter with which the next line begins is a १ and not व so that the final word of the verse cannot be read वसिष्ठव. The Ms. is generally free from slips and is carefully corrected.]

Of the two ways of interpreting this verse, viz (1) $[1500 \times 2] + 100] + 74 = 1174$ Śaka or 1332 A. D. and (2) $[500 + 100] \times 2] + 74 = 1274$ Śaka or 1332 A. D., I should prefer the former interpretation. Apart from the convincing historical grounds adduced by Mr Telang (Introduction to Mahāvidyāvidambana pp. 111—11) there is another fact to be considered. In the Ms. named above there is an entry evidently by a later hand that the Ms. was purchased by one Visva from one Udaya Sinha for 25 (?) pieces in Sam. 1428 (= 1371 A. D.) विष्णुमिश्रद्वारा पुस्तक २५विंशति (नि?) नवमेये पौर्णिमादि ॥ सप्त १४ ८ अष्टमे तस्य अष्टमे यदि २ दिनावा रवौ ॥ श्रीमन्नार्यसमस्त ॥ श्री ॥ श्री ॥ श्री ॥ This statement shows that the Ms. was purchased in 1371 A. D. Consequently the date of transcription must be earlier and that of composition much earlier still. In view of this circumstance the alternative of 1332 A. D. as the date of the composition of the world's first strike me as probable. I therefore accept the former interpretation of the verse and take the date to represent 1232 A. D. Cf. also Hall (Bibl. Index, p. 6).

* Sarvajña is said to have been defeated in a public controversy by the Jain Logician Jaya Sinha Suri (1366 A. D.), author of a commentary on Bhāṣya Jñāna Nyāya Sāra, whose pupil Nyāyachandra Suri describes this event in his Hammita-havya. See F. M. Tripoli's Introduction p. xviii to Ananda-purāṇa Tukarāṅgīya (Gokhale's Oriental Series, No. III).

100b²)* ; this Vāṇindra is probably identical with the author of the same name to whom *Rasasāra*, a Commentary on the second part of the *Kiraṇāvali*, is attributed (Hall, p 67).

Rāghava was a Śaiva (see fols 19b, 72a b, 100b). His native country is not known for certain, but it seems likely that he was a man of the South. In his Commentary he quotes or refers to the earlier authorities as below

खण्डनमण्डनाः†...4b²,

वात्स्यायन मत 7a⁷

न्यायभाष्यकाराः 8b⁴

मीमांसका . }

चार्वाकाः .. } 8b⁵

भूषण, भास्वङ्ग—11b⁴

वार्त्तिककृत्—12b⁶, 20a⁷

तथाचोक्तं—लौकिकी प्रतिभा यद्वत् &c—16a³⁻⁴

तदुक्तं—एकेन तु प्रमाणेन &c—16a⁵

तदाह—यदि पङ्क्तिः प्रमाणैः स्यात्—16a⁶

(The above three quotations are from Kumārila's *Śloka Vārtika*, 432, 2.112 & 2.111, pp 143, 80 & 79 of the Chowkhamba Ed)

तदुक्तं न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके &c—18b³⁻⁴

* Cf also the introductory verse in *Nyayaśāra vichara* :

महादेवमह वन्दे गुरु सर्वज्ञमादरात् । ग्रन्थमन्यतु योचित्ये शक्तिर्वहमादभू-मम ॥

Ind. Off. Cat., p. 609,

& the verse at the end .

प्रकाशस्यास एवाव मया प्र-पञ्चत्वादित् । वादीन्द्रवि + + ३ मागेऽ-गवि-न-पणा ॥

Banarès Sk. Coll. Ms. fol 100b 5-6

† Is this Khāṇḍana Maṇḍana identical with the work of Paramānanda existing in the Deccan College Library ? (*Cat. of Decc. College*, p. 58).

(From Vākyapadīya, I 124)

वार्तिककार—18b⁴

केचिद् विचक्षणा—19b²

(Apparently this is an ironical reference to an earlier Commentator on Nyāyasāra to whose interpretation Raghava takes serious objection. Thus in Bhāsarvajña's definition of anumāna—सम्यग्निनामादेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानं—this unnamed annotator tries to establish a syntactical relation between the words सम्यक् and अनुभव which Raghava would not allow.

Who is the Commentator meant here ?

रामभट्टप्रभृतयः. 19b³

Rāma Bhaṭṭa was another Commentator on Nyāyasāra whose name and work have been forgotten. In connection with the foregoing definition of anumāna Rāma Bhaṭṭa, as against the view already set forth, prefers to take सम्यक् in relation to the immediately succeeding word, on which Raghava's criticism follows.

To be Continued.

THE MODERN PERIOD

The School of Mithilā

I—GANGEŚA UPĀDHYAYA

There is no man perhaps in the history of Nyaya Vaiśeṣika philosophy more frequently heard of on the lips of scholars than Gangeśa or Gangestara Upādhyaya of Mithilā. He gave to this philosophy a new line of development and created for it a new field of work, and for practical purposes, he may be said to have been the father of that form of Nyāya Śāstra with which we are familiar to day. Essentially a keen dialectician and a brilliant controversialist, he made it the sole end of his literary life to make Nyaya Śāstrā a Science of Debate. For this reason he devoted all his energies and intellectual abilities to the task of expounding problems of a methodological and epistemological character. The *Tattvachintamāṇi* which forms the noblest monument of his genius deals almost exclusively with the Theory of Knowledge and the kindred logical questions (प्रमाण), leaving very little room for pure Metaphysics or Ontology. Even the little theistic tract which has come down to us from his pen is more strictly a work on *Anumana Khaṇḍa*, of which it is expressly stated to form a part than an independent ontological piece.

It is usually believed that it was Gangeśa who for the first time gave to *pramāṇa* a place of great importance in the Science (& Art) of Debate and inaugurated its studies to the exclusion of every thing else in the schools with a rigour almost unprecedented in the history of modern philosophy. And, further, to Gangeśa is universally ascribed the credit of founding the Neo logic of Eastern India which with its militant dialectics and spirit of analytical criticism has won its way

into every form of intellectual life in the country. That the first of these propositions is unfounded needs no pointing out. For what Gaṅgeśa did for the orthodox system had already been accomplished by the Buddhist and Jain logicians who had preceded him. Dignāga's *Pramāṇa samuchchaya*, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa Vartika* and *Pramāṇa Vinischaya*, Vidyānanda's *Pramāṇa parikṣa* & Deva Śūni's *Pramāṇa naya tattvaloka* are some of the works on प्रमाण which Gaṅgeśa had before him already in the field. But the second proposition may be accepted, for our notion of Neo logic is bound up with *Tattvachintāmaṇi* and the series of Commentaries and subcommentaries upon it but even here it must be remembered that our restriction of 'navya' to Gaṅgeśa is only of a practical value. In the *Vidhi-vāda* section of *Śabda Khanda* (p 276, Bib Ed) Gaṅgeśa himself refers to the views of *Saṅkara Upadhyāya* as those of a modern scholar (नव्यास्तु), thus shewing that the term had already been in vogue even before the days of Gaṅgeśa. The word being only a relative term, it is intelligible why Udayana, Bhāsarvajña *before* Gaṅgeśa and Raghunatha, &c *after* him should have equally been characterised as modern. Nevertheless, in the sense in which we employ the word नव्य-यय at the present day it refers to Gaṅgeśa and to him alone.

Gaṅgeśa's date is not known with certainty. All that we know about it is that he quotes or refers to the views and statements of his predecessors some of whom he mentions by name. Of these Khandana Kara (i.e. Śrī Harṣa, author of *Khandana Khanda Khadya*), Jaraṇa Naiyayika (i.e. Jayanta, author of *Nyāya Manjaṇ*), Maṇḍanacharya (author of *Vidhi viveka*) and Śivāditya (author of *Saptapadartha*) are admittedly very early, being assigned to periods approximately known. But these render us no help in clearing up the date problem of Gaṅgeśa. The dates of Ratnakośa and

Nyāyāḷilavati, also quoted in Tattvachintāmaṇi, have not yet been ascertained, though we have found that the author of Nyāyāḷilavati may tentatively be assigned to the 12th century A D The only conclusion therefore which the premises justify us in drawing in the present state of our imperfect knowledge is that Gaṅgeśa may be placed somewhere in the 13th century A D

Regarding his personal history we have no authentic records There are certain *floating* traditions which make him in his early life a blockhead whose ascent to greatness was absolutely an act of Divine Grace.

II VARDHAMANA

Gaṅgeśa was succeeded in Mithilā by his son Vardhamana Upadhyaya who followed in the wake of his illustrious father and kept alive the fire of the New Science which the latter had kindled In point of scholarship Vardhamana does not seem to have been in any way less than his great father, and the works which proceeded from him are still universally resorted to as of the highest authority in the subjects concerned His style is elaborate, but free from verbosity and bathos He is known to have been the author of the following works —

A Commentaries on

(a) Gotama's

1 Nyaya Sūtras (= अन्वीक्षातत्त्वबोध* or simply तत्त्वबोध)

The work is of the nature of a gloss and seems to have treated of the whole text The प्रमेयतत्त्वबोध to which Ruchidatta and Jayarama refer as the work of Vardhamana

* A Ms of this rare work, dealing with the 5th chapter, exists in the Govt Sanskrit Library, Benares (New collection of 1917 18, Nyaya section Vestana 9). It is named there अन्वीक्षानुसृतत्वबोध and not अन्वीक्षातत्त्वबोध, but as Vardhamana himself refers to it under the second name in his Guṇa Kirāṇavalīprakaśa we keep it unchanged here.

(Kusumanjali prakasa makaranda Ben Ed., p 5 of Chap 3, cf Aufrecht, Cat Cat I, p 554) and the प्रमाणतत्त्वबोध * also attributed to Vardhamana in Ruchidatta's Commentary on Tattvachintama n (See *The Pandit*, Old series, VI, p 128) may be only sections of श्रुत्वादिप्रमाणतत्त्वबोध and no separate treatises

(b) Udayana's

i Nyayakusumanjali Prakarana (= कुसुमजलिप्रकाश)

ii Kiranavali (= किरणवली प्रकाश)

iii Nyaya Vartika tatparya parisuddhi (= न्यायनिबन्ध प्रकाश)

iv Nyayaparisista (= परिशिष्ट प्रकाश)

(c) Śrīharṣa's

i Khandana Khanda Khadya This work was utilised by Pragalbha in writing his own commentary on Śrīharṣa's treatise Vachaspati II, in his Khandanoddharat, refers to Vardhamana's खण्डनफक्किद्वार which may be identical with it

(d) Vallabha's

i Nyāyālavati (= लीलावती प्रकाश)

and (e) Gangeśa's

i Tattvachintama n (= चिन्तामणि प्रकाश)

These are all the works of Vardhamana with which we are acquainted to day But it is generally believed that Vardhamana also wrote a Commentary on Udayana's Atmatattva viveka, but the work has since been lost

We shall not be probably far in the wrong if we place Vardhamana in the first quarter of the 14th Century, but

* While explaining the meaning of the word चक्र in Anumāna dīdhiti—'यथा चावसरस्य सङ्गात्सर्वं यथा व्यवहारः Bhavananda (Bibl Ed p 12) identifies it with Pramāṇatattvabodha May it not be Vardhamana's work of the same name?

† Reprint from the Pandit, p 77

there is no ground in Mr Chakravarti's assertion, repeated by Dr Vidyabhusana (Ind Logic p 455), that he is named by Madhavacharya in the Pāṇinīdarśana section of his Śivadarśana saṅgraha. The Vardhamāna, also a Mahopādhyāya, whose name is mentioned in Mithila's story, was a grammarian being the author of Gaṇarūpa Mahodadhī.

III—PAKṢADHARA *ALIAS* JAYADEVA MĪSRA

For a long time after the death of Vardhamāna there was no thinker in Mithila to preserve, far less to enrich, the new philosophy of the country. Supposing that our assumption of Vardhamāna's date is practically right, we would find that during the long interval of over a century after his age Mithila was without any scholar with any pretension to philosophical renown.

By the third quarter of the 15th century was born Pakṣadhara *alias* Jayadeva Mīra to whom we are indebted for the revival of interest in the study of Chintamāni. In plain truth Pakṣadhara was one of the greatest intellects that modern Mithila has ever produced. He was the nephew and pupil* of Hari Mīra with whom he had read philosophy and whose memory he gratefully revered in the benedictory verse of his commentary on the Chintamāni **पितृव्यहरि-
मिधोपदिष्ट ।**

He was the author of commentaries on

(a) Śaśadhara's

1 Nyaya siddhāntadīpa. A Ms of this work exists in the Govt Sanskrit Library Benares.

(b) Gangesa's

1 Tattvachintamāni (= चिन्तामण्यलोक) and

(c) Vardhamāna's

*In the Navadvīpa mahima p 31, he is described as the pupil of Yajñapati Upādhyāya.

- i. Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa
and ii. Nyāyalilāvatīprakāśa (=लीलावतीविषेक)

It may be of interest to note that in the Govt. Sanskrit Library Benares there is a Ms of a commentary, called *Tippani*, on the *Chintamani* by Pakṣadhara—which is different from the *Aloka*. It is dated Sam 1667.

From a survey of the contemporary literature it seems certain that on its first appearance the *Aloka*, which formed indeed the best product of Pakṣadhara's labour, created a great sensation in the world of letters of that time. It was read and taught, admired and criticised in every circle. All parties set themselves to write commentaries upon it. What this general stir was really due to we have no means of knowing. But it is probable that Pakṣadhara's new interpretation was mainly responsible for it.

From Gangeśa down to Pakṣadhara Navyanyāya had its sole home in Mithilā. The pandits of that place, who had made it their monopoly & been so long its trusted guardians, took especial care to see that this privilege of teaching the *gāṣṭra* did not pass away from them into what they perhaps thought unworthy hands*. Students from various parts of India used to flock to Mithilā to draw inspiration from its far famed scholars, and when they completed their studies they returned home with the diploma which their Guru had

* This cautiousness was pushed to its utmost limit. Thus we are told that Mss of Nyāya works which existed in Mithilā, having been left there by their authors, were not allowed to be copied, lest they should be borne away and the prestige of Mithilā for ever destroyed. Students had to commit the texts to memory, and before returning homes had to be very carefully examined by their teachers. It was in this way that the *Karikās* of Kusumañjali were brought to Bengal for the first time, according to tradition, by Haridasa Nyāyāluṅkara (but according to *Navadvīpa mahimā*, pp 35-36, by Vasudeva Sarvaabhauma).

his works the following three commentaries only can so far be traced these are—

A Commentaries on

(a) Gaṛgeśa's

1. Tattvachintamani (= चिन्तामणिप्रकाश), referred to in its several sections in (b—1) In this work he speaks of having read the Śāstras with several Gurus

and (b) Vardhamana's

1. Kusuma jāli prakāśa (= ककुमकुलप्रकाश) This is a very useful work Though not a running commentary and quite original it makes an honest and generally successful attempt to make Vardhamana's purport, often hidden and deep beneath the surface, intelligible to the reader

and 2. (Dravya) Kīranavālī prakāśa (= द्रव्यप्रकाशविवृति)
Vide Peterson's Ulwar Catalogue No 606,
p 26 ext no 146, p 53

There is a Ms of this work in the Govt Sanskrit Library dated Samvat 1600 (=1543 A D)

The time when Ruchidatta flourished may be approximately fixed on the following data

- (a) There is a Ms of his Mahārāṇḍa in the Government Sanskrit Library Benares (No 122) which bears the date 423 (अक्षिपदानिमग) La Sam, corresponding to the year 1542 A D But as this is the date of transcription of the Ms the author may be set down to some time earlier still
- (b) But the time of Ruchidatta is placed beyond all destroyable doubt by a look at the Ms of a copy of Kīranavālī returned by himself in the year 386 (= रसवसुहरनत्र) It was in the responding to the year 1505 A D *

to Bengal for

Nyāyalaukāra (but ...
Vasudeva Saṅgahāṇḍa) ...
... ककुमकुलप्रकाश ...
... वाद कुववार नसरे आदमये च ।

That this is the true date of Ruchidatta will become apparent when we shall find it synchronising with the age of his contemporary and fellow pupil Bhagiratha Thakkura. The date 1292 Śaka (= 1370 A. D) which appears in a Ms of his Chintāmaṇiprakāśa, as reported by Peterson (Sixth Report, p 76, no 190), is therefore to be taken as a slip of the pen on the part of the scribe.

VI—RAGHUPATI

Raghupati was Mahamahopādhyāya Ruchidatta's son. He was the author of a Commentary on Tattvachintamāni, of which two Mss, one of the Śāhda Khanda (शब्दमागधर् च्छा, dated Sam 1644=1587 A. D) and the other of the Anumāna Khanda, exist in the Govt Sanskrit Library, Benares.

VII—BHAGIRATHA THAKKURA

Bhagiratha *alias* Megha Thakkura of Mithilā was also Pakadhara's pupil, as already stated. He himself says that he had received his philosophical training under Jayadeva and distinguished himself as a scholar of some renown at the early age of 20*. His parents were Chandra-

विदु बुधविनीत कामनी सुपुत्री-

महामहोपाध्यायः आसीत् अ सुवेताम् ॥

[See V P. Dube's Introduction to Vaiśeṣika darśana with Kiraṇavali, p 28]

* Babu Rajendranath Ghose, in his valuable work on Navya-Nyāya-Vyūptipanchaka (Intro p 29), seems inclined to take the sentence विशाब्द अद्वयपरिहृतकवेःतत्कालि-यामगत, occurring in Bhagiratha's commentary on Dravyakiraṇavali prakāśa, in the sense that Bhagiratha completed his studies of Jayadeva's works, at the age of 20. He understands क्व with 6th case ending and denies any relation between Jayadeva and Bhagiratha. But it appears to me that though on any construction the sentence would be a faulty one, it would nevertheless yield a better sense if we were to take कवे as with 5th case ending. Moreover, Mahesa Thakkura's time being ascertained on other

his works the following three commentaries only can so far be traced : these are—

A. Commentaries on

(a) Gaṅgeśa's

1. Tattvachintāmaṇi (= चिन्तामणिप्रकाश), referred to, in its several sections, in (b—1). In this work he speaks of having read the Śāstras with several Gurus

and (b) Vardhamāna's

1. Kusumañjali prakāśa (= ०मकरन्द). This is a very useful work. Though not a running commentary and quite original it makes an honest and generally successful attempt to make Vardhamāna's purport, often hidden and deep beneath the surface, intelligible to the reader.

and ii. (Dravya) Kiranāvali prakāśa (= द्रव्यप्रकाशविवृति).
Vide Peterson's Ulwar Catalogue, No. 606, p. 26 ; ext. no. 146, p. 53.

There is a Ms of this work in the Govt. Sanskrit Library dated Samvat 1600 (= 1543 A. D.).

The time when Ruchidatta flourished may be approximately fixed on the following data:

(a) There is a Ms. of his Makaranda in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares (No. 122) which bears the date 423 (अक्षिपक्षनिगम) La Sam, corresponding to the year 1542 A. D. But as this is the date of transcription of the Ms. the author may be set down to some time earlier still.

(b) But the time of Ruchidatta is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by a look at the Ms. of a copy of Kiranāvali transcribed by himself in the year 386 (= रसवसुहरनेत्र) La Sam corresponding to the year 1505 A. D.*

That this is the true date of Ruchidatta will become apparent when we shall find it synchronising with the age of his contemporary and fellow pupil Bhagiratha Thakkura. The date 1292 Śaka (=1370 A. D.) which appears in a Ms. of his *Chintamaṇiprakāśa*, as reported by Peterson (Sixth Report, p. 76, no. 190), is therefore to be taken as a slip of the pen on the part of the scribe.

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विदुः सुधावनाद कायसि सुपुत्रा

महोदधमन्त्रणात् आहूय अस्मिन् ॥

(See V. P. Dube's Introduction to *Vaiśeṣika darśana* with *Kiraṇavali*, p. 28.)

* Babu Rajendranath Ghose in his valuable work on *Navya Nyāya Vyaptipanchika* (Intro. p. 29), seems inclined to take the sentence *विश्वाम्भरः जयदेवपण्डितस्य वरक १० वर्षावत्* occurring in Bhagiratha's commentary on *Dravyakiraṇavali prakāśa* in the sense that Bhagiratha completed his studies of Jayadeva's works, at the age of 20. He understands *वर* with 6th case ending and denies any relation between Jayadeva and Bhagiratha. But it appears to me that though on any construction the sentence would be a faulty one, it would nevertheless yield a better sense if we were to take *वर* as with 5th case ending. Moreover, Maheśa Thakkura's time being ascertained on other

pati and Dhīrā, and Maheśa Thakkura, of whom we shall speak shortly, was his youngest brother. Among his other brothers we find the names of Mahādeva and Dāmodara mentioned in Maheśa's Darpana. Mahadeva was probably his elder brother and Damodara his immediately younger one *.

We know of the following works of Bhagīratha, viz. Commentaries on—

(a) Vardhamāna's

i. Kīraṇāvalīprakāśa (= किरणावलीप्रकाशभाष्यप्रकाशिका)

Mss. of this work, dated Śaka 1511 (शशिद्वययुत-
स्मरवाणच-द्र) or 1588 A. D. and Sam. 1654 or 1597
A. D. are in the Govt. Sanskrit Library, Benares.

ii. Nyāyakusumāñjali prakāśa (= कुसुमाञ्जलि प्रका-
शिका)†

and iii. Nyāyalīlāvati prakāśat (न्यायलीलावतीप्रकाशिका)

All these commentaries are popularly known under the name of *Jalada*. Bhagīratha is called in a Ms. of his Com. on *Līlavati* (in Govt. Sk. Library) "Śankara Bhagīratha".

grounds also to be somewhere in the 16th century, the facts would square well if Bhagīratha were placed in the early part of that century and Jayadeva in the middle of the previous century. In Maheśa's time Ālōka was a new work. Mr. Chakravarti's hypothesis regarding Bhagīratha and Maheśa's date (1400 A. D.) is not very convincing.

* ज्येष्ठा महादेव भगवत्पुत्रे कामोदता यस्य वयोमुष्णभ्याम् । स दर्पण निर्मितवानमं वा
सङ्गादौ विष्णुपरा महशः ॥ (Anumānāloka-darpana by Maheśa Thakkura),
Hall (p. 66) and Pt. V P. Dube (Introduction to Tārikākarakṣā,
p. 24, f. note 1) are thus wrong in identifying Maheśa with his
eldest brother Mahadeva. That Mahadeva was Bhagīratha's elder
brother is clearly stated by the latter in his Kusumāñjali Prakāśikā:
आसादनुपमः सोऽपि हृदिवः कुलाग्रणी । अनुजज्ञेय कृत्रानिमाख्यास्तु भगवत्पुत्रः
(Ms. belonging to Govt. Sanskrit Library, Benares—fol. 126 a).

† Both these works are under edition and expected to be published very shortly from the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares.

VIII—MAHEŚA THAKKURA

Maheśa Thakkura was Bhagīratha's younger brother and founder of the present Raj family of Dārbb-ṅgā. He rose into prominence even more quickly than his brother. He was the author of an excellent commentary, called Darpaṇa, on Paṅsadhara's Chintāmaṇyaloka, which displays his great acumen. One of the main objects of his writing this commentary seems to have been, as in the case of Vasudeva Miśra or Madhusūdana Thakkura, to reclaim Paṅsadhara's renown from hostile attacks. The phrase प्रमथितखलदर्पः, as applied to himself in his Darpaṇa, is suggestive.

But it is strange that he did not prosecute his studies with the great Paṅsadhara whose name at that time must have been a household word in Mithila. His brother Bhagīratha had been Paṅsadhara's pupil. What stood in the way of Maheśa then that he was compelled to travel all the way over to Benares and study with a Deccanī Paṇḍit—Rāmesvara Bhaṭṭa? It is hard to discover the true cause of this. But two alternative explanations may be suggested.

(a) Either that Paṅsadhara had been recently dead or even if living he must have been too old to hold regular classes,

(b) or that Maheśa's personal predilections for Vedāntic studies led him to come over to Kāśī, which had been the principal seat of Vedic culture ever since the days of Śaṅkaracharya or even earlier, and seek instructions with a foreign though far famed scholar.

At any rate his stay in Benares and his pursuit of what I take to be Vedāntic studies had the natural effect of broadening his outlook. His attitude towards Vedānta became tolerant and even respectful, being free from those prejudices which

were a characteristic feature of a Naiyāyika's mind. Thus in the light of what has been said above we are in a better position to understand the meaning of the following statement quoted from Maheśa's commentary (Anumana Section): तदेतत् संक्षेपेण वेदान्तिमतं लिखितं न द्रष्टुं श्रुतिपुराणस्मृतिश्रुतिश्रुतिवात् । This passage indicates a departure from the custom of the Nyāya writer and a leaning towards Vedānta.

Maheśa is known from expressions in his work to have been a Vaiṣṇava (विष्णुपर) in faith, being an earnest votary of the Balagopāla form of Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

The age of Maheśa may be fixed with tolerable certainty. It is well known that he obtained the kingdom of Darbhanga as a free gift from the then reigning ruler of Mithilā (the last descendant of Kameśa's family). As to when this grant was made Mahamahopādhyāya Haraprāsada Śāstrī assigns it to the early part of the 16th century, saying that the Charter was ratified by Sher Shah and Akbar. He further adds that a letter from Maheśa to Raghunātha (composed at Nadia in 1529 A.D.) is found in a Ms of Vāyasvata Siddhānta deposited in the Bengal Asiatic Society's Library*. Though this statement is contradicted by the date given for Maheśa's assumption of royalty in the well known inscription on well at Dhanukhā in Mithilā,† the difference between the two dates is insignificant, and it may be taken for certain that Maheśa belonged to the middle of the 16th Century.

Maheśa seemed to have reigned long. We know of a work named सर्वदेववृत्तान्तसंग्रह which describes a part of Akbar's reign and was composed in his reign. It is attributed to Maheśa Thakkurāṭ. If this Maheśa be identical with the author of Darpana, as is very likely, he was

* See Indian Antiquary, 1912, p. 9

† See V. P. Dube's Intro. to Tārākarikā

‡ Aufrecht, Cat. Cat. I, p. 701; Ind. Office, p. 1573

certainly contemporary with Akbar and therefore lived into a part of the latter half of the 16th Century, Akbar's reign having commenced in 1556 A D

IX JIVANATHA MISRA

Jivanātha was Śankara Misra's uncle, being the elder brother of Bhavanatha. No work by him has yet been discovered, but from the statement in the Upaskara (under Sutra 9 2 1), where his view on the definition of पक्ष * is quoted it appears that Jivanatha left some written works behind him

X—BHAVANATHA MISRA

Dr Gaṅgānatha Jha, in his Preface to the Vādivinoda, p 2, affirms, obviously on the strength of local tradition, that Bhavanatha, otherwise known as Bube Misra (also known under the nickname Ajāch), was a great scholar in various subjects etc. His works on Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa are available, but nothing is known about his Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika treatises, if he had written any

XI—ŚANKARA MISRA

Except perhaps the great Pakādhara, Śankara Misra had few equals in Mithilā since the days of Gaṅgeśa. His influence and popularity were immense, and though he was primarily no more than a commentary writer, his services in the cause of the philosophy to which he owed allegiance were assuredly very great

Regarding his personal history only a few fragments can be gathered. It is believed that he was born in the village of Sarināba, not far from Darbhanga, where the goddess Siddheśvari enshrined by him is still in existence†.

* उपायसाधकत्वात्तानि विनिवर्त्यम वात्पाक्षेन व्यवस्थित्य नानाविच्छिन्नाभाव यम स पक्ष इति जवनाथमिश्रा । This lakṣṇa is also quoted by Śankara in his

† Preface to Dr Gaṅgānatha Jha's edition of Vādivinoda, p. 2

He is said to have been a precocious child, and anecdotes illustrating his possession of wonderful gifts are still widely current*. The names of his parents appear as Bhavanātha and Bhavānī to whom he never fails to pay homage†. If we can place any reliance on Śaṅkara's personal testimony it must be owned that Bhavanātha had been a man of great erudition in almost all his works Śaṅkara acknowledges his deep indebtedness for his interpretation of the texts, especially in their knotty points, to the instructions received from his father ‡. It would seem from words used by Śaṅkara himself that he was taught by Bhavanātha formally who in his turn had been the pupil of his own elder brother Jīvarātha§,

Vaḍi Vinodā p 116-17, [३१] it seems to be a better reading than उदय which is accepted by Dr Jha.] There is another reference to Jīvanātha in the Vadvinodā (p 6121-22).

*Ibid, pp 34

That Śaṅkara was a devoted Śaiva is proved by his benedictory verses (see the introductory verses of the Upaśkāra, of the Līlāvati Kaṭṭhāhharana, of the Kaṭādarahasyam, of the Vādivinoda, of the Khandanaṭikā, &c) and by his describing himself as भचार्यनिरतः (end of Vādivinoda and of Upaśkāra). He was a voluminous writer, being the author of the following philosophical treatises :—

A. Commentaries on

(a) Kanāda's

1. Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (उपस्कार) Śaṅkara's introductory verse (3) seems to imply that in interpreting the construction of the Sūtras he had no predecessors for his guidance or support. It was, he says, like the hazardous enterprise of a daring acrobat (खेल) who attempts at walking in the mid-air on the nominal support of a piece of thread :

सूत्रमात्रावलम्बेन निरालम्बेऽपि गच्छतः ।

खे खेलवन्ममाप्यत्र सादृशं सिद्धिमेप्स्यति ॥

Here the words सूत्रमात्रावलम्बेन and निरालम्बे would seem to suggest that in Śaṅkara's time no direct gloss on the Sūtras was extant.

खनूतुर्जीविनः पश्य व्याख्यामाख्यातवान् माय ।

मार्गता भवनाद्यो मा तामिहास्तिमुत्तमान् ॥ fol 165b

The Śloka also occurs in the printed text of Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Khandana Khandā Khādyā (Lazarus & Co. Benares, 1888, p. 732), where the name Jīvanātha is replaced by Jayanatha; but it does not appear in the MS. No 134, dated Samvat 1529, belonging to the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares. The statement, however, plainly shows that Śaṅkara reproduced in his works, at any rate in the Commentary on the Līlāvati, what had been dictated to him by his father according to the teaching of his uncle, and that consequently he should not be held directly responsible for the views therein expressed.

Now, if this suggestion were true what are we to say of the *Vṛtti* to which Śaṅkara himself makes such constant references (Upaskāra, under Sūtras 1.1.2; 1.2.3, 6; 4.1.7; 9.2.13 &c)? Possibly to maintain his consistency we shall have to fall back on the only other alternative that the *Vṛtti* from which he quotes had not been, like the Bhāṣya itself, an immediate interpretation of the Sūtras.

The following authorities are referred to in the Upaskāra:

- { प्रशस्तदेवाचार्याः—1.1.8, 4.1 2, 8 2.3, 9.2.8
- { प्रशस्तदेवपादाः—9 2.6
- { प्रशस्ताचार्याः—9.2.13, 10.1.1
- { प्रशस्तदेवाः—9.1.10
- { वृत्तिकार—1 2.3, 6.1.12, 9 2.8
- { वृत्तिकृत—1.1.2. 1 2.6; 4.1 7, 7.1.3; 9.2.13; 10.1.3
- { उद्योतकराचार्याः—1.2.5
- { न्यायवार्तिक—9.1.1
- कीर्त्ति—(धर्मकीर्त्ति) 8.1.2
- विङ्गनाग—8.1.2
- भूषण—7.2.1
- वैतातिकाः—7.2.20
- पराशरं प्रदेयः(?)—9.2 6
- श्रीधराचार्याः—7.2.8
- उदयनाचार्याः—7.2.8
- वल्लभाचार्याः—4.1.10

The Upaskāra appears to have been composed at Benares.
- Cf the sentence-दृश्यते चेह वाराणस्यां &c under Sūt. 7.1.22.

(b) Praśastapāda's

- 1. Padārthadharmasamgraha (कणादरहस्यम्), referred to in the Upaskāra (7. 1. 6.). It reads more like an independent treatise than a commentary, and had it not been for the

intimation by the author himself that it is a "Vyakhya"* it would never have been possible to class it under commentaries. No *pratikas* from the original are given for the guidance of the reader and usually the order of the Bhāṣya too is not followed.

(c) Udayana's

1. *Ātmatattvavivēka* (*आत्मतत्त्वविवेककल्पलता*)
 2. *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* (*आमोद*)† In the third introductory verse of this book the author refers to three previous commentaries, viz *Makaranda*, *Prakāśa* and *Pañmalatā*†

*See Kanada rahasyam, p1 (Chow. Ed) • द्रव्यगुणसमवयव-
विशेषमशयानां पदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानं हि श्रेयसङ्गुरितं प्रयत्नवादाधार्यमाभ्युपगम्य चक्रेन
कथाद्वयस्य व्याख्यास्यामः ।

†Aufrecht, Oxf Cat, p 243, No 601. Though the name of the Commentator does not occur here, there cannot be any question about Śaṅkara's authorship of the work. The verse—भवानिमन्नायाभ्यामितृभ्या प्रथमम्यद्वयम्—and the expression—रतोऽधिभिरनुव्याख्यातव्यानुमयमुद्यम—prove the fact beyond any shadow of doubt. There is no ground therefore for attributing this Commentary to Ramabhadra Sarvabhauma (*Sub Voce*). The Ms of Amoda, which exists in the Govt. Sanskrit Library Benares (fols 1-116), calls itself in the colophon the work of Śaṅkara Mīśra.

‡The verse runs

भक्तान्दे प्रकाशे या व्याख्या परिमल्लेऽथवा ।

ततोऽधिका पितृव्यांख्यामाख्यातुमयमुद्यम ॥

(Mr Chakravarti's reading of the Śloka (J A S B, Sept, 1915, p. 281) is manifestly corrupt). Aufrecht's Latin interpretation of this stanza, as given in the oxford Catalogue, is hopelessly inaccurate. Putting aside for the moment the identity of Makaranda which might for aught we know appear to be the well known work by Ruchidatta (though there is every reason to question this

- iii. *Trisūtrī nibandha* (त्रिसूत्रीनिबन्धव्याख्या). Śaṅkara mentions here (Intro. Verse 2) the existence of three excellent commentaries on Udayana's nibandha, viz. *Prakāśa*, *Darpana* and *Uddyota* and adds that his own attempt is rather to bring out the plain meaning of the text. Thus we have प्रकाशदर्पणोद्द्योत (not प्रवृत्ति as in the Notices) कृत्रिभ्यां व्याकृतोऽस्त्वयम् । तथपि बोधनामात्रमुद्दिश्यामि नमोऽयम् ॥

Śāstri's Notices, III. No 136 pp. 88, 89. It is clear that the three Commentaries named in the above sloka were all on Udayana's *Trisūtrī nibandha*—the work on which Śaṅkara just proposes to comment. Of them *Prakāśa* is undoubtedly the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* of Vardhamāna, but the remaining two are unknown. The identifications which Mr. Chakravarti (*loc. cit.*, p. 269) suggests for these Commentaries will never hold (a) The *Prakāśa* can in no wise be supposed to be the work of Ruchidatta, (i) because Ruchidatta was a later writer (La. Sam 386 = 1505 A.D.) than Śaṅkara Mīśra

any Commentary on the Nyāyanibandha. His Prakāśa is a Commentary on Gangeśa's Tattva Chintamani, and *not on the Nyāyanibandha* to which Śaṅkara alludes (b c). Similarly, the Darpaṇa and the Uddyota could not have been the respective works of Mahēśa Thakkura and Vahinipati, for the double reason (i) that they are not Commentaries on the Nibandha (but on Prakāśa's Alola) and (ii) that both Mahēśa (1548 A D) and Vahinipati (later than the date of Vasudeva Sarvabhūma) were Śaṅkara Miśra's successors and not predecessors.

(d) Śrīharṣa

- 1. Khandana Khandi Khadya (आनन्दवदन) [A Ms. of this work (fols 1—118) on palm-leaf and in early Bengali script, exists in the private library of a gentleman at Benares. It bears the date in Lakṣmana Era 423 i.e. 1542 A D. The colophon runs thus: इति महामहोमिधर्मीशङ्करकृतप्रथमखण्डसखडबाद्यनिन्दवदनं समाप्तमिति । हरनेत्रपञ्चवेदलक्ष्मणसम्भते । शिवाचानि रत स्वार्थं श्रीमान् यधरोलिखत् ।

(e) Vallabhacharya

- 1. Nyayaklavatī (न्यायलीलावतीकण्ठाभरणम्)

(f) Gangeśa

- 1. Tattva Chintamani (चिन्तामणिमुख) It is referred to in the Upaśkara (3 1 14, 17, 3 2 18, 7 2 20, 26 *) and the Vādivimoda, p. 59.

B (a) यदिचिन्तः, an original treatise on the Science of Dialectics, referred to in the Upaśkara (9 2 2)

- (b) भेदरत्नप्रकाश*. The main object of this book was to reclaim the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dualism from the attacks of Vedānta. And as this could not possibly be accomplished without in the first instance overthrowing the position already gained by Śrīhaṛṣa in the Schools the work turns out practically to be a refutation of Khandana Khaṇḍa Khadya itself. Though Śaṅkara, by commenting on the Khandana, appears to have been in sympathy with Vedānta, his real attitude towards it was always hostile.

Śaṅkara's time may be thus calculated. There is a Ms. of his Commentary on the Khandana Khaṇḍa Khadya in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares which

* This seems to me to have been the full designation of the work, which appears in R. L. Miua's Bikaner Catalogue (p. 539, Ms. No. 1145) It is also called simply Bheda-prakāśa, as by the author in the Vādivinoda (p. 44) or as in Hall's Bibliographical Index (p. 85) or simply Bhedaratna as in Jha's Introduction to the Vādivinoda (p. 4).

Aufrecht (Cat. Cat. I, p. 416) says that this book (Bheda-prakāśa) was "reproved in *Saṅkṣepa Śāstra* 2, 1." Leaving aside the question how a book written in the 15th Century could have been noticed in a work decidedly several hundred years earlier, I cannot make out how Dr. Aufrecht discovered the name of a book at all in the śloka above referred to. The śloka is reproduced below :

एव समन्वयनिर्णयवाङ्मये,
जतोऽप्यस्यदार्ढ्यवशो ननु वाच्यजन्यः ।
मानान्तरेण परिणीत एव ज्ञानो
भेदप्रकाशप्रज्ञाप्रतिबन्धनेन ॥

Probably the phrase here underlined made Dr. Aufrecht suspect it to be the title of a book ! It is strange how Dr. Satis Chandra could have accepted this blunder in his *Indian Logic*, p. 459 !

bears Samvat 1529 (=1472 A.D.) as the date of its transcription. Hall saw (p. 85) a copy of Bhedapraśa dated 1519 of the Vikrama Era (=1462 A.D)*. This supplies the lower limit of Śaṅkara's age. The other limit however may be taken to be the time of Vardhamana Upādhyāya whose Commentary on the *Kusumājñāli* is referred to in Śaṅkara's own Commentary, *Amoda*. Thus it is highly probable, as Mr Chakravarti holds, that Śaṅkara flourished about the second quarter of the 15th Century†. And this date of Śaṅkara would be in full agreement with the tradition that he was a contemporary of Vāchaspati Miśra II and Pakṣadhara Miśra‡.

* This Ms. is now deposited in the Raghunath Temple Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. The date is thus entered. सवत् १५१९ समये चैत्र शुद्ध १५ पूर्णिमा मङ्गलदिनि । [It is significant that the oldest MSS of Śaṅkara's works, so far brought to light, were both written at Benares— (a) the *Khandanāṭika* in the Benares Library in 1472 A.D. by one Vasudeva, a native of Bengal and (b) the *Bhedapraśa* in 1462 A.D. by one Kāyastha Surja Dasa (see Steio, *Jammu Catalogue*, p. 328)?]

† Dr. Ganganatha Jha, in his Preface to the *Vedānta*, pp. 1-2, places Śaṅkara about Samvat 1585. But in view of the positive evidence adduced above it is no longer possible to accept this date as true.

‡ Cf. the verse

रङ्गवाचस्पत्यो. समानी रङ्गवाचस्पती मवता ।

पञ्चप्रतिपदो लक्ष्मीभूते न च ववारी ॥

(Quoted in the Preface to *Khandanoddhara*, p. 3) Most probably the first two names Śaṅkara and Vachaspati are to be understood as directly intended for Śaṅkaracharya and Vachaspati Miśra, the great champions of Vedānta, and not merely for Śiva and Bṛhaspati, and the point of the saying would then consist in the popular estimate that as Śaṅkaracharya and Vachaspati were masters of Vedānta, in the same way Śaṅkara Miśra and Vachaspati II occupied a unique position in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

VII- VACHASPATI MIŚRA II

Śaṅkara Miśra's younger contemporary was Vachaspati Miśra II Vardhamāna in his introduction to *Dandavivēka* calls himself the pupil of these two scholars*, and according to tradition also Śaṅkara Vachaspati and Pakadhira were all contemporaries †

Vachaspati was the Court Poet of Rajas Bhairavendra *alias* Hariniravāna Deva and his son Rupaniravāna *alias* Ramabhadra Deva of Mithila and lived about the middle of the 17th Century *

He wrote mainly on Hindu Law, but he was also a good Naiyayika. The following philosophical works attributed to him display closeness of reasoning and great original powers

A Commentaries on

(a) Gautamas

Nyāya Sūtras (=न्यायतत्त्वालोक)

and (b) Gaṅgeśas

Tattvachintamāni

B (a) Nyāyasūtrōddhāra This booklet was intended to determine the number and true readings of the genuine sūtras as distinguished from those which have been interpolated into the text from time to time. This work is therefore, in its object, of a similar nature with its predecessor, the Nyāyaśāstrī nibandha of Vachaspati Miśra I. It

* Śaṅkara Miśra and Vachaspati Miśra II (and Gaṅgādhara Miśra) were the gurus of the Śāstrī Vardhamāna the contemporary of R. Bhairavendra. Cf. *Dandavivēka* As Soc. Vol. p. 1, verse 6 —

स्वायान् गुरुकर्मज्ञं गुरुवाचस्पतिं च गुरुम् ।

† गुरुवाचस्पतिं महेश्वरं गुरुम् ।

द्वयं गुरुवत्तमं स्वाम्यान्मनसं वदाम् ॥

principal interest however consists in the fact that it represents the Maithila recension of the *Sātrapaṭha*

- (b) *Khaṇḍanoddhara* This is a rejoinder to the objections brought forward by Śrīhara in his famous polemical treatise against the dualistic hypotheses of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought. Though certainly the work does not rise up to the high level of Śrīhara's masterpiece it is nevertheless an interesting study, as showing how cleverly the Naiyāyika brushes aside the charges of his opponents.

We have seen above that Śaṅkara Miśra too was a firm dualist and that his *Bhedaratnaprakāśa* was an attempt on the part of an advocate of realism made in defence of his realistic convictions. It was Śaṅkara's no less than Vachaspati's religious instinct which impelled them to employ their pen against the authority of Śrīhara's masterly treatise. The controversy on the Vedānta side was resumed at a later date by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī whose *Advaitaratnaprakāśa* is a scholarly reply to Śaṅkara's *Bhedaratna*. But Vachaspati's *Khaṇḍanoddhara* seems to have been left neglected by the Vedāntists.

XIII —MADHUSŪDANA THAKKURA

It has been observed that the *Tattvachintamani* and more especially its Commentary, the *Āloka* by Pakṣadhara, were very seriously attacked on their first appearance, and that in consequence of this it became the fashion of the commentators to take upon themselves, in addition to the usual work of interpretation, the further task of defending the text. Madhusūdana's claim to distinction, like that of the predecessor Vāsudeva Miśra, rests on the successful

accomplishment of a self imposed task of a similar kind
In fact, his commentaries are all of the nature of defence

Madhusudana was a Maithila Brahmana His age is still undetermined but I feel strongly inclined to place him in the last quarter of the 15th Century or in the first of the 16th Having commented on Vachaspati II's Dvaitanirṇaya*, he must have been later than the middle of the 15th Century But Mr Chakravarti's surmise that he lived in the third quarter of the 16th century (J A S B Sept 1915, p 271) is hardly tenable His conclusion is apparently based upon the evidence of a Ms of Kāṭhakodhāra transcribed in La Samvat 491, but this is of no weight as against the positive testimony of another Ms of the same work copied 32 years earlier in La Samvat 459 (See Mitra's Notices, No 1909, Vol V, p 225) or 1578 A D

His Nyaṣya works are commentaries on

(a) Gāṅgeśa's

1 Tattvachintāmaṇi (कण्टकोद्धार) This is known through Burnell's entry only (Tanjore Catalogue, p 115 b), but is otherwise unknown It is possible that on examination it will prove to be a commentary on the Aloka

& (b) Pakṣadhara's

1 Tattva Chintāmaṇyūloka (कण्टकोद्धार or पक्ष-
वरोद्धार as in Hall, p. 39) This is really his main

* This Commentary is known as वाचस्पति See Mitra's Notices, No 1853 (Vol V p 116) where the Colophon is thus given इति महा-
महोपाध्याय श्रीमज्जुष्टनठः (मुद्रितो) २००० वर्षे कृतोद्धारः स ३८ ।

† It may be pointed out here that there exists in the Government Sanskrit Library, Benares, a Ms of Kāṭhakodhāra dated Samvat 1667 (—1600 A D)——a date which is practically identical

work, in which he describes himself as a master of Mimāṃsā and Nyāya (*मामांसान्यायपारगेन*)*

It is probably to this work that Viśveśvara Sūri refers in his *Vyākaraṇa Siddhānta Sudhanidhi* (Chowkh: Ed., pp 58, 69). The *Śabda Khaṇḍa* of his Commentary, of which a Ms. in two sub sections (marked here as A and B) exists in the Govt. Sanskrit Library, Benares, is found to contain the following references:

Section A :—

- { वर्धमानवचन 2 a¹
 { वर्धमानोपाध्याय वचन ..5¹
 अनुमान कण्टकोद्धार (his own)
 • प्राभाकराः 28b⁴
 अर्थाचीनाः 34b¹
 प्राचीनाः 34 b⁸
 श्रीफरमत 39 a⁹
 किरणावली (कालग्रन्थ) 42 b⁵
 नव्याः 45 b⁶, 60 b¹
 महार्णववत्सेश्वरौ 46 b¹¹
 दुर्गटीका 58 a¹
 महार्णव 58 b¹¹, 59 a⁶
 हरदत्त 60 b⁶ (The following verses are quoted
 from Haradatta

उक्तं च हरदत्तेन—

अनिदं प्रथमाः शब्दाः साधयः परिकीर्तिताः ।
 त एव शक्तियैकव्यप्रमादालसतादिभिः ॥
 अन्यथा विवृताः पुंभिरपशब्दा उद्वीरिताः ।
 स्मारयन्तश्च ते साधूनर्थयद्द्वैतवः स्मृताः ॥

Section B —

कुसुमाञ्जलि 3b*

नव्या 38 a*

उपाध्यायाः 38 a¹⁰, 48 a¹⁰ b¹

XIV.—DEVANĀTHA THAKKURA

Devanātha is known to have written a supplement (परिशिष्ट) to Pakadharma's Aloka (including notes on the original text of Gangesa). He was a Śaiva (See the Intro versel) and probably a pupil of Govinda*. A Ms. of this work, as noticed by Mm Hara Prasada Śāstri (Notices, Vol. III, p. 74), was transcribed by one Rāghava at the instruction of the author himself and bears the date in La Samvat 443 or 1562 A. D.†. Thus Devanātha's time falls in the middle of the 16th Century.

XV.—GOPINATHA THAKKURA

He was the son of the Maithila Thakkura Mahāmabopādhyāya Bhavanātha of the Goghota family, and a Vaiṣṇava of the Br̥ndāvana school of faith. He is known to have written only two works on Nyāya, viz.—

A. A Commentary on

(a) Keśava Miśra's

1. Tarkabhāṣa (तर्कभाषाभाष्यप्रकाशिका), in

which he quotes or alludes to the views of

मणिकृत—fols 7b¹¹, 20 a¹⁰, 22b¹², 23a⁸;पञ्चचरमिथा—fols 7b¹⁸, 23a¹ 12;

* स. से. ४४३ रेव वदि एका. तथा चन्दे महामहाठकुर मादन, यमहायवाभुयासनाद राघवेन लिखितम् ।

† Thus we read the 2nd introductory verse of the Commentary:

देवनाथेन गोविन्दवर्याभुवमेविना ।

चिन्तामयी वदाशेरे परिशिष्टं द्रुच्यते ॥

Who was this Govinda? Could he have been the well-known author of Kāvya-pradīpa, a Commentary on the Kāvya-prakāśa?

रत्नकोषकारः—fol. 23b⁴;

मिश्राः—fol. 23b⁶,

उपाध्यायः—fol. 23a¹⁰(1)

and B (a) चिन्तामणिसार or simply मणिसार (2)

It contains an abstract of the exposition of the fundamental concepts of Chintāmaṇi and may be held to be either a synoptic Commentary on the text or an independent work on the basis of it. Aufrecht is wrong in attributing it to Gopinātha Miśra (Cat. Cat. I 217), for the author of the Commentary on Tarkabhāṣa himself affirms that मणिसार is his own composition.

Cf. इति प्रतिपादितं (प्रपञ्चनं) मणिसारे—

-fols. 13a⁶, 13b⁶, 14a³, 29a¹ (Benares Sanskrit Library Ms.).

Gopinātha's time is later than Gaurikānta who refers to him in his Bhāvārthadīpikā. He may have lived therefore in the 16th Century (end).

(1) The leaves are of the Benares Sanskrit Ms. Library.

(2) The Anuśaṅga section of this work has been edited by Pandit T. Ganapati Śāstrī and published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series (No. XXV), 1914.

To be Continued

'Vairasenicharita,' 'Bhaimibhartrecharitra', &c., has one point common to them all, and that is the word 'charita' or 'charitra', which defines the character of the work and classes it under a 'charita kavya' (biographic or historical poem). Or, if, on the strength of arguments to be adduced hereafter one questions, as one may, the authority of the concluding verses which, evidently, are no parts of the subject of the poem, we have another, an indisputable one, in the mention of the Naxadha (meaning this same poem as is

काव्य चारुणि नैपथीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (IX)

तर्कैष्वसमभ्रमस्य दशमस्तस्य व्यरंक्षान्महा-

काव्ये चारुणि नैपथीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (X)

भृङ्गारामृततीक्ष्णभावयमगादेकादशस्तन्महा-

काव्ये चारुणि नैपथीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XI)

तस्य द्वादश एव मातृचणाम्भोजालिमौलेर्महा-

काव्येऽयं व्यगलग्रहस्य चरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XII)

स्वादूतारदभृति त्रयोदशतयादेश्वस्तदीये महा-

काव्येऽयं व्यगलग्रहस्य चरिते सगौ रसाम्भोजनिधिः ॥ (XIII)

यातस्तस्य चतुर्दशः द्वादशज्योत्स्नाच्छसूके महा-

काव्ये चारुणि नैपथीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XIV)

यातः पञ्चदशः कुशेतरसस्वादाविहाय महा-

काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XV)

काश्मीरं नैहितं चतुर्दशतयो विद्यां विजिज्ञिमहा-

काव्ये तदभुवि नैपथीयचरिते सगौ आमतपोदशः ॥ (XVI)

यातः सप्तदशः स्वच्छः सुवदशि चिह्नप्रदास्तेर्महा-

काव्ये तदभुवि नैपथीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XVII)

यातोऽमिन् विपन्नक्तिस्त्रिभिर्गणितोऽप्यत्रयव्ये महा-

काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सगौऽयमष्टादशः ॥ (XVIII)

एकामतज्जतो नवार्थगटनामेकाग्रविज्ञो महा-

काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सगौऽयमभिन्नगात् ॥ (XIX)

अन्वाधुषणसयमेवमणितो विनस्तदीये महा-

काव्येऽयं व्यगलग्रहस्य चरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XX)

तस्यागात्यमेकविंशजनः दाव्यऽतिरच्ये कृतौ

भर्माऽधुर्वरितवर्णनमये सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XXI)

द्वाविंशो नरसाहमाङ्कचरिते चम्पूकृतोऽयं महा-

काव्ये तस्य कृतौ नलीयचरिते सगौ निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥ (XXII)

clear from the context) by this same term in the body of a second work by the same author, the Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khadya (2). That the two books—the Naradha and the Khaṇḍana—are by the same author is borne out by the use of the first person (अहम्) in the text of the Khaṇḍana referred to above, and the same indirect reference to Panini by दाक्षीपुत्र in the Naradha (3) and by दाक्षीनन्दन in the Khaṇḍana (4), disregarding the concluding verse of the 6th canto (on the ground referred to above) and the concluding verse of the book as it stands (5) (on the ground of its falling under the same category with the concluding verses of the cantos, as will be fully discussed later on), though both of them, the former directly by its mention of the Khaṇḍana as another work by S'rihaṇa and the latter indirectly by its recurrence at the end of the Khaṇḍana also,—point to the same common authorship. Thus, then, it is clear that the Naradha is a biographic poem. By a biographic poem we mean, and naturally, one that records, if not all, at least the leading events in the life of its hero or heroine. What of this kind do we find in the Naradha? There only one principal event—the wedlock with its preliminaries—occupying the early life of the hero exhausts the whole subject. The eventful after-

(2) तथाहमकथयन्नेवधर्चरिरस्य पामपुरास्तुतो सग— ch 1)

(3) दाक्षीपुत्रस्य तन्त्रं ध्रुमयमभवत् कोऽप्यधीती कथेत.

यथं शस्त्रौघसिद्धिस्तद्वदतिनीशेषयुपायगतः ।

संयं त्रिमूर्त्यं देवान् स्मृतिमुग्रमि गतां पौरवत् यो ध्रुवज्ञं

प्राक् सम्कारेण सम्प्रत्यपि ध्रुवति शितः पट्टिकापाटनेन ॥ XIX, 61)

(4) अन्यथा दाक्षीनन्दनोदीरितनदायज्ञावस्थभिज्ञायां पाथः प्रार्थयमानः दानन-
स्थानामलीघामिनी भवानाहृत t ch 1)

(5) ताम्पूरूपमायनं य लभते यः कान्तगुञ्जेश्वरात्

यः साक्षात् कुरुते समाधिषु परं यत्नं प्रमादगणम् t

यस्तदाय सधुर्यपि धर्पितपरास्तर्कं पुन्यमयम्

भीर्भीरुपदेः वृत्तिः वृत्तिगुणं सम्मान्युदीरादिहम् ॥

to which of these was the real Nala) had already begun his torment on the fair Damayanti (6). Here the poet has given a forecast of Kali's persecution on Nala. In XVI. 57 our poet in describing the knotting of the garments of the married couple says —The all knowing Priest then knotted the garment of the Vidarbha princess with that of her beloved, communicating in the act, as it were, the infidelity of Nala who would afterwards cut off her garment and run away (7) Here we are told how Kali in the guise of a bird would divest Nala

life of Nala (as we deduce from the Mahābhārata on which our poet has drawn for his subject) has been completely ignored. Even the scriptural injunction which prescribes marriage for progeny (पुत्रार्थं क्रियते भार्यी) has been disrespected. The Hindu scripture, which only countenances assigns an equal place to conjugal sport (रति) with progeny (पुत्र) in the line (रतिपुत्रफला नारी) can hardly tolerate this outrage which allots the whole portion to रति and leaves none for the पुत्र. The poet's license has hardly a plea in the present case. For, however acute it may be, it cannot transgress the bounds of propriety. If close following of the original was never the intention of the poet, it was open to him to devise new events to give consistency to his poem. Silence is absolutely unwarranted. To suppose that no notable events characterised the life of the hero is grotesque in itself. Thus, it is the title itself that establishes the incompleteness of the poem, and the same has been amplified by numerous forecasts—mostly on the line of the original, the Mahābhārata—in the book. Consistency of these places would be at stake if a continuation of the Naisadha were not admitted. For, a poet's hero is an independent creation. To understand him we must resort to his own work, and no extraneous source. Even in a case of complete likeness in character between the hero of a poem and his prototype, it would be an unnatural procedure to understand one for the other. Hence, the Naisadha alone is competent for the solution of points raised in the Naisadha. The Mahābhārata is perfectly foreign in this matter. I shall now refer to those exact places where our poet has given forecasts of his hero's after-life. In XIII. 37 where Damayanti on seeing five persons of the appearance of Nala cannot come to a decision, the poet describes her then perplexity in the following terms—Nala's persecution by Kālī was yet to come ; but Dvāpara (i. e. the doubt as

to which of these was the real Nala) had already begun his torment on the fair Damayanti (6). Here the poet has given a forecast of Kali's persecution on Nala. In XVI. 37 our poet in describing the knotting of the garments of the married couple says —The all-knowing Priest then knotted the garment of the Vidarbhha princess with that of her beloved, communicating in the act, as it were, the infidelity of Nala who would afterwards cut off her garment and run away (7) Here we are told how Kali in the guise of a bird would divest Nala of his garment, and how Nala would clothe himself in a half piece cut off from the garment of Damayanti and abscond. Again, in XVII. 14, in the poet's use of the term अज्ञाविनय (where अज्ञ means both dice and the seuses) (8) we find an allusion to the fatal play at dice. But these are only covert allusions, and our poet has gone even farther. He has brought on the stage the root cause of all mischiefs—Kali, in person, made him pronounce his stern resolution—'I shall completely subjugate him, shall strip him of both his land and Damayanti' (9), set him on his journey for the execution of his resolve (10), escorted him to Nala's kingdom and to his capital (11), and

(6) कारिष्यते परिभवः कलिना नलस्य

तां द्वापरस्तु सुतनूमुदुनोत् पुरस्तात् । (XIII.37)

(7) प्रियांशुकप्रस्थितिप्रद्वयासं तदा पुरोधा विधिं विदमजाम् ।

जगाद विच्छिद्य पटं प्रयास्यतो नष्टादविधातमियेष विश्ववित् ॥ (XVI.37)

(8) अद्राक्षुराजिहानं ते स्मरमयेसर ह्यतः ।

अज्ञाविनयशिक्षां कलिनेव पुरस्कृतम् ॥ (XVII.14)

(9) प्रतिज्ञेय नले विज्ञाः कलेर्विज्ञायतां मम ।

तेन भूमौ च भूमिं च त्याज्यामि जयामि तम् ॥ (XVII.138)

(10) द्वापरैकपरीवारः कलिर्मत्सरमूर्च्छितः ।

नलनिवारिणीं यात्रां जगाद ग्रहिलः किल ॥ (XVII.159)

(11) मण्डलं निपथेन्द्रस्य चन्द्रस्येवामलं कलिः ।

प्राप म्हापथितुं पापः स्वर्मानुरिच संग्रहात् ॥

life of Nala (as we deduce from the Mahābhārata on which our poet has drawn for his subject) has been completely ignored. Even the scriptural injunction which prescribes marriage for progeny (पुत्रार्थे क्रियते भायो) has been disrespected. The Hindu scripture, which only courteously assigns an equal place to conjugal sport (रति) with progeny (पुत्र) in the line (रतिपुत्रफला नारी) can hardly tolerate this outrage which allots the whole portion to रति and leaves none for the पुत्र. The poet's license has hardly a plea in the present case. For, however acute it may be, it cannot transgress the bounds of propriety. If close following of the original was never the intention of the poet, it was open to him to devise new events to give consistency to his poem. Silence is absolutely unwarranted. To suppose that no notable events characterised the life of the hero is grotesque in itself. Thus, it is the title itself that establishes the incompleteness of the poem, and the same has been amplified by numerous forecasts—mostly on the line of the original, the Mahābhārata—in the hook. Consistency of these places would be at stake if a continuation of the Naisadha were not admitted. For, a poet's hero is an independent creation. To understand him we must resort to his own work, and no extraneous source. Even in a case of complete likeness in character between the hero of a poem and his prototype, it would be an unnatural procedure to understand one for the other. Hence, the Naisadha alone is competent for the solution of points raised in the Naisadha. The Mahābhārata is perfectly foreign in this matter. I shall now refer to those exact places where our poet has given forecasts of his hero's after life. In XIII. 37 where Damayanti on seeing five persons of the appearance of Nala cannot come to a decision, the poet describes her then perplexity in the following terms—Nala's persecution by Kālī was yet to come; but Dvāpara (i.e. the doubt as

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(6) कारिष्यते परिभव कलिना नलस्य

ता द्वापरस्तु एतन्मदुनोत् पुरस्तात् । (XVI 37)

(7) प्रियाशुरुप्रन्थिनिश्चदवासस तदा पुरोधा विधिं विदभजाम् ।

जगाद् विच्छिद्य पट प्रयास्यतो नरादविश्वासमिवेय विश्ववित् ॥ (XVI.37)

(8) अन्धशुराजिहान ते स्मरमेषस एता ।

अन्धविनयसिद्धार्थं कलिनेव पुरस्कृतम् ॥ (XVII 14)

(9) प्रतिभेय नरे विना कलेर्विज्ञायता मम ।

तेन भूमौ च भूमि च दशद्वयामि जयामि तम् ॥ (XVII.138)

(10) द्वापरैकगरीगरः कलिर्मस्तमूर्च्छितः ।

नलनिवारिणीं यात्रा जगाद् ग्रहिल कलिः ॥ (XVII 159)

(11) मण्डल निपेन्द्रस्य चन्द्रस्येवामल कलिः ।

प्राप म्भापयितुं पापं स्वभानुरिव सप्रहान् ॥

having lodged him secure on a *buhhitaka* tree in the garden adjoining his palace placed him an expectant for an opportunity for his persecution (12). With all this preparation, when the time comes for its fruition, the poet says a good-bye. How is this to be justified? In this connection let us also have a peep into the character of the boons which the gods respectively grant the couple. Indra gives his boon (to Nala)—‘For your residence a town will be built in your name near Benares on the other side of the Asi’ (13). Agni gives his (to Nala)—‘My energy which is conserved for cookery will be at your disposal (14). Yama gives his (also to Nala)—‘Even when badly situated, your mind will not swerve from virtue (15). Varuna gives his (also to Nala)—‘Water will become manifest wherever you will wish it, even though the place may happen to be a dry land’ (16); ‘also, by contact with your body, fading will not come over a flower and fragrance will be preserved’ (17). Their joint boon to Damayanti is—‘You are amazed to see how we cast off our disguise and resumed our native forms. You too by our grace will acquire the same power of assuming forms at pleasure’ (18). Now where, one may ask, is the consistency of this introduction of boons in the poem? The author of the *Mahābhārata* has shown its denouement in the episode

कियतापि च कालेन कालः कलिरूपयिवान् ।

भेमीभर्तुर्हस्मान्नी राजधानीं महीभुजः ॥ (XVII.161-2)

(12) तमालम्बनमासाद्य वैदर्भीनिपथेनयोः ।

कलुषं कलिरन्विष्यन्नवारसीद् वत्सरात् बहून् ॥ (XVII.217)

(13) तवोपवाराणसि नामचिह्नं वासाय पारेजसि पुरं पुराणि । (XIV.74)

(14) या दास्याकौषयिकी तनुमे भूयास्त्वदिच्छावसवर्तिनी सा । (XIV.77)

(15) कृच्छ्रे गतस्यापि दग्धविपाकधर्मात्त चेतः स्तलत्तु त्वदीयम् । (XIV.81)

(16) यथाभिलाषस्तव तत् देवे नन्वस्तु धन्वन्यपि तृणमणः । (XIV.83)

(17) अम्लानितामोदभरश्च दिव्यः पुष्पेषु भूयाद् भवद्गुणैर्गतात् । (XIV.85)

(18) कृत्वायमगहाय नो वपुर्बिभ्रतस्त्रिमसि वीक्ष्य विस्मिता ।

भाप्नुमाकृतिमतो मनीषितां विधया हृदि तवाप्युदीयताम् ॥ (XIV.94)

of Damayanti's second Svayamvara. But nowhere in the character of either his hero or his heroine has the author of the Naisadha shown it in his poem. Should it be said that the reader of the Naisadha will supply the omission from the Mahābhārata, that cannot be, the two, as we have remarked before, being entirely distinct from the standpoint of each other. Even admitting for argument's sake, that such license is permissible, how are we to explain those cases where the author has deviated from the Mahābhārata? The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that the current Naisadha is incomplete. But here a question may arise that if the current Naisadha is incomplete how are we to explain the presence of the four verses appended at the end of the poem (19)? The plain answer to this is that the verses are spurious. Why we say so may be shown thus. First, one great discrepancy that staggers one at the outset in the verses is that the author has been designated in two of these (verses 1 & 3) by the first person, in one (verse 2) by suggestion, and in one (verse 4) by the direct mention of his name. Secondly, the style of the verses, if carefully examined, would strike one with the idea that they are not all of the same hand or of the same period. The stamp of a raw hand is also at places clearly manifest,

(19) (a) यथा यूतस्तद्वत्परममणीयापि रमणी
कुमाराणामन्तःकरणहरणं नैव कुरते ।
मदुच्छिद्येदन्तमदयति क्षर्षाभूय क्षपिय
किमरुणं नाम स्यादासगुरुरापादरभरे ॥

(b) दिशि दिशि गिरिप्रावाणः स्वा वमन्तु सास्वती
तुलयतु मितस्तामःपातस्फुरद्भुविदम्बराम् ।
स परमपरः क्षीरोदन्वान् यदीयमुदीयते
मधितुरमृतं सैदच्छेदि प्रमोदनमोदनम् ॥

(c) ग्रन्थग्रन्थिरिह कचिन् कचिदपि न्यासि प्रयत्नान्मया
प्राज्ञमन्यमना हटेन पटिती मारिमन् खलः खेळतु ।
धृष्टासाद्गुरुरधीकृन्तदग्रन्थि समासादप-
त्येतकाव्यं सोर्मिमज्जनलक्ष्म्यासज्जन सज्जन ॥

(d) See footnote (4)

for example in the expression **ययं तदम्** in verse 1. Thirdly, from the tenor of verses 1 & 3 it would appear that the poem did not find favour with a certain class of readers and of the intricacies which were probably the cause of this disfavor as it of explanation has been attempted in the verses. For nobody on the propriety of a possible interpretation of his book will likely his own discursive tongue to turn the fanciful into a reality. I venture, as such first step to be the effect of an actual his previous experience in respect of other works of the author the attitude is not fully justified. Hence it is probable that some successful writer—an admirer of our poet—mortified at the unmerited disparagement of his idol has disturbed his feeling in the above way. Fourthly extreme self conceit has found expression in the second verse. It soars as ungraceful when coming, in the form of self approbation. Such self conceit has found expression in two other places also—the concluding verses of cantos 5 and 20—which also should therefore be construed in the same way as this. Fifthly, the fourth verse (as also the third) also appears at the end of the author's *khajana-khaya-khadya*. Until therefore, from other works of the author, it is definitely known that the same has been the procedure invariably adopted by him, we may safely take it that this (as also the preceding) has its right place in the *khajana*, having under the mistaken notion that the book had ended there, been subsequently appended to the *Naxadha*. The same remark in a slightly modified form applies also to the first two verses viz., those too had their right place elsewhere, and it seems likely, for in those too there is nothing to show that they are exclusively meant for the *Naxadha*. Or, the spuriousness of the fourth verse can be shown in another way also. The verse is autobiographic in character. In this and also in affinity of style, it ranks with the concluding verses of the cantos

About the concluding verses, in spite of their historical value, one feels constrained to believe that they are not genuine, or synchronous with the production of the *Naiṣadha*. The following are our grounds for the above belief.---

(i) The monotonous repetition at the end of each canto like the recurrence of the drop scene after each act of a play is most repulsive, and yet not indispensable like that other. The concert of a new element here and there is far too weak to remove that repulsiveness. That the same master poet, who has evinced wonderful command over the realm of thought in his *Pañcha-Nalī* (a set of verses popularly so called, being equally applicable to the real and the pseudo-Nalīs) and at several places to the same thought has presented a well devised variation of expressions, should exhibit such a poor stock of thoughts and expressions in the lexicon of his resources, is a thing hardly conceivable. (ii) In the concluding verse of Canto 16 which alludes to the appreciation of the poem by the scholars of Kashmir we meet with a discrepancy that hardly admits of a solution. The poem is yet in the embryo, for only sixteen cantos have been finished, yet there is the appreciation declaring the poem as an accomplished thing already. Even admitting, though such admission is prohibited by the third case ending in *काश्मीरः*, that the *अस्मि* क्त signifies the present time, we are no safer. The whole *Kāvya* is not there, only a portion of it. If, again, on the precedence of the use in the *Bhāgavadgītā* (I 9)—*अन्ये च बहवः शूरा मदर्थं त्यक्तजीविता*—we attempt to explain the *अस्मि* as expressive of future, we shall be landing ourselves on a fresh inconsistency. For, there the fate of the accoutred heroes—though future—is as sure as the past. The same is not the case with the fate of the poem. For, the honour that claims record in a book is never an easy thing to gain. Chances of failure are quite possible. To seek

a solution in the supposition that the statement might be possible on the appreciation of the portion already finished would involve in the first place an error of expression, and in the second an error of judgment (ii) Both the Naisadha and the Khandana have in each a reference to the other (vide the concluding verse of Canto 6 and footnote (2)) which is another way of saying that the same in one place is anterior and in another posterior with respect to the other Bhagavatāchārya, editor of the Khandana, not finding a solution of this riddle felt constrained to conclude the simultaneous production of the two books—a curious conclusion for a scholiast on a book of philosophy We in plain terms shall simply class the concluding verse as spurious

The above conclusion in no way detracts from the historic importance of the concluding verses For, though no genuine products of the author, nor synchronous with the production of the Naisadha, they may yet have been composed subsequently by his son, pupil, or any other responsible person

After such elaborate discussion no one will raise the question of bulk (I mean of the book) to disturb our conclusion Yet that too has a reply In the science of poetics there is no maximum limit prescribed for the number of cantos as none for the number of verses in each canto, and there even exists a poem named Haravijaya with as many as fifty cantos

If a continuation of the Naisadha is admitted, we must either say that the sequel is lost, or that the poet could not finish the book But when we look into two facts it is well nigh clear that the book *was* finished one, the mention of the Naisadha in the Khandanakhandakhādya (see footnote (2)), and the other, the appreciation of the Naisadha by scholars in Kashmir (Vide the concluding verse of Canto 16) For, by the first, though the priority of the Naisadha up only to the end of the 21st Canto (which forms the subject of

the psalm referred to there) is conclusively proved, yet it would be too much to suppose that the author could think of leaving his book unfinished at an advanced stage reaching up to the close of Canto 22 (up to which it is available) and beginning another so different in character and so stiff and bulky as the *Khaṇḍanakhanda*. As for the second, the appreciation of a *Maṭṭlavya* is not possible when there is only a portion of it (viz 22 Cantos) there. For, besides poesy, it requires character sketch correlation of the parts, and many other things for consideration. This, therefore is our final conclusion that the sequel also was written, but is now lost, and this is probable too for, a good many of our poet's works—whose names we find—are lost to day.

In connection with the above conclusion of mine I may casually remark that, in my solicitude to learn whether tradition lent any support to my view I referred the matter to many of my friends and acquaintances, and, among them, to Pandit Ramagopāl Smṛtibhūga of Benares, whereupon the last gentleman emphatically supported my view and said that many years back he had witnessed with his own eyes a manuscript of the sequel in *Uṇya* character with an *Uṇya* pupil of his—named either Damodar or Rudranarayan (he did not recollect which). He also quoted two verses (one in full and the other in part) belonging, he said, to the same. The verses are —

- (1) यदन्ति ये चन्द्रमसं सुभास न पीयते ते किमु नायिकाधरम् ।
सुरापगाम्भीर्यं (?) पिबज्जनेन किं रसत्तर (?) नारधिनीरमुच्यते ॥
(2) अशुद्धस्तनपर्वतादचतरङ्गद्वेय द्वायावली रोमांलि प्रतिपद्यते —

The late revered Mahamahopadhyāya Rakhaladasa Nyayaratna too is reported to have used to quote a half verse which, he said, belonged to the *Nayadha*, but is not found in the twenty two cantos current of the poem. The half verse referred to is this —

सस्मर सस्मरमना प्रियदूतभूत तत्तामरालयमरालमरालकेशी ।

II

I now come to the second part of my treatise.

In the auto biographic verses (I mean the concluding verses of the cantos and the concluding verse of the poem as a whole) we find mention of the poet's parents, his works, his realisation of the Chintāmanī mantra his honour at the court of the King of Kanouj, and many other things. But nowhere do we find any mention of his native country. Yet there are evidences in abundance in the book which go unmistakably to show that his native land was Bengal. Those evidences are presented one by one, before our readers.

The first evidence is the mention of the 'ululu' (a peculiar sound produced by the tongue, resorted to by women on festive occasions). The poet has introduced it in connection with the Svayamvara of Damayanti. The context is —When Damayanti offered to place the garland on the shoulders of Nalā, the characteristic festive song, articulated with ecstasy, came out as the sound of 'ululu' from the mouth of the ladies of the harem (20). Now, every body knows that the 'ululu', though extended as a thing to Assam and Orissa as well, is, as a name, confined to Bengal alone. The same finds corroboration in Nārāyaṇa's comment —'The name 'ululu' is used in Gauda for a class of festive songs indulged in on festive occasions like marriage &c.'—where Gauda in the opinions of the experts is Bengal. Mallinātha's interpretation of the term, though slightly diverging from Nārāyaṇa's, viz he has termed it a custom of the north, also, when we view it from his own country—the south, points to the same conclusion, at least in part.

'20) कापि धर्मोदास्तुतिर्निर्दिष्टानवगम्य वा मङ्गलगीतिरासाम् ।

सैवाननेभ्यः पुण्येन्द्रागामुच्यते तु च्यति चकार ॥ XIV 51)

(21) विवाहाद्वृत्तस्य स्त्रीणां धवलादिमङ्गलगीतिविशेषो गौडदेशे 'उलुलु'

। इत्युच्यते । —Nārāyaṇa

Experience also tells us that, excepting Assam, Bengal & Orissa, nowhere else in North India is this practice to be met with. There too, the union of the name and the thing, as observed above, is peculiar to Bengal alone.

The second evidence is the use of the conch bangle. This too as the writer has come to learn from his investigation, is characteristic of Bengal alone. 'The conch bangle and vermillion' is a common saying for an unwidowed woman in Bengal. The connection in which it finds mention is the Naisadha is this. 'The bride's arms, united with auspicious conch bangles, appeared as if they were being attended upon by fresh grown lotus stalks for acquiring tenderness from them' (23). That this practice of wearing conch bangles is current only in Gauda or Bengal finds support also from Nārāyaṇa whose words are—'गौड़देशे विवाहकाले शङ्खचलय-धारणमाचार' (The wearing of conch bangles by the bride at marriage is a practice prevalent in Gauda). Just as the wearing of conch bangles characterises the beginning of married life, so does the breaking of them characterise the beginning of widowhood. The poet has referred to this second point also in connection with his description of a certain king (the king of Kanchi) who attended the Svayamvara, as follows—'Swans in the shape of his glories carrying off lotus stalks in the shape of conch bangles breaking on the hands of the youthful consorts of the rival heroes, sport in fountains of the tears of the same wives of his enemies' (24).

(22) उल्लुचुरितस्वरं चन्द्रिद्वयगतमन्तुं स्याद्ययौ ध्वनिर्विषय उत्सवाद् श्रीभि-
र्ययत इत्युनीच्यानामाचारः ।——Mallinatha

(See V. P. Dube's Introduction to Vaisika Darśana with
(Kiraṇavali 28)

(23) उगस्त्वमानावित्रं शिशिलु नतो मृदुस्त्वमप्रोवृष्टुणालमालयः ।

विरेजनुमाङ्गलिकेन सङ्गतौ भुजां च त्वा बलयेन कम्प्युन ॥ (XV 45)

(24) अत्र समित्पम्मुल्लवारीरतपुट्पुभुजा कम्पुमृणालहारिणा ।

द्विपङ्कगन्धेगद्गम्युनिहर यशोमालालिकिरिवाम्य गेलति ॥ (XII. 35)

The third evidence is the tying of the hands of the bridegroom and the bride with a kuśa blade at marriage. This is no scriptural injunction, but a usage (25), prevalent in Bengal, and, so far as I have been able to learn from investigation, in Bengal only. The poet has introduced this in the Naisadha in the following connection — 'The hand of the bridegroom is a delighter in homicide (i.e. in war), while that of the bride is a stealer of the lustre of a lotus (being equally beautiful). Is it for this reason that in the well governed Vidarbha kingdom these two (a murderer and a thief) were bound with stiff kuśa ?' (26)

Now if, as we have seen, the three customs above alluded to are not found in the country (Vidarbha or Nisadha) in relation to which they have been introduced, are we justified in inferring that these are the customs of the poet's own country ? Nārāyaṇa too in his comment on the 'ulūlu' expressed the same opinion, namely, that the poet has alluded to the custom of his own country (स्वदेशरीतिः कचिनोक्ताः). If so, then think what that country should be. Should it not be the same country of Gauda or Bengal, where the three customs unite ?

Besides the three places indicated above, the poet has in many other places followed the customs of Bengal or his own country. Such are—(i) The painting of the floors and walls of a house with the pigment of rice powder on festive occasions (27). (ii) The wearing of a crest and the holding of a mirror by the bridegroom while starting on the marriage procession (28). (iii) The entrance of the married

(25) 'कुक्षौ पाणिश्चान्नं देहाचारः ।' Nārāyaṇa,

(26) वरस्य पाणि परघातर्षीतुर्वी बधूकर पङ्कजकान्तितरुकरः ।

सुगन्धि तौ तत्र विदर्भमण्डके ततो निश्च्यौ किमु कर्क्षौ कुक्षौ ॥ (XVI, 14)

(27) कचित्तदालेपनदानादिभिरुता कमप्यङ्गुलमगात्तुस्कृता । (XV, 12)

(28) अनर्घ्यस्तौघमयेन मण्डितो राज्ञ राज्ञा मुकुटेन मूर्धनि । (XV 60)

couple into a room specially designed for the occasion, in which they are to pass the night in company with their friends (29) (iv) Niceties of fish and flesh in marriage feast (XVI 76, 81, 82, 87) &c These customs, individually speaking, are more or less to be found in other parts of India as well, but collectively they are the specialities of Bengal alone. The nicety of fish and flesh is a notable feature of Bengal. Excepting Kishmir, nowhere else in India does a fish meal constitute a prominent part of a banquet like Bengal. 'Fish and rice' is a by-word with the Bengalis, and the same has its exact counterpart in our poet's 'अन्नमीन' (XIV 78). Again, vermilion is a close associate of the hair parting of a married woman (whose husband is living) in Bengal, and our poet's predilection for this custom of Bengal has led him to introduce the thing even in Vidarbha where saffron is current. In the act he has not sacrificed consistency, having shown it not in the gynaeceum of Vidarbha itself, but in the bevy of the royal consorts who had been invited to the wedding. The connection is this—When the royal consorts who had come to attend the nuptials bowed at the feet of Damayanti with the express intention of winning her intercession against chances of widowhood at the hands of Nala, the lac of her feet appeared on their heads like auspicious vermilion for the longevity of their husbands (30). That saffron is current or profusely used in Vidarbha may be gathered from our poet's own words. In one place he says—'where the large tank infused with the saffron

ये समस्तापयनावलम्बिता विभूषणाना मणिमण्डल नल ॥

स्वरुरक्षामवलम्बित विष्कलीचक्रार सेवाचणदपेगापेगम् ॥ (XV 70)

(29) स कौतुकागारमगात् पुरन्ध्रिभिः सहस्रान्ध्रीकृतमीक्षितुं ततः ॥ (XVI, 46)

(30) नलात्स्वयैश्वस्त्यमवाप्तुमान्ता वृषद्विषो भीममहोत्सवागतः ।

तद्दृष्ट्वाक्षामदधन्त मङ्गलं तिर घ सिन्दूरमित्र प्रियायुषे ॥ (XX. 55)

coming from the beautiful ladies while bathing does not, like an unappeased woman clear up by the whole night' (31) In another—where at every sunset the saffron shops shone like the rays of the sunk down sun having tarried on earth (32)

With regard to the above customs one may urge that there is no knowing that they were current in Bengal even at the time of our poet To this our answer is that the customs of a family or of a country do not change easily Their authority is higher than even that of the scriptures For illustration look at the history of the present age and you will see how in the midst of innumerable adverse circumstances the ancient beliefs are still clinging to the people's mind While the assembly hall is resonant with the cheers of equality, the seraglio is carefully guarding its own individuality The predominance of local customs finds support in Śrīharṣa too The following extract from Narayana's commentary will bear testimony to this—अत्र कचित् कचिद् विधिकमभङ्गो देशाचाराच्छास्त्राभिदा-
कुलाचारविशेषाद् वा बोद्धव्यः । न पुनः श्रीहर्षकचेरज्ञानलेशोऽपि ।
(Wherever in this marriage concern scriptural injunctions will be seen to have been violated, this should be explained as having been done out of regard for usage (of the family or the country) or revelation In no way is it a mark of the ignorance of the poet Śrīharṣa) From this same we are also to conclude that the customs of other countries too were very nearly the same at the time of our author as they are to day

Here a question may arise that, if the customs were the same even before, how are we to justify the two Vedic uses

(31) छद्मतीजनमज्जनार्पितर्घुसुर्गैर्यत्र कषायिताशया ।

न निशाखिलयापि वापिका प्रसस्ता ग्रहिल्य मानिनी ॥ (II 77)

(32) हवयोऽस्तनितस्य भास्वत स्खलिता यत्र निालया किल ।

(अनुतायमभुर्विलेपवापणकाश्मीरजपण्यदीथम ॥ (II 90)

'उलुलय' (with its variant 'उल्लुलय') (33) and उल्लुलवः (34)? For these undoubtedly are the prototypes of our modern 'उल्लु' and as such they prove, along with its antiquity its diffusiveness also. Apart from the Vedic uses in a comparatively modern poem too we find reference to the ululu (35). The author is a Gujrati which means that the custom was in vogue in Gujrat as well in ancient times. As for the conch bangle too, from its reference in the Mahabharata (36), as also in the Kadambas (37) it is well nigh clear that the practice was in vogue in other countries as well and not confined to Bengal.

In reply, we should take the cases individually. With regard to the two Vedic uses 'उलुलय' (with its variant 'उल्लुलय') and उल्लुलवः we should first consider whether they conform to our ululu. For, simply because there is sameness in expression, we are not necessarily to conclude that there is sameness in meaning as well. The same word very often

(33) उल्लुलयन्ता मयन्नुवाजिनान्युद प्रारणा जयतामप धाप ।

पृथग धोपा उलुलय कतुमन्त उदीरता

देवा इन्द्रज्येष्ठा महतो यन्तु मन । ॥ Atharva-veda III in : (6)

(34) अथ यत्तदजायत साऽसायादित्यन्त जयमान धापा उल्लुलवोऽनुदतिष्ठन्त सर्वाणि च भूतानि सर्व उ कामास्तस्मात्तस्यास्य प्रति प्रत्यायत प्रति धापा उल्लुलवोऽनुत्तिष्ठन्ति सर्वाणि च भूतानि सर्व चैव कामा । Chhandogya—III

19 (3)

(35) हूपाभिल्लु तुङ्गाणा वाणाना किरारय ।

स्थानामपि चोत्कारमुत्तारुषोऽमुतामृताम् ॥

मरुताना पदपद्मान स्ल्लुलवामक्षुपाम् ।

सङ्गे चक्षति तस्याभूतङ्गाद्वैतमय जगत् ॥ (Jyega-luchanata)

(36) पिङ्गम्भु पाणिभ्या तृतीया प्रहृति गत ।

वणीकृतशिरा राजसन्ता च उहृत्ता ॥ (Virata 2 27)

अयापरोऽदृश्यत रूपमग्रा स्नागमलमपि उहृत्तुमान् ।

— प्राकारवप्र प्रतिसुच्छकुण्डत दाव च स्मृतिरि हादये शुभ ॥ (Vir ta II 1)

(37) इमकदभाद्धोऽभुक्तशित म स्वताभुजलताधिगलित शङ्खवलयरिव
मृणालशकै कलमापितम् (आश्रमनन्दयम् ।

(८)

is found to convey widely divergent meanings, and a philologist in such cases of divergency of meanings will not even admit the sameness of the word. So long, therefore, as we shall not find concordance of both word and meaning in the instances, we cannot admit their application to the present case. So let us see the extent of that concordance in the two cases. The 'उल्लुल्य' (with its variant उल्लुल्यः) finds mention in a hymn of the Atharva Veda. It relates to warfare. The heroes are going to the war. The priest is offering his invocation for their victory. The meaning of the hymn is this — 'O Indra, let our heroes by your grace be inspired with warlike spirit, the warcry of the triumphant heroes rise deafening the ears of the enemies, the quarters resound with loud shouts of 'ullulu', the gods headed by Indra (yourself) come to our help in the fight". From what we get from the meaning of the hymn, we cannot class this 'ullulu' and our 'ululu' under the same category. The 'उल्लुल्य' is a mild auspicious sound peculiar to the gynaceum; the उल्लुल्य is a wild ecstatic shout peculiar to the battle field. Though ecstasy and auspiciousness are both inherent in both, yet in one they are primary, and in the other secondary (respectively taken). This double character of the 'ululu' as primary and secondary in its two aspects respectively understood finds expression also in the particular sloka of our poet. (The use of उल्लुल्य throughout in this topic for उल्लुलि or उल्लुलि in the readings उल्लुल्य and उल्लुल्यः of the text is in accordance with Sāyana) (38). Now to उल्लुल्यः. This occurs in the Chhandogya Upaniṣad. The context is this ; "When the sun had his birth, simultaneously therewith arose acclamations, as also all heings and all desires. Therefore, (even to-day) at his rising and also setting (or reappearing), rise acclamations, as also all heings and all desires.'—

(38) 'उल्लुल्य इति । अनुकरणशब्दोऽयम् । उल्लुल्य इत्येवमात्मकाः'—Sāyana

Śāṅkarachārya According to Śāṅkara उलूखः = उरुख = acclamatory, that is, he, in consonance with the dictum—'र and ल are identical'—read उरु for उलु (उलूख = उलु + उलु = उरु + उरु = उरुख), and construed the word as an adjective to द्योषा, and though by the remark as follows the birth of the first son of the lord has apparently admitted the two aspects (ecstasy and auspiciousness) of the उलूख, yet by his attaching the alternative meaning of 'setting to प्रत्यागत' has also partially discarded them. For where in 'rise' there is the suggestion of birth, in 'decline' that of death is inevitable. Hence what at one place has been prescribed because of its festive and auspicious character cannot, on the worldly standpoint, be justified at the other unless stripped of that character. Even omitting the alternative meaning of 'setting', the word 'उलूख' as taken by Śāṅkara cannot be admitted as suggestive of the 'ululu' which is purely of an onomatopoeic character. Truly speaking, the 'उलूख' in question is completely unsuitable in the present case, for, at the first appearance of the sun, the absence of creation necessarily involves absence of the sound in question, and even after, nobody ever uses the 'उलूख' at sunrise, at sunset never. By this Ānandagiri's interpretation of the word directly referring to our उलु (for he explains it as 'a peculiar acclamation on festive occasions confined to particular countries' which is clearly a periphrasis for उलु) is also discarded.

The reference in the 'Jagaluḥarita'—the modern poem spoken of before—is this 'When his (Jaglu Shah's) party started (on pilgrimage), the neighings of horses, the trumpetings of elephants, the rattlings of chariots, the arm slaps of the strong armed, the panegyrics of bards and the 'ululu' sounds of the fur eyed, all contributed to turn the whole atmosphere into one of sound alone. Here with all deference to the

author's knowledge of the thing 'उल्लू', we are constrained to say that he was not fully informed about its application. For, nowhere in the parts of India where the practice of उल्लू is current, is it used on occasions of pilgrimage. This short coming only shows that the author's information was second hand. Or, even admitting that the practice was prevalent in Gujrat at the time of either the author or his hero it cannot affect our position until we meet with an exact parallel to the case we meet with in the Nai udha and even then the other evidences that have been adduced will run counter.

Now for the conch bangle. The connection in which it finds mention in the Mahabharata is this. The Pandavas having settled that they should pass the year of their incognito life in the city of Virata are now coming to an agreement as to how each should pass that life. Yudhishtira and Bhishma having communicated their own modes, Arjuna communicates his — I shall introduce myself as a eunuch named Brihanoala, and, concealing the bow string marks on the arms with bangles, wearing ear rings and conch bangles and tying the hair into a braid, shall thus in the guise of a woman teach music to the queens and also amuse the hearts of the king and the ladies with tales. Thus I shall live incognito. Should the king ask my antecedents I shall say that I was formerly an attendant of Draupadi in the house of Yudhishtira. After that Draupadi, Nakula and Sahadeva declared theirs in their turns. All the six it should be known, emphasised their former connection with Yudhishtira as their common master. This done, the whole party prepared themselves for entering Virata. Here one may naturally think that conch bangles were current at that time in Virata and other allied places. So we shall see whether any solution is possible of this. In the opinion of experts the name Virata or Matsya applies also to a part of Bengal (viz the districts of Dmajpur Rangpur and Cooch Behar jointly taken) and the acceptance of that view would

solve the question very easily and from the standpoint of distance that would indeed be very favourable to a life of concealment, for considering the importance of this life on the success of which rested the future of the Pandavas, the safer such life would be the better. But from the separate mention of Vāṅga and Virāṭa in the description of the princes assembled at the Rajasuya of Yudhiṣṭhira in the Mahābhārata (39), and the geographical situation of the country of Matsya (40) mentioned in connection with the incognito life, it is clear that Matsya or Virāṭa is distinct from Bengal and located somewhere in the north west of India. Therefore the solution of the question should be sought elsewhere. In the consultation above referred to we find that the five brothers and Draupad all come to the agreement that if asked by the king of Virāṭa they would each say that they formerly served under Yudhiṣṭhira and would also describe the nature of their service. The object of mentioning Yudhiṣṭhira is that if known to be complete strangers Virāṭa would not admit them in his house, and the name of Yudhiṣṭhira carried with it not only a removal of that bar, but also his sympathy, for, they knew that king Virāṭa was loyal to the Pandavas (41), and for this reason particularly they sought the shelter of Virāṭa. In the above connection with Yudhiṣṭhira they want to show that they are not residents of Virāṭa, and they do not also want manifestly to show that they belong to the country of Yudhiṣṭhira. If so the object of wearing

(39) पौण्ड्रको वासुदेवश्च बद्ध कालिङ्गस्तथा ।

विशट सह पुत्राभ्या मायलश्च महाबल ॥ (Sabha 34 11-2)

(40) उत्तरण दशार्णस्ते पञ्चालान् दक्षिणेन तु ।

उत्तरण पृच्छोमान् दूरसेनाश्च पाण्डवा ।

लुब्धा भुवाणा मत्स्यस्य विषय प्राविशन् वनात् ॥ (Virata 5)

(41) मत्स्यो विशाटो बलवानभिरर्कोऽथ पाण्डवान् ।

धर्मशीला वदान्यश्च वृद्धश्च सतत प्रिय ॥ (Virata 1-16)

the conch bangle is to show their alien connection, and thus Bengal also may come. This is possible, and desirable too,—possible, because Arjuna, while out on pilgrimage wandered through many countries and in the course of his wanderings went to Bengal also (42), and was acquainted with the practices of the place,—desirable, because by creating the impression of a distant residence it would greatly contribute to the security of the disguised life, or, a combination of the practices of two distinct provinces, such as a bunch of bangles on the arm and conch baogles on the wrists, through a vagueness about residence, would the more strengthen that contribution. A side question also is possible here, and that is—If the conch bangle were not current in Virata, how could Arjuna procure it there? To this we reply—The matter is not directly opposed to the principle of commerce, nor is there any justification for the belief that conch artisans were scarce in a flourishing city like Virāṭa. Further, it would not be an unreasonable supposition that in consequence of the extreme hardness of the incognito life, the subject was uppermost in the mind of the Pandavas and they had long been preparing themselves for it.

The place of the Kēdambari is the picture of a hermitage. The connection of conch bangles there is this 'In the hermitage here and there were lying morsels of lotus stalks half swallowed by young elephants, which gave one the impression that they were conch bangles slipped out of the hands of Goddess Sarasvatī'—(The Parrot's speech). For the all-white Sarasvatī such an ornament—the conch bangle—is most suited and natural. So the poet's conception in that respect is very nice indeed. But side by side with this an element of distaste also is there. That is the poet's ascription of slipping (from the hand) to the conch bangle. For, the

(42) अह्ववह्वरुह्वयु यानि तीर्थानि कानिचित् ।

जगाम तानि सर्वाणि पुण्यान्यायततानि च ॥ Ādiparva 215-9)

conch bangle is never worn in a way that would make slipping possible. Then, there is always associated with the conch bangle an idea of auspiciousness that urged the author of the *Narsadha* to introduce in the abundance of jewelled bangles the bangle of conch. From the afore said conception of slipping as also from the suggestion of a broken condition to be supplied from the context the idea of auspiciousness has suffered with the result that the attainments of the hermits which dictated the introduction of *Sarasvatī* in the hermitage have been negatived by the allied conception of her widowhood. Should one attempt a justification by construing it as a part of the उत्प्रेक्षा, it would not stand. For the potency of the उत्प्रेक्षा has been exhausted in the ascription of the material conch bangle to the spiritual *Sarasvatī*. Hence, it is clear that even admitting the prevalence of the conch bangle in *Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa*'s time (7th century A. D.) in his country (Behar) it was certainly not in the way in which we find it introduced in the *Narsadha*. The latter is typically Bengali. Next, in consideration of *Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa*'s extensive travels (for which his own admission in the *Harsachanta* is the authority) and the peculiar association of *Sarasvatī* and conch bangles with Bengal, it would not be unfair to connect his introduction of the conch bangle with the influence of his acquaintance (however imperfect) with Bengal. Or, this may have been influenced by the *Mahābhārata*. Thus our position is unaffected from first to last, and our poet (*Śrīharṣa*) was not only an inhabitant of the country of conch bangles, but was also conversant with the art, as evidenced in the following extract —

ताराशङ्खविलोपकस्य जलज तीक्ष्णत्वपो भिन्दत
 सारम्भं चलता करेण निविडां निष्पीडतां लम्बित ।
 छेदार्योपहताम्बुकम्बुजरज्जोजम्बालपाण्डुभव
 च्छङ्खच्छिक्करपल्लतामिह वदन्नस्तं गतोऽर्थो विधुः॥(XIX 57)

the conch bangle is to show their alien connection, and thus Bengal also may come. This is possible, and desirable too,—possible, because Arjuna, while out on pilgrimage wandered through many countries and in the course of his wanderings went to Bengal also (42) and was acquainted with the practices of the place—desirable, because by creating the impression of a distant residence it would greatly contribute to the security of the disguised life, or, a combination of the practices of two distinct provinces, such as a bunch of bangles on the arm and conch bangles on the wrists, through a vagueress about residence, would the more strengthen that contribution. A side question also is possible here, and that is—If the conch bangle were not current in Virāṭa, how could Arjuna procure it there? To this we reply—The matter is not directly opposed to the principle of commerce, nor is there any justification for the belief that conch artisans were scarce in a flourishing city like Virāṭa. Further, it would not be an unreasonable supposition that in consequence of the extreme hardness of the incognito life, the subject was uppermost in the mind of the Pāṇḍavas and they had long been preparing themselves for it.

conch bangle is never worn in a way that would make slipping possible. Then, there is always associated with the conch bangle an idea of auspiciousness that urged the author of the *Naradha* to introduce in the abundance of jewelled bangles the bangle of conch. From the afore said conception of slipping as also from the suggestion of a broken condition to be supplied from the context the idea of auspiciousness has suffered, with the result that the attainments of the hermits which dictated the introduction of *Sarasvati* in the hermitage have been negatived by the allied conception of her widowhood. Should one attempt a justification by construing it as a part of the उत्प्रेक्षा, it would not stand. For the potency of the उत्प्रेक्षा has been exhausted in the ascription of the material conch bangle to the spiritual *Sarasvati*. Hence, it is clear that even admitting the prevalence of the conch bangle in *Bāna Bhaṭṭa's* time (7th century A. D.) in his country (Behar) it was certainly not in the way in which we find it introduced in the *Naradha*. The latter is typically Bengali. Next, in consideration of *Bāna Bhaṭṭa's* extensive travels (for which his own admission in the *Harsha-charita* is the authority) and the peculiar association of *Sarasvati* and conch bangles with Bengal, it would not be unfair to connect his introduction of the conch bangle with the influence of his acquaintance (however imperfect) with Bengal. Or, this may have been influenced by the *Mahābhārata*. Thus our position is unaffected from first to last, and our poet (*Śiṅharāja*) was not only an inhabitant of the country of conch bangles, but was also conversant with the art, as evidenced in the following extract —

ताराशङ्खचिलोपकस्य जलजं तीक्ष्णत्वियो भिन्दत.

सारम्भं चलता करेण निविडां निष्पीडनां लम्बितः ।

छेदार्थोपहृताम्बुकम्बुजरजोज्ज्वलपारङ्गमय-

च्छुद्धचित्तुत्करपत्ततामिह यदग्रस्तं गतोऽर्थो विधुः॥(XIX.57)

the conch bangle is to show their alien connection, and thus Bengal also may come. This is possible, and desirable too,—possible, because Arjuna while out on pilgrimage wandered through many countries and in the course of his wanderings went to Bengal also (42) and was acquainted with the practices of the place—desirable, because by creating the impression of a distant residence it would greatly contribute to the security of the disguised life, or, a combination of the practices of two distinct provinces, such as a bunch of bangles on the arm and conch bangles on the wrists, through a vagueness about residence, would the more strengthen that contribution. A side question also is possible here, and that is—If the conch bangle were not current in Virāṭa, how could Arjuna procure it there? To this we reply—The matter is not directly opposed to the principle of commerce, nor is there any justification for the belief that conch artisans were scarce in a flourishing city like Virāṭa. Further, it would not be an unreasonable supposition that in consequence of the extreme hardness of the incognito life, the subject was uppermost in the mind of the Pāṇḍavas and they had long been preparing themselves for it.

The place of the *kādambarī* is the picture of a hermitage. The connection of conch bangles there is this: 'In the hermitage here and there were lying morsels of lotus stalks half swallowed by young elephants, which gave one the impression that they were conch bangles slipped out of the hands of Goddess Sarasvatī'—(The Parrot's speech). For the all-white *Sarasvatī* such an ornament—the conch bangle—is most suited and natural. So the poet's conception in that respect is very nice indeed. But side by side with this an element of distaste also is there. That is the poet's ascription of slipping (from the hand) to the conch bangle. For, the

(42) भद्रवद्भङ्गिष्ठसु यानि तीर्थानि कानिचित् ।

जगाम तानि सर्वाङ्गि पुण्यस्थायत्वानि च ॥ १८१॥ १८१॥

conch bangle is never worn in a way that would make slipping possible. Then, there is always associated with the conch bangle an idea of auspiciousness that urged the author of the *Naradha* to introduce in the abundance of jewelled bangles the bangle of conch. From the afore said conception of slipping as also from the suggestion of a broken condition to be supplied from the context the idea of auspiciousness has suffered with the result that the attainments of the hermits which dictated the introduction of *Sarasvati* in the hermitage have been negatived by the allied conception of her widowhood. Should one attempt a justification by construing it as a part of the उत्प्रेक्षा, it would not stand. For the potency of the उत्प्रेक्षा has been exhausted in the ascription of the material conch bangle to the spiritual *Sarasvati*. Hence, it is clear that even admitting the prevalence of the conch bangle in *Bana Bhatta*'s time (7th century A. D.) in his country (Behar) it was certainly not in the way in which we find it introduced in the *Naradha*. The latter is typically Bengali. Next, in consideration of *Bana Bhatta*'s extensive travels (for which his own admission in the *Harṣa charita* is the authority) and the peculiar association of *Sarasvati* and conch bangles with Bengal, it would not be unfair to connect his introduction of the conch bangle with the influence of his acquaintance (however imperfect) with Bengal. Or, this may have been influenced by the *Mahābhārata*. Thus our position is unaffected from first to last, and our poet (*Śrīharṣa*) was not only an inhabitant of the country of conch bangles, but was also conversant with the art, as evidenced in the following extract —

ताराशङ्खविलोपकस्य जलजं तीक्ष्णविषो मिन्दतः
 सारम्भं चलता करेण निविडं निष्पीडना लम्बित ।
 छेदार्थोपहृताम्युक्म्युजरजोजम्बालपाण्डुभव
 च्छङ्खच्छिक्खरपत्ततामिह यद्वस्तं गतोऽर्थो विधु ॥ (XIX 57)

Purport —The stars have disappeared. Lotuses are in bloom. The half set moon, hard pressed by the rays of the rising sun, appears like the conch cutters saw white with conch dusts turned into clay by contact with water brought for facilitating the task of incision.

Devotion to the *Sārasvata mantra* after the Tantra also points to Bengal. For, Bengal is not simply the great centre of Tantra it is its nursery. The influence of this *mantra* is fully reflected in our poet's character too. The realisation of the *Chintamani mantra* is the effect of that same. This finds allusion in XIV. 88—90 of the *Naiṣadha* (43).

An examination into the names of Śrīharṣa's works—the names are our only resort in the absence of the named—also points to the same conclusion of his connection with Gaṇḍa or Bengal. For, besides the *Naiṣadha* and the *Khandanakhaṇḍa*, Śrīharṣa is the author of a good many other works. Their names (so far as we know from their mention in the concluding verses of the cantos and in the *Khandanakhaṇḍa*) are—*Sthairyavichara*, *Vijayaprasasti*, *Gaudorivāṅkulaprasasti*, *Arṇava-varṇana*, *Chhinda*-(*Chhanda*) *prasasti*, *Śivasakti siddhi*, *Nṛpa*—(*Nava*—) *Sāhasakacharita*, and *Iśvarābhisandhi*. Of

(43) अवामावानाथैः सकलमुभयाद्वरघटनाद्
 द्विवाभूतं रूपं भगवद्भिषयं नवाति यत् ।
 तदन्तर्मन्त्रं मे स्मरहरमय सेन्दुममले
 निराकार शधन्जप नरपते सिध्यतु स ते ॥
 सर्वाङ्गीणरसामृतस्तिमितया वाचा स वाचस्पति.
 स स्वर्गाय मृगादृशामपि वशाकाराय मारायते ।
 यस्मै स स्पृहयत्यनेन स तदेवाप्नोति किं भूयसा
 येनाय हृदये कृत. सृष्टिना सम्मन्त्रचिन्तामणि ॥
 पुष्पैरभ्यर्च्य गन्वादिभिरपि सुभगाध्याहृतेन मां चे-
 त्रियांतीं मन्त्रमूर्तिं जपति मयि मूर्तिं न्यम्य मय्येव भक्तः ।
 तत्प्राप्तं वत्सरान्ते शिरसि करमसौ यस्य कस्यापि धेते
 सोऽपि दशोक्तानकाण्डे रचयति गचिरान् कौतुक हृदयमस्या. ॥

these, the relation of the Gaudorvis akulaprasasti to Gauḍa is obvious, and while, it may be noted, that we are disposed to understand by the term गौड़ोर्वीश the Gauḍa kings in general, the commentator Gopinatha understood by it a particular king of Gauḍa—viz Vijayasena to whom we shall refer below. In the Nṛpa—(Nava—)Sahasanka charita, the Sāhasanka, with Mallinatha and Narayana, is the name of a Gauḍa king, which however, is not conclusive as the same commentators have also observed that with some this Sāhasanka is Bhoja or Vikramaditya. The Chhinda (with its variant Chhandi) in the Chhinda—(Chhanda—) prasasti is, with commentators, the name of a king not localised. This, therefore, though not supporting our case, is neither opposed to it. Or by accepting the variant छन्द-प्रशस्ति all difficulty is solved. Narayana has even done so and explained छन्द as a treatise on metre. But on examination into the meaning and use of the word प्रशस्ति that reading does not appear to be appropriate. The Arnavavargana whose subject matter is obvious from the name would be most appropriate to Bengal, though not improbable elsewhere. As for the Vijayaprasasti, though the commentators (of course such as were available) are all silent on the point, the 'Vijaya,' assuredly, is the name of an individual—I mean a king. For, to assign the meaning 'victory' would lead to an inaccuracy as observed above in connection with the Chhandaprasasti. If, then, it is the name of a king, it is now for us to determine who the king might be, and of what country. The history of the 12th century designates a Gauḍa king named Vijayasena—the father of the illustrious Vallalasena. Vallala has referred to him in his work entitled 'Dānastigara.' The time of Śrīhara too, on examination, appears to fall somewhere in the same century. For Śrīhara in many places in his Khanḍana has refuted the arguments of the

author of the *kusumāñjali*—Udayanācharya (44), who flourished in the 10th century (45) And Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in his *Tattvachintamani* has refuted the arguments of Śrīhara as embodied in the *khaṇḍana* (46) His time has been ascertained to be the 13th century (47) Thus the two ends of Śrīhara's time being limited, the convention of old writers that they never write on modern works by allowing a reasonable margin on both sides will present something like the same That Śrīhara was never anterior to Vijayasena nor even posterior is testified to by the manner of Gopinatha's specification already referred to Viewed in this light, the 'Vijayaprasasti' too favours the Bengal connection of the author. The *Śivaśakti siddhi*, as appears from the title, treats of a subject bearing on the Tantra, and none need be told of the sway which the *tantra* holds over Bengal. The subject matter of the remaining works is alien, as is manifest from the names, and so not a matter for the present consideration.

Even after this determination of the poet's country one might say that this is conclusive in so far as it proves that he was an inhabitant of Bengal Until, therefore, it is definitely shown that his mother tongue was Bengali, one cannot be convinced that he was a Bengali in the full sense of the term, I mean one born with the instincts of a Bengali The question is the more urgent, as there already exists a tradition that

(44) For reference, see such places as "तद्विदमाहुः 'प्रमाणवन्त्यदृशानि स्वप्यानि सुगृह्यपि' इति । तस्मात्—"; "द्वितीयस्तु व्याघातादेवासम्भवी 'परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकाशान्तरि विवर्तते' इति"; and "तस्मादस्मादित्यप्यग्निरथ न सलु दुपगता । त्वद्गायैवान्ययाकारमक्षराणि क्रियन्त्यपि ॥"

(45) Thus his own word—

तर्काम्बरादृक्प्रमितेऽवतीतेषु नम्रान्ततः ।

वपयूद्यनभक्ते सुरोषां वज्रणावलीम् ॥ *Saka* 906 (A D. 984)

(46) So he says 'इति सगुह्यकारमृतमप्यपस्तम्'.

(47) See Rajendranath Ghosh's Introduction to his 'Navyanyāsa'

connects his nativity with Kanouj and only his domicile with Bengal. The solution will be easy from the mode of his pronunciation noticeable in the poem. It is a well known fact that every vernacular has its own way of pronunciation in respect of certain letters, and Sanskrit which is no longer a spoken language is completely at the mercy of the Vernacular (mother tongue) in this respect. The Bengali tongue, it should be known, observes no distinction in the pronunciation of the three sibilants (श, ष, स), the letters ए, व and य (the last when it begins a word) are in Bengali invariably pronounced like न, ब and ज respectively, the प in क्ष is treated invariably as ख, the प्रिसर्ग is conspicuous by shortness, and there are other such peculiarities holding the Bengali tongue as distinct from others. This trend of our poet has revealed itself through his alliterations. Our poet is exceedingly fond of alliteration. There is hardly a verse where alliteration has not its share, and in most places it partakes of the character of an analogue (यमक) and so cannot be slighted. This fondness of our poet for alliteration or any verbal feat having transcended his poetry has made itself felt even in his philosophy. Two quotations are made from the Khandanakhandā—

(1) तद्वैतयुतेस्तावद् वाच प्रत्यक्षत ज्ञत ।

नानुमानादि तं कर्तुं तथापि क्षमते मत ॥

अद्वैतागमनासीरे साधु सा धु-वती परान् ।

सेवांमवाजयत्यर्थापत्तिपत्ति परम्परा ॥

(2) समस्तलोकशार्ङ्गक्रमन्माश्रित्य नृत्यतो ।

का तदस्तु गतिस्तत्तद्वन्तुभीव्यवहारया ॥

Under such circumstances we may reasonably conclude that, wherever the adoption of the Bengali mode of pronunciation gives us prominent cases of alliterations, analogue-ridden or otherwise, that is there the pronunciation intended

by the poet. The truth of this will be ascertained from the following illustrations —

- 1 य प स—अमी ततस्तस्य विभूयितं सितं (I-57),
अयोगभाजोऽपि नृपस्य पश्यता (I-100), सखा सखायः
स्रवदश्रवो मम (I-136), कटु कीटादशनः सत कंचित् (II-4),
अज्ञासिषु स्त्रीणिशुवालिशास्तं (X-32), बालामभापत सभासत-
तंगहमा (XI-16), अश्वैरश्वैरवेगैः (XII-100), नाशनाति स्नाति
द्वा मोहात् (XVII-41) ज्ञानस्पर्शांतरा मौनमानशे मानसेविनी
(XX-13), चिन्त्राणि विभ्राणितवान् पितृभ्यः (XXII-50).
- 2 ज, य—यनस्तु यं नोऽज्जतु जातु यातु (III-59), उपेयमाधुर्यं
मधैर्यंसर्जि (VI-93), मनुष्यजन्मन्यपि यन्मतो जने
(IX-34), यातुं तनो जातु न यातुधान (X-11), तद्य-
पत्रजन्मा यन्मारुत. (XI-39), जागर्ति यागेश्वरः (XII-38),
यज्ञयूपधनो जज्ञौ (XXII-172).
- 3 ण, न—पुण्येन मध्ये पुनरयजन्म (VIII-33), स्फुरद्दिग्ग-
नन्दमहाणुवैनवैः (XII-2), अमूनि मध्येऽमरानिभंरिषया
(XXII-21)
- 4 व, व—कुलं सुधांगोवहलं वदन् वहु (I-110), स्मरहरः
विममुं वुभुञ्ज विभु. (IV-60) वुवुधिरे विवुधेन्द्रा. (V-60),
त्रिविवुयी वुवुधे न (V-72), स विलोक्य बालाम् (VI-13),
संविभ्रति श्रोत्रयविभ्रमं यत् (VII-100) क्षये जगज्जीवपिधं
शिधं वदन् (IX-124), ।
- 5 क्ष—नलस्य च स्वस्य च सख्यमीक्षते (I-38), अमिख्या
भिक्षाधुना (VII-104), तय सौख्यलक्ष्यः XI-108, ।
माचख्यौ चाक्षि अमुम् (XVII-92), सख्यौ सक्षीमभावेऽ
पि (XX-129)

6. विसर्ग (The peculiarity attaching to the विसर्ग
is prominent in the analogue alone Hence that alone is
considered here) —

आगत्य भूतः सकलो भवत्याभावप्रतीत्या गुणलोभवत्याः (III-115)
 तं संवदत्यङ्कुमृगस्यनाभि-कस्तूरिकासौरमवासनाभिः (XXII-86)
 Miscellaneous—स राशिरासीन्महसां महोज्ज्वलः (I-1)
 असंवरे शम्बरवैरविक्रमे (I-53), अवाह्यमिज्यते
 (II-78), आसन्ननायकविषयणमुखानुमेय (XI-12),
 पङ्कजसख्यशिक्षा (XI-102), सृणीपदसुचिन्हा श्री (XX-58)
 अङ्कुस्थितसज्जशयम् (XXII-2).

Like his fondness for alliteration his fondness for me too is so distinctly manifest in the Naiṣadha, that may be called a regular mania of the poet. A few examples are quoted :—

धार्यं कथङ्कुमरमहंभवत्या वियद्विहारी वसुधैकमत्या (III-15)
 अशक्प्रशङ्कुव्यभिचारहेतुर्वाणी न वेदा यदि सन्तु के तु ।
 (III-78) ।

अपां हि तृप्ताय न वारिधारा स्वादु. सुगन्धिः स्वदत्ते तुपारा ।
 (III-93) ।

तं कापि मेनं स्मरमेव कन्या मेजे मनोभूवशभूवमन्या ।
 (VIII-6) ।

जाता न वित्ते न गुणे न काम सौन्दर्य एव प्रवणः स
 वामः । (X-13) ।

मध्येसमं सावततार बाला मन्धर्वविद्याधरकण्ठमावा ।
 त्रयीमयीभूतवलीविभङ्गा साहित्यनिर्वर्तितदृकरङ्गा ॥ X-73)

Such examples are profuse, not only in the Naiṣadha, but also in the Khandana so poor in verses. It is therefore no wonder that the influence of the Bengali tongue will be perceived in this rhyme too. Thus we have—

वचसामपि गोचरो न यः स तमानन्दमधिन्दत द्विजः । (II-1)
 आस्थितावितयतागुणपाशस्त्वादशा सविदुषा दुरपासः ॥ V-130)
 तस्मिन् विषयार्थपथात्तपातं तदङ्गरागञ्कुरितं निरीक्ष्य ।
 विस्मरतामापुरविस्मरन्त्य. क्षिप्तं मिथः कन्दुकमिन्दुमुख्यः ॥
 (VI-42))

छायासु रूपां भुवि वीक्ष्य नस्य फलं दृशोरानशिरं महिष्यः
(VI—43) ।

चन्द्रागिकैतन्मुखचन्द्रिकाणां दरायतं तत्किरणं दृ घनान् म ।
(VII—44)

यस्य कर्तिव्यदायति स्म सा कर्तिकीतिधितिधीयिनी
स्वसा । (XVIII—22)

कार्तवीर्यमिदुषेण दशस्ये रेणुकेय मयता सुखनाशये ।
(XXI—68)

With regard to this question of pronunciation one might say that deviations too are observable in the Naisadha. Such a one is च ये ..चयम् (See the first half of the concluding verses of the cantos) Or, contending that this forms part of the concluding verse of a canto and the concluding verses have already been shown to be spurious, and also, the marks of the analogue (यमक) are not so conspicuous here, and hence negligible, there is another whose authority is unquestioned and where the marks of the analogue are also conspicuous in the extract—सुपर्वणां हि स्फुट-भायना या सा पूर्वकः फलभायनायाः । (XIV—7) How should that be explained ?

Reply—The question is a little complex no doubt, but not insoluble. In the solution we should first see what is the extent of the analogue, I mean whether it is confined to भायना alone or 'या-या' also is to be included. If it is confined to भायना no difficulty arises. If 'या-या' also is to be included, then the question will be—How to solve the विसर्ग ? For it cannot be separated from the vowel, and if not separated the analogue (यमक) will suffer. The analogue difficulty is solved on admitting the Bengali pronunciation, but that very procedure will establish the Bengali pronunciation of the 'य' as well. Therefore, the analogue here is to be restricted to the भायना portion only and the Bengali pronunciation of य is intact.

Conclusive as the above evidences are in establishing the Bengali origin of the poet, doubts on some minor points are still not unlikely. Such are—(1) his mother's strange name 'Māmalladevi', (2) the addition of 'Mīśra' after his name as found at the end of some chapters of his *Khaṇḍanakhāḍya*, (3) the traces, in many places in his *Naiṣadha* and *Khaṇḍanakhāḍya*, of his acquaintance with Pāṇini (48), (4) his high honours at the hands of the King of Kanouj (foot-note 5), and (5) the appreciation of his poem by scholars in Kashmir (foot note (1)—canto XVI). So these too require to be cleared.

The first doubt attaches to a name and our reply to this is that the name is no authority. Sridharācārya was a Bengali (which is an established fact), yet his mother's name was 'Acbbhokā'. Besides, if the name 'Māmalladevi' is not current in Bengal, neither is it in other countries. So it is not a contrary point. Even supposing it to have a foreign origin, that would be no bar to our conclusion, for even in the modern age of narrowed nationalities instances are not rare of a Bengali being named Janglal or a Hindusthani Venkatachari. About the second point, the surname 'Mīśra' is no proof of one's being a non-Bengali. For, it was so before, and even now many Bengalis are found with 'Mīśra' for their surname. With regard to the third point, *viz* acquaintance with Pāṇini, our reply is that the currency of Pāṇini in the Rajshahi district (Bengal) dates from olden times. The *Bhāṣāvṛtti* of Pāṇini is current only in Bengal. Its author Purushottam was a Bengali. The saying goes that it was written at the instance of King Lakshman Sen of Gauḍa. Also, the *Dhātuvṛtti*, *Dhātupradīpa*,

(48) इह किमुपसि पृच्छाशसिर्किदन्दरूप-प्रतिनिर्यामितवाचा वायसैनेव पृष्ट ।
भग फणिभवदाखे तातड. स्थानिनौ काविति विदिततुहीवागुचरः कोकि-
लोऽभूत् ॥ (XX-60). Also foot-note (4) and (5)

Tantrapradīpa and Kāśikā-vivaraṇa-panchikā (which last goes by the name Nyāsa—of course incomplete) have all been discovered by the Rajshahi Varendra Society and that in Bengal. Besides, the celebrated Naiyāyika Gadādhara Bhattacharya, a Bengali, has in many places in his glosses quoted *sūtras* from Paṇini. As for the last two points relating to Kanyakubja and Kashmir, these are no proofs to the contrary. It is the Indian adage which says विद्वान् सर्वत्र पूज्यते (The learned are honoured everywhere). Honouring the poet is a time honoured custom in India. Distance was never an impediment to it.

My conclusion regarding the Bengali origin of Śrīharṣa finds support in two ancient works also. Rājasekhara Suri in his Prahandhakosha (Harīharaprahandha) says about Harīhara that he was descended from Śrīharṣa and belonged to Gauḍa (49), and Vidyāpati Thakkura—of nearly the same age—says in an anecdote of his Puruṣaparīkṣā that Śrīharṣa was a native of Gauḍa. The anecdote in brief is this —

In the country of Gauḍa there lived a poet and scholar named Śrīharṣa. He composed a poem entitled Nalacharita and to show it to the Pandits for their approval went to Benares. There he read it to a Pandit named Koka. Koka went on hearing, but passed no remark though a greater part of the book had been read to him. Śrīharṣa then asked him: 'Perhaps you are not listening'. Koka said, 'Oh yes, I am. But I reserve my opinion until I hear the whole, when I shall be in a position to judge the work. Afterwards, when the whole had been read, he gave his views and sent him away. (50)

(49) 'गौडदेशीय.' इति 'श्रीहर्षचंन्ने हरिहरो गौडदेश्य.' इति ।

(50) बभूव गौडविषये श्रीहर्षो नाम कविपण्डितः । स च नलचरिताभिधानं काव्यं कृत्वा * * * तत्काव्यं दर्शयितुं पण्डितमण्डलीमुद्दिश्य वाराणसीं जगाम । तत्र च कोकनामानं पण्डितं आचयामास । * * * श्रीहर्षस्तु समनुगच्छन् पठति प्रत्यहम् । तदुत्तरं किमपि नामोति । एषदा श्रीहर्षोक्तम् । भाषं

I shall conclude this second point of my article with an examination into the views (1) of those who by the authority of Rajasekhara Suri's Prabandhakosa (referred to above) say that Srihara was a Pandit at the court of Jayantachandra (otherwise called Jayachandra and Jayachchandra), king of Benares, and at that time Kanouj and Benares were under one rule (51) and so he was a native of Benares or Kanouj, (2) of those who resting on the tradition relating to Adisur, king of Bengal, say that he was a native of Kanouj, having subsequently transferred his residence to Bengal, and (3) of those who on the strength of the tradition which represents him as a nephew (sister's son) of Mammata believe that he was a Kashmiri.

With regard to the first view the question is—Had Srihara been a native of Benares or Kanouj, could he, consistently, have passed over the king of his own country (Benares or Kanouj) and written a chanta or a prasasti of the king of a distant country (Gauda)? If it be said that his Vijayaprasasti refers not to Vijayasen, king of Gauda, but to Vijayachandra, father of Jayantachandra, even then his connection with Gauda (shown above) as revealed in the names of his other works is not solved. Besides, we are

महाकाव्ये कृतश्रमोऽहम् । उत्परीक्षार्थं त्वामुद्दिश्य बुद्ध्या स्वदेशीयवात्सल्येन
च महतो दुरादागतोऽमि । * * * भवान्न निन्दात न चाभिनन्दति । तन्मन्ये
कर्णमेव नार्पयामि । श्लोक उवाच । अहं कथमहं कर्णं नार्पयामि । किन्तु
सम्पूर्णं श्रुत्वा शब्दार्थयोरुद्घापोहेन सन्दर्भशुद्धिं ज्ञात्वा विशेषं वक्ष्यामि ।
कोकपण्डितस्यैव काव्यस्य गुणान् प्रस्तुत्य दोषान् समाधाय विशेषानु-
दोष्य तं श्रीहृषिकेशराजं दृष्टमानसं कृत्वा गृहं प्रस्थापयामास । (Vidyapa-
ti's Purusaparikā)

- (51) Thus Purusaparikā a—अस्ति मागीरधीतरो काव्यकुब्ज नाम नरा म् ।
तत्र दाशीधरो जयचन्द्रो राजा बभूव । Also ततः कापि गत्वा भुजदर्पणं
पौर्यमजयामीति परामृश्य स कुमारः काव्यकुब्ज नाम जनपदं जगाम । तत्र
च श्रीजयचन्द्रनाम्नो राज्ञः काशीरवात्सल्यं भवदपह्निपाट्या दर्शनं चकार ।

still in darkness as to why he should pass over one he is directly concerned with—I mean Jayachandra or Jayantachandra—in favour of his father Vijayachandra. Again, all are not agreed about the name of Jayachandra's father. According to Rajaśekhara his father's name was Govindachandra. With others, Govindachandra was the name of his grandfather. Moreover, the verse that is often quoted in support of the Vijayachandra view (52) has nothing therein to show that it exclusively refers to Vijayachandra and not to Jayachandra. For while the 'son of Govinda (गोविन्दनन्दन)' in the verse means in one view Vijayachandra, it may in the other mean Jayachandra as well. In this way, as also from the fact that at the time of Vijayachandra's expedition (which is said to be the occasion for the verse) Sriharṣa was a boy (this, too, is the version of the same party), and for a boy a verse like the above would appear, if not from the point of composition, at least from the point of conception, unnatural, its reference to Vijayachandra is hard to establish. To this if we add the view of the Prabandhakosa, the matter becomes altogether different. There, when Sriharṣa returned equipped with scholarship for the requital of his father's disgrace, he hailed Jayantachandra with that verse. Thus the connection of the 'Vijayaprasasti' with Vijayachandra can in no way be entertained, and the inconsistency about the title of the book remains unsolved as before. Moreover, in that view where is the solution of those other points (discussed in this paper) that go to establish the Bengali character? Above all, the same authority of Rajaśekhara's Prabandhakosa whose first part 'Sriharṣa Vidyadhara Jayantachandra Prabandha' by reason of its presenting Sriharṣa as a member

(52) गोविन्दनन्दनतया च बहु धिया च मां निमन्त्रये कुरु । कामधिय तरुण्य ।

अस्त्रीकरोति जगता विजये स्मरस्त्रीस्त्री जन पुनरेन विधीयते स्त्रा ॥

(53) See footnote (49)

of the court of Jayantachandra has been made the basis of establishing Srihara's non Bengali origin, by the distinct mention, in its last part 'Harihara prabandha', of the expression 'Harihara in the line of Srihara was a Gaudiya', only confirms our own view about the poet, viz that he was a Bengali.

With regard to the second view, based on the tradition about Ādisur, the first question would be how far it would be possible for a foreigner having come to a place at an advanced age to completely identify himself with it, even to the extent of forgetting the trends of his mother tongue. Secondly, for a rituahstic Brāhmana (for Ādisur brought the five Brāhmanas for the performance of a sacrifice) intensive studies of poesy and philosophy do not, from the point of taste and leisure, commune to reason. Thirdly, from our examination of the titles of Sriharṣa's works we nowhere find any reference to Virasimha who sent him to Bengal. How is this to be explained? Fourthly, the family registers (कुलपत्रिकास) give the name of Sriharṣa's father as Tithimedha,—different from Hira or Sribira. Fifthly, according to genealogist Vanṣivadan Vidyaratna, it was some ancestor of Sriharṣa and not Sriharṣa himself who was among the five Brāhmanas that hailed from Kanauj. This view, therefore, in spite of its conformity to the Gauda connection revealed in the works as aforesaid, cannot be accepted as tenable.

As regards the third view the first objection would come from the historians, who contradict the tradition where it relates to our poet's interview with the rhetorician by saying that the two were never contemporary. Secondly, it is hard to reconcile how when a distinguished Kashmiran critic like Mammata could not accord his approbation, the poem could still be given the credentials of one having won laurels at the learned assembly of Kashmir. Thirdly, the glorification in the

Kashmir honours, as also the alien notion attaching to the direct mention of Kashmir, would naturally expect one to connect these honours with impartial judges of a foreign land. Lastly, this offers no solution of the points going to prove a different view as shown above.

From the aforesaid examination of the three views we come to the following conclusions (1) In spite of the possibility of his having lived in the court of the king of Kāsi or Kanouj, Śrīharsa was never a native of either of those places. (2) Śrīharsa in question was never among the five Brāhmanas reported to have come from Kanouj, and the view that an ancestor of our Śrīharsa hailed from Kanouj does not mar our position whose main point is that the author of the Naisadha was born with the instincts of a Bengali, for the distance of even two or three removes in a foreign land with all communication cut off with one's own country is sufficient for identification with the new place. (3) The alleged relationship between Mammata and our poet, coupled with the peculiar formation of the name मामल्लदेवी which, according to some, approximates a Kashminian name, would at best establish his Kashmir connection on the mother's side, which, considering the peculiar relationship holding between Kashmir and Bengal in those days and comparative relaxation of marriage restrictions, would be no bar to his Bengal connection on the father's side, and that establishes our point.

V — INDIAN DRAMATURGY.

(BY P. N. PATANKAR)—9-3-12

Like most of the स्मृतिः, नीतिशास्त्रः, पुराणाः &c, the नाट्यशास्त्र going under the name of भरत seems to be an enlargement of an original briefer work in the form of सूत्रः, भवभूति actually speaks of a तैय्यत्रिक सूत्र by भरत. The नाट्यशास्त्र speaks of भरत as the lecturer to an assemblage of ऋषिः and contains many verses professedly current in the mouths of the representatives of the particular branches of thought or art with reference to which they are quoted

Though traceable to meanest performances like picture scenes, pantomimes and puppet shows—suggested by the etymology of words like सूत्रधार, and corroborated by existing remnants of those crude types yet to be seen in the less refined quarters of the country,—the drama in the early age to which we might trace the नाट्यशास्त्र had reached a stage of undoubted perfection so far as the detail of acting as well as decorative appurtenances went, to say nothing of the poetic art and the study of poesy in its abstrusest details

The arts connected with the representation of the drama represent of course the type of refinement the society had reached From the practical aspects of engineering applied to architecture, the various industries that supplied the means and materials of stage arrangements and decorations to the construction of musical instruments of a large variety of shapes and structures, the mind and hand of man can both be easily seen as hardly inferior to the perfections of any society one might imagine either past or present

If effectual performance is the end of dramatic representation, भरत's teachings can never be excelled by any thinkers and students of the science and art of dramaturgy.

The नाट्य therefore has been appropriately raised to the dignity of a वेद and in the early beliefs about the source of anything that is perfect in its conception or virtue, this वेद has been rightly attributed to ब्रह्मन् himself, just in the same way that that god was the inspirer of the great वाल्मीकि in singing the story of राम.

भरत obtained the नाट्यवेद and performed for the pleasure of the gods and demigods or demons representing their own exploits. The असुरसः including गन्धर्वs of heaven are his assistants and from them sprang a class of performers on the earth. They were esteemed by ब्राह्मणs and नृपs and perpetuated the art in the world. जयदेव of the प्रसन्नराघव speaks of the actors as an inferior class to ब्राह्मणs, the special terms indulgently allowed to be used by नटी and सूत्रधार towards each other as श्याय and श्याया might imply an inferiority, but the inferiority does not seem to have amounted to untouchableness in the festive dinners; मैत्रेय in the मृच्छकटिक is invited to dine at the सूत्रधार's, the सूत्रधार of the मुद्राराक्षस allows a dinner to be given to ब्राह्मणs by his wife. Learning even in the sacred lore is not denied to that class, as can easily be gathered by reference to any of the known dramas.

As already hinted, the society for whom the नाटक was performed was of the most refined श्याय classes, and an adaptation to the taste of the time and the condition of the society is a principle that shows how perfect the ideals were both in the case of the Actors and that of the audience. Nor was this वेद denied to the शूद्र class. In the literal attitude of the भगवद्गीता (स्त्रियो वैश्यास्तथा शूद्रास्तेऽपि यांति परां गतिम्), it was even intended for their enlightenment.

If poetic justice means anything, it is fully maintained in the भारतीय ideal of the नाट्य. The नाट्य must be an honest picture of existing phenomena (in the moral and

spiritual world more especially, the physical being often left to the imagination) and the possibilities from them. The drama *must have a moral aim*. What could be superior to the conception of the matter? Everything that would mislead offend or corrupt is to be eschewed from the representation. Nothing could be more touching than the care of the guardian of the souls of the receptive spectators when he warns you against what may harm the sensibilities and thoughts of the innocent souls.

Unlike the modern ways a dramatic performance was not a very frequent affair. Only important occasions were availed of for the performance and usually the aspicies of some powerful patron were sought by the profession. It was a solemn affair, not a mere entertainment. It was therefore commenced with proper 'pomp and circumstance from the religious point of view. It was thus a quasi religious performance. Worship and prayers and sacrificing preceded the representation and the effect could be expected to be correspondingly great.

The sage takes care to teach with the very elements and beginning with the units of measurement, he details, the construction of the theatre in a thoroughly practical and scientific spirit. It is interesting to note the principles of every art that bears on the author's main subject. Some of these will be treated further below.

Every care is taken to propitiate the spiritual powers from beginning to end of every main part of the whole business. The choice of place and time and persons in safeguarding the spiritual side in full keeping with the existing superstitions is enjoined and full practical directions given about the measurement material and structure with all the minor particulars required for the convenience of situations in the acting.

All materials required to make the apparatus needed for the scenes, the directions to construct the same, the personal decorations including costumes jewels, have been given in full detail, that throws immense light on the fashion of social life of a very important period of Aryan history. Lists of these are interesting in a variety of ways.

The drama involves poetics, music singing and dancing. The last as a matter of fact is intimately connected with the very idea of acting. The author has devoted abundant space and patience to the treatment of these four subjects. Each of these has given rise to different branches of study in later times. The *साहित्यदर्पण* treats fully of poetics including general poetry as well as particular. Technical works exist on singing and musical instruments especially the *सुदह*—arts familiar in the courts of India. A reading of these would throw light on the obscurities in the understanding of the tunes of the songs in some of the older dramas as well as the nature of some technical terms that but for this as an original authority would be unintelligible. It is true that a thorough appreciation of the details is almost impossible, but the chapters on these subjects serve as a mine from which much valuable matter is discoverable.

The details of *अभिनेय* (inclusive of the modulation of the voice) can never be surpassed. The observation both of the nicer shades of acting and of the corresponding effects is a matter belonging solely to the province of genius and in everyone of the above branches, the power of the Indian mind indicates the possibilities which set forth hidden treasures of the soul. Later authors could not give all the detail, that is too vast to follow but yet too valuable to be neglected.

It has been already said that Actors made a separate caste. Males and females both acted on the stage. Pro-

fessional female dancers and female singers are mentioned, but the वेश्या or harlot class must be considered as a distinct one from the भरत caste. The dancing girls are even spoken of as high born.

The acting of female parts by male persons and vice versa was in vogue to a little extent. But the sexes seem most usually to play their own parts, the females belonging to the भरत caste of course being the female players. While the वेश्या or गणिका is a separate class altogether, though she was notwithstanding her profession held respectable in the social scale. वसन्तसेना's mansion and honourable position are a sufficient instance in point.

For the history of language, of society and of different peoples in the geographical situations, much research is possible with the help of भरत's नाट्यशास्त्र. Names of countries, of peoples, of particular features and fashions among the variety of nationalities are matters of supreme interest to the student of history. The study of prosody given here will suggest the stages in the history of Sanskrit and Prakrit that will be very useful in determining the periods of development or otherwise in the variety of languages described or illustrated. There are numerous miscellaneous features that deserve attention.

The worship of gods can very nearly be traced as mediaeval between Vedic worship and later image worship, a kind of the गृह्य rites with the later and local superstitions. गणपति and महागणपति in their later characters are nowhere, while the now neglected ब्रह्मन् as a deity worshipped in image is highly prominent.

नक्षत्रs seem to have been the common expression of popular astronomy instead of the more popular राक्षs of the later times.

Numbers of miscellaneous points may be noted. सरस्वती is spoken of as हरिप्रिया, कपायचमन is an ill omen नाडापुडी used in modern worship seems to have had an early origin, श्मश्रुकर्म has been prescribed for particular purposes. While technical terms belonging to the fine arts occur in innumerable details and form in themselves an indication of the taste and intellectual development of the age represented in the work

The नाटक is of course the principal subject. The abstract as well as concrete features of the subject find perfect expression here and the history of the Sanskrit drama can start from this work as the most valuable material. As already noted, the drama being a काव्य, भरत has detailed all the characteristics of the काव्य on which later writers on the subject have amply drawn to make their own systems.

There is some question with regard to the unities.—But the idea of the Greek unities is almost absent because of the free spirit in which the Indian drama was conceived and constructed. The question has been started with the assumption that India owes something to Hellenic models in the art. The unities are naturally given up in so far as there may be no need for them, the Elizabethan drama in English did so and the Sanskrit drama did that in the early age.

Some early dramas have been mentioned in the नाट्यशास्त्र. Some are hinted later on by Patanjali. अमृतमंथन, त्रिपुरदाह, बलिबन्धन, कंसवध &c. are instances.

The age of the writing of the नाट्यशास्त्र is an interesting question. There is no doubt that Kalidasa had known it well. भवभूति did know, but he speaks of भरत as the तौर्पत्रिसूत्रकार. भवभूति has made use of the poetic fact of the machinery of the अष्टरस being employed by भरत. Worship of ब्रह्मन् is mentioned by कालिदास. The triad of ब्रह्मन्, विष्णु and महादेव has been recognised. The point of नक्षत्रs being used for sacred purposes and not राशिs lends data in inferring the date. We must at any rate go behind कालिदास, i. e. behind the fifth century in settling the date of the work.

A more careful and patient study will enable one to develop all these subjects more fully.